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Abstract 
Russia started to export hydrocarbons to Western Europe in the middle of the Cold War, and 
for a long time, despite their ideological differences, Russia was considered to be a reliable 
energy supplier. Starting from the early 2000s, EU-Russia energy relations were transformed 
from a mainly economic dimension to a political one. Currently, energy trade is seen as part 
of national security for both Russia and the European Union (EU). The central question of this 
study: is how EU-Russia energy relations have become highly securitised?  This thesis 
approaches this problem from the perspective of a critical reading of securitisation theory. 
Following Balzacq (2005) and Fierke (2007), the securitisation process is de-constructed into 
the follows elements: securitisation actors (in Russia and in the EU), the speech act 
(negotiation of energy security to the audience), context of securitising (economic, political, 
and cultural), the consequences of securitisation, and the potential for de-securitisation. The 
thesis applies combination of quantitative and qualitative methods for data collection and 
analysis. The thesis uses an interpretive constructivist account and a methodology which 
integrates that theory with the specific methods of inquiry. It uses some quantitative 
analysis, but rests primarily on a qualitative approach consistent with its roots in the Critical 
Security Studies (CSS) literature.   
The extensive analysis of EU-Russia energy relations demonstrates that the 
securitisation of energy relations resulted from a number of factors which are not necessarily 
directly connected with energy security. For instance, the Russian government securitises the 
energy sector because of its importance for Russian economic development and, 
consequently, its political stability. At the same time, the securitisation process within the EU 
is more complex and involves the clash between the supranational and national levels, and 
between the member states with different level of dependence on Russia. The national 
security and collective memory played an important role in the securitisation process in both 
Russia and the EU. For example, the media analysis demonstrated that the securitising actors 
use the shared knowledge to negotiate energy security threats to the audience. As a result of 
the securitisation process, both Russia and the EU have securitised energy policies and try to 
diversify energy demand and supply. This thesis demonstrates that the EU-Russia energy 
relations would benefit from managed de-securitisation and a move towards the 
international governance of their energy relations (via institutions and international 
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agreements). The thesis recognizes throughout that there are fundamental differences 
between the Russian government and the EU as energy policy makers; but at the same time 
there are sufficient similarities between the securitisation process in each that the theory 
can be applied to both. However, the aim is not to make comparative study of the similarities 
of the two institutional frameworks so much as to draw out the implications for energy 
security of their differences. 
The thesis is original because it: (a) rests on a set of wholly original interviews 
conducted in English and Russian in a range of a range of countries and institutions; (b) 
deploys a distinctive critical reading of CSS in both its theory and methodology; (c) draws 
original conclusions from the research; and (d) suggests policy implications which follow 
from these conclusions.    
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This thesis focuses on the securitisation of energy relations between Russia and the 
European Union (EU) and is based on the theoretical assumptions of Critical Security Studies 
(CSS). In particular, this work draws upon the critique of the Copenhagen School of Thought 
suggested by Balzacq (Balzacq, 2011; McDonald, 2008). The energy relations between Russia 
and the EU are complex due to their different understandings of energy security. This thesis 
looks at the problem of securitisation from different angles, looking at different securitising 
actors in Russia and the EU, the communication of security threats to the audience, and the 
consequences of securitisation on the overall state of the energy relationship between Russia 
and the EU.  
The end of the Cold War has posed the urgent need for security studies to redefine 
the understanding of security, because the meaning of security as a concept has changed 
(Krause, et al. 1997: 223). CSS emerged in the 1990s as a part of critical theory in academic 
International Relations. It shifted the focus of security from the narrow realist definition of 
security from the military perspective to a wider range of threats. It is the securitisation 
process which transfers a particular issue into a securitised threat. Barry Buzan defines 
securitisation as “the negotiation of security act between the securitiser and the audience” 
(Buzan, et al. 1998: 26).  Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde write that “the senses of threat, 
vulnerability and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively absent or 
present” (Buzan, et al. 1998: 57). The power to decide what is real in politics is crucial: “the 
ability to dominate the defining of reality is a step towards dominating politics” (Booth, 2007: 
184). According to critical research traditions, “truth is always situated and implicated in 
relations to power” (Denzin, et al. 1998: 292). In other words, securitisation is the extreme 
point of politicisation (Fierke, 2007: 99). Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate the high levels of 
securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations.  The threats to be securitised are different 
depending on space and time. This thesis aims to de-construct the question of power and 
interests in energy security construction in EU-Russia relations. It is not enough to look at this 
problem from the traditional state-centric position. Despite the fact, that states play a crucial 
role in the decision-making process on energy related issues, the interests of other actors are 
important as well (energy companies, supranational  institutions). Moreover, it is important 
to consider the impact of national identity on energy policies in both Russia and the EU.  
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Context 
It was oil supply interruptions from the Middle East in the 1970s which demonstrated the key 
importance of access to energy resources at a time of growing energy consumption (because 
of growing world population and industrial development) (Paffer, 1980: 158) and demand 
which demonstrated the key importance of access to energy resources (Wionczek, 1983: 
839). The events of 1973 and 1979 have changed the perceptions of energy availability 
(Paffer, 1980: 155). Some experts agree that it was the 1970s Oil Shocks which brought 
energy to the international security agenda (Ikenberry, 1986: 105).  The two oil shocks which 
took place in 1973 and 1979, during the Cold War, demonstrated for Western energy-
importers that “the probability of Soviet tanks rolling across the north German plain is much 
lower than the likelihood of an interruption of oil supplies” (Nye, 1980: 133). On the 
contrary, Western countries saw the opportunity to diversify their energy supply by buying 
oil and gas from the Soviet Union. Until that period of time, the USSR was not that interested 
in the export of energy resources to the international market. Soviet leaders who had to 
cover big expenditures internally and support allied states saw the opportunity in the energy 
market to gain income. Moreover, around the same time new large oil and gas fields had 
been discovered in Western Siberia (Baev, 2008: 18). Since then the Soviet Union, and after 
1991, the Russian Federation has been a reliable energy supplier to the EU. However, in 
2000s EU-Russia relations gradually became more securitised and politicized.   
The global context of the late twentieth to early twenty-first century brought a new 
escalation of energy trade. Hydrocarbons are important for development of industry and 
they will retain their leading position in the near future, even considering the development 
of alternative energy sources and energy efficiency policies (Milov, 2008: 1). Energy 
availability became an important part of national security for many states because of the 
growing imbalance of access to energy resources throughout the world. For instance, Milov 
provides us with the following statistics: 12 countries (Russia and OPEC member-states) with 
only 6.5 per cent of global GDP control more than 80 per cent of the total proven 
hydrocarbon reserves. At the same time the countries producing 75 per cent of global GDP 
control only about 10 per cent of oil and gas (Milov, 2008: 1).  This imbalance creates a 
feeling of insecurity among energy consumers, who are afraid for the future availability of 
energy resources and the possibility of energy producers exploiting the energy trade as a 
mechanism of foreign policy.  
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In the 2000s the Russian government was severely criticized for increasing control of 
the extensive energy reserves in the country and for using the ‘energy weapon’ to fulfill its 
foreign policy ambitions. Oil and gas sales have enabled Russia to build the Stabilization 
Fund, to support the social sector and to pay off its international debt. However, the early 
2000s brought a new wave of securitisation to energy relations between Russian and the EU. 
The main reasons were: series of transit rows with Ukraine and Belarus (2006, 2007, 2009) 
(discussed in chapter 4), increased prices for the Commonwealth of the Independent States 
(CIS), and Russian ambitions to regain the great power status, by consolidating the energy 
sector under state control. Russian attempts to rebuild its economy using revenues from high 
hydrocarbon sales to the EU contradicted the Western pledge for liberalization of oil-and-gas 
markets and the reduction of levels of governmental interference. Chapter 3 demonstrates 
that the Russian government increased its control over the energy sector for domestic 
(political and economic reasons) rather than as a potential foreign policy tool. 
Some experts (Proedrou, 2012: 8) agree that the energy sector is a part of national 
security in the majority of states, because of its influence on economic development. 
Because the energy sector is influencing all the spheres of state life, from the economic to 
the social, energy security is a priority for both Russian and European governments. For 
instance, the Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2020 defines energy security as 
an important element of national security (Energy Strategy of Russia up to 2020). In 2007 
energy security was also at the top of the EU agenda. There was even the idea of the creation 
of an ‘Energy NATO’ to ensure energy supplies in Europe (Goldthau, 2008: 687). Energy 
security can be defined as the adequacy of energy supply at a reasonable price, in other 
words energy should be physically available and its price should be reasonable (Haghighi, 
2007: 14). Prices are considered to be reasonable if they “stop short of causing severe 
disruption of normal social and economic activity” (Deese, 1979 – 1980: 140). However, 
there are differences in the understanding of energy security between energy-importers and 
energy-exporters. For exporters it is mainly the security of demand (the guarantee of stable 
market demand on energy resources at fair prices) (Borovskiy, 2008: 12).  For importers 
energy security is focused on the security of supply (Borovskiy, 2008: 13).  Security of supply 
can be divided into system security and quantity security. System security is the guaranteed 
energy supply (through the structure of delivery systems, and quantity security is adequate 
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energy volumes, price and levels of diversification (Spanjer, 2006: 2890).   
Russia and the EU demonstrate high levels of interdependence, since the EU is the 
main importer of Russia’s energy. Self-sufficiency of the EU in energy consumption is 
gradually falling (in 1997-2007 the EU-area self-sufficiency in oil consumption declined from 
24 per cent to 16 per cent, and in natural gas from 56 per cent to 40 per cent). As a result 
energy import requirements are rising. At the moment, the EU imports about half of its 
energy requirements and this will increase up to 80 per cent by 2030 (Proedrou, 2012: 57). 
Currently, Russia is providing the EU with one-quarter of its gas and 40 per cent of its total 
energy requirements (Tekin, et al. 2009: 339 – 340). The EU depends on three main energy 
supply regions, one of which is Russia, and at this moment it would be difficult for the EU to 
diversify its energy supplies (Tekin, et al. 2009: 352). However, it is important to mention that 
the EU member-states vary in the level of their dependence on Russian gas. Andreas 
Goldthau divided European consumers into two groups on the basis of their dependence 
levels on Russian energy supplies. The first is ‘old’ Europe, which is less dependent on Russia 
and imports less than half its requirements from Russia (Germany is the biggest consumer in 
this group with 46 per cent import share); the second group consists of the so-called ‘new’ 
European states, which are significantly more dependent on Russian supplies. For instance, 
the Baltic Republics, Poland and the Czech Republic import around two-thirds of their 
supplies from Russia (Goldthau, 2008: 687).    
 In its turn, according to various sources, 58 per cent of Russian oil exports and 88 per 
cent of its natural gas were destined for the EU in 2003 (Haghighi, 2007: 342).  Exports to 
Europe are the main source of income for Gazprom, which has to maintain low prices on 
domestic gas market (European prices are 6 times those of Russian domestic prices). In 2003, 
65 per cent of Gazprom’s revenues were from European sales (Spanjer, 2007: 2891).  
Moreover, oil and gas exports together comprise around 15 per cent of Russian overall GDP 
(Tekin, et al. 2009: 340). The Energy Strategy of Russia emphasizes the importance for Russia 
to diversify the export routes to the north, east and south in order to lower its dependence 
on the European market (Energy Strategy of Russia up to 2020). These projects will take long 
a time to develop, which is why Russia is highly interested in the European energy market, 
since its loss would harm the Russian economy. 
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It is important to mention transit issues as an important element in energy security. 
Around 7 per cent of the world’s energy supplies transit through the territory of third 
countries (Mironov, 2003: 153). In the case of gas, it would be especially difficult to diversify 
supplies because of the transportation limits: there must be a physical link between the 
producer and consumer with very little possibility for alternative routes (Haghighi, 2007: 13). 
Pipelines are the most effective way of gas transportation (for a distances of less than 
3,500km), but due to the energy producer’s lack of control of the pipeline on the territory of 
the transit state, there is a risk that the pipeline could be damaged, or the gas supply could 
be stopped or used for the needs of the transit state. The security of energy transit depends 
on every single element in the chain (producer, transit state, and consumer) (Mironov, 2003: 
150-151).  Around 95 per cent of Russian gas supplies transit through the territory of at least 
one country before reaching its consumers in Europe. Ukraine is among the most important 
transit states for Russian exports, because around 80 per cent of Russia’s gas exports go 
through Ukrainian territory. This creates transit risks for both Russia and Europe (Spanjer, 
2007: 2890).  
Facility dependence is rooted in the former monopoly system of gas supply (Weisser, 
2005: 2). Previously, up to the 1990s, there was a centrally controlled system of energy 
resource transportation not only in Eastern Europe but also in Western Europe. The post-
Cold War geopolitical changes and creation of new transit states has led to the escalation of 
risks, including short cuts in energy supplies, commercial losses, transit disputes and political 
integration (Mironov, 2003: 151). These risks are the main reason for the alternative pipeline 
projects construction such as the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea to minimize the 
dependence on the transit states. All this demonstrates the high levels of interdependence 
vulnerability (Keohane, et al. 2001: 35) between Russia and the EU. The vulnerability is 
connected to “the relative availability and costiveness of the alternatives that various actors 
face” in the interdependent relations (Rogerson, 2000: 421). In this case the less vulnerable 
actor will have more control over the situation and policy developments (Keohane, et al. 
1973: 160).  
Structural risks are also connected with the transportation limits mentioned above, 
especially in the case of gas, where the diversification of supply is limited due to the pipeline 
system of transportation and cost of the construction of new pipelines. Hellmuth Weisser 
16 
 
also connects the structural risks with the shifting role of government in guaranteeing energy 
security (Weisser, 2005: 2).  Currently there are two main actors in energy sector: private 
companies and national ones, controlled by the government (Kokoshin, 2006: 26). The 
security of the old monopoly system of gas supply was guaranteed by the monopolist and 
supporting government. Recently, the system has changed to a more liberalized one 
(Weisser, 2005: 2). In the last 15–20 years a majority of governments have rejected the use of 
state energy companies (Kokoshin, 2006: 26). This means that “the responsibility for security 
of supply has shifted away from governments to the market players” (Weisser, 2005: 2). 
However, it is the large national companies who are taking the leading role in the better 
projects and competing for the new fields. Some countries are closed to foreign investment 
in the energy industry (for example Saudi Arabia and Mexico) (Kokoshin, A. 2006: 26). Some 
would argue that government should still control the energy supply, because the energy 
industry is of key importance for industrial development and the population’s well-being in 
the majority of countries (Weisser, H. 2005: 3).  
In Russia, the state has been blamed for ‘repressions’ of the private sector in the 
energy industry and its consolidation in state hands. However, it is important to remember 
that the private sector represented in the Russian energy production belonged to the so-
called ‘oligarchs’ who established business on the basis of former Soviet enterprises and have 
been managing them in an extensive way by the exploitation of the old Soviet infrastructure, 
getting as much income for themselves as possible without either investing into the 
development of the industry or paying taxes (due to the failures of the Russian political 
system in the transition period) (Simonov, 2006: 78). In the 2000s, the Kremlin re-
consolidated the energy sector under state control. According to the opinion of Russian 
leaders the income from oil and gas sales is the way for the reconstruction of economy. It is 
important to understand that Russia has a different understanding of security from the 
energy-importing states. The Russian understanding of energy security is presented in 
Chapter 3 in more detail.  
Energy exporting states argue that international energy security is focused mainly on 
the interests of the energy consumers, in other words security of supply. Of course, the four 
groups of dependence risks which are described above are true for the security of demand as 
well. Any interruption in energy supplies threatens the interests of energy-producers as well 
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since it will lead to revenue losses. However, there are some other risks which threaten 
mainly the security of producers. Some OPEC experts argue that the focus on guaranteeing 
security of supply is negatively influencing security of demand, or the security of energy 
exporting states (Kokoshin, 2006: 32-33). It is expected that energy producers should have 
reserve capacities to ensure energy supplies in case of any kind of crisis (Kokoshin, 2006: 33).  
 Among other risks are market failure due to the interdependence between energy 
exports income and economic development of energy producing states. Countries where a 
lot of energy resources are located often focus their economy primarily on the energy 
producing industry, which creates dependence of economic development on energy prices. 
At the same time, some of the energy producing states keep energy prices at a low level for 
domestic consumers and use export revenues to subsidize the domestic sector, without 
reforming the economy to boost the development of other industries apart from energy 
(Mironov, 2003: 137). This phenomenon is known as the ‘Dutch Disease’. This term appeared 
in the 1980s after the discovery of gas in the North Sea in 1970s (Enders, et al. 1983: 473).  
The example of the Netherlands and later of other resource-rich countries demonstrated the 
possibility of decline in the non-resource sector of a national economy as a result of 
increased wealth from energy sales (Oomes, et al. 2007). High revenues from energy exports 
endangers “the survival of the traditional export and import-competing industries and may 
even lead to de-industrialization” (Enders, et al. 1983: 473). 
The Russian economy illustrates this particular problem. Energy is an important 
source of income for Russia, taxes from oil companies providing around 25 per cent of 
Russia’s tax base (Jaffe, et al. 2001: 134). The Russian government is the biggest shareholder 
(51 per cent) of Russian gas monopolist, Gazprom, 51 per cent of whose revenues go to the 
Russian treasury. The state of the Russian economy is thus closely connected with the state 
of the energy market. For instance, the fall in oil prices in 1998 resulted in a fall in Russian 
revenue from oil sales, which in turn contributed to the serious downturn of the country’s 
economy. Conversely, the rise in oil prices in 2000 resulted in an extra 70 per cent of revenue 
for Russian oil companies and accordingly an additional US$8.1 billion in tax for the Russian 
state (Jaffe, et al. 2001: 134). The Russian government sees energy sales as the main means 
of economic reconstruction. It is argued that the energy sector became the key to Russian 
economic reconstruction after Putin came to power in 2000. According to the Russian 
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government Russia’s abundant raw material resources are the basis for the continued 
development of the Russian economy. It is the “extraction, processing and exploitation of 
mineral and raw minerals” (Putin, 1997) which can provide the essential material for Russia’s 
economic growth.   
 The dependence of economic development on energy revenues creates additional 
pressure for the maintenance of high productive and extraction capacities in order to keep or 
increase money inflow from oil and gas sales. Even large fields of energy resources will 
sooner or later be exhausted. Fields to be developed are often located in difficult geological 
and climatic conditions, which make the production process more difficult and expensive. It 
means that energy – producers must constantly invest a lot into the development of new 
fields (Goldthau, 2007: 687). The maintenance of high productive capacities and their 
increase is very important, not only to meet the contractual conditions for existing 
customers, but also for new ones. Security of demand for energy exporting states as well as 
security of supply for energy importing ones is connected with the possibility of exports 
diversification. Russia would face significant difficulties if the EU were to re-orientate to 
other suppliers (even thought it would be difficult to do in the near future) or increase usage 
of alternative energy sources. That is why the question of demand diversification is a very 
important one (Kokoshin, 2006: 36).  
Research question 
The main research question in this thesis is: how is it that energy trade between Russia 
and the EU reaches such a high level of securitisation? To answer this research question, 
the thesis utilizes the assumptions of critical theory and CSS to see how the threats to 
energy security are constructed and what could be done to overcome the contradictions 
between Russia as energy-producer and the EU as energy-consumer in order to provide 
the ground for the further development of energy relations (de-securitisation). In 
particular, this thesis applies the securitisation theory based on the Balzacqian critique of 
the Copenhagen Theory. The securitisation happens on two levels: the level of agent and 
the level of act. To answer the research question, this thesis looks at the securitisation 
process at the level of agent by looking  at Russia (Chapter 3) and the EU (Chapter 2), and 
the level of act (Chapter 4), and finally evaluates the potential approaches to de-
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securitisation (Chapter 5).  
The analysis presented in this thesis will fill a gap in the academic literature, which 
is often influenced by the personal background of the author (either pro-European or pro-
Russian). The access to a wide range of published literature in both Russian and English 
languages, in addition to the choice of theory and methodology, and the opportunity to 
introduce the opinion of high-level officials in the field of energy policy both in Russia and 
in Europe will provide an original contribution to knowledge. 
Aims and objectives 
This research project aims to: 
1. Evaluate and critique existing literature on EU-Russia energy relations. 
2. Building on this critique, to explore the political securitisation of EU-Russia energy 
relations through empirical study, including extensive interview and qualitative 
analysis, based on the assumptions of critical theory (see below for more detailed 
explanation of the theoretical and methodological grounds of this research). 
3. Evaluate the significance of this empirical analysis for an understanding of EU-Russia 
energy relations, giving an original account framed in a distinctive CSS approach.  
Indicative Literature Review 
The review of the existing literature is continued throughout the thesis. However, it is 
important to locate the thesis within the spectrum of the existing literature on EU-Russia 
energy policy. This section begins that task. Two extreme ends correspond with the two 
different definitions of energy security: energy security of supply and demand. Some of the 
Western authors look at the problem from the perspective of energy consumer and often 
label Russian energy policy as a threat to the European energy security (Baran, 2007). On the 
other side, some Russian authors approach the problem from the Russian perspective of an 
energy-producing state, and blame the EU of trying to impose European values on Russia 
without taking into consideration Russian interests (Simonov, 2006). Below are discussed 
examples of academic works, which are situated on the extreme ends of the spectrum. Zeyno 
Baran is one of these authors who claim that Russia uses the energy supplies as a political 
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weapon. In her article EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage she criticizes the EU 
for lack of unity in regards to energy policy towards Russia. She argues that: “Moscow is 
pursuing divide and conquer strategy of amassing bilateral deals with member states. This 
disunity allowed Moscow to preemptively block European attempts to construct transport 
routes for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas that do not involve Russia” (Baran, 2007: 
131). Keith C. Smith shares Baran’s criticism of bilateral energy deals between Russia and the 
individual member states (Smith, 2007: 1).  
Both Baran and Smith criticise the individual member states (in particular, Germany, 
Italy, and France) for securing energy deals with Russia on a bilateral level, in spite of the EU’s 
attempts to develop common policy towards Russia. According to these authors Russia is 
bending the rules and negotiates the deals with the governments of the separate member 
states in order to increase the European dependence on Russian energy deals and sabotage 
the diversification projects. Marshall Goldman is another author, who shares similar views 
and writes about Russian energy policy as a political game. Throughout his book ‘Oilopoly: 
Putin, Power and the rise of the new Russia’ he claims that Russia tries to use dependence 
on Russian energy supplies as a lever in political dialogue with the EU. For instance, he 
compares Russian attempts to access the Asian markets to a blackmail strategy aimed to 
influence the EU. He implies that Russian negotiations with China ought to demonstrate to 
the EU countries that the amount of Russian gas available for the European market could be 
reduced due to the growing demand for it from the East (Goldman, 2008: 163). Moreover, he 
argues that not only is the EU vulnerable to Russian energy policy, but potential Asian 
customers as well. He writes that if China starts buying gas from Russia, Beijing “is likely… to 
find itself becoming as vulnerable as Europe to the possibility of political pressure and on 
occasion blackmail” (Goldman, 2008: 163). All of these authors see Russian energy policy as a 
part of Russian foreign policy. However, this approach is too simplistic: to understand the real 
motives behind the developments of Russian energy policy, it is important to take into 
consideration the other side of the story and to look at the potential threats and risks to 
Russian energy security as well.   
Russian authors situated on the opposite end of the spectrum often explain the EU-
Russia energy relations differently from the European ones. For example, both Simonov and 
Rahr acknowledge the high levels of governmental interference into the energy sector. 
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However, they present the close interconnection between the state and the energy sector as 
a necessity for the economic development of Russia. Simonov argues that Russia’s energy 
policy is not an attempt to use energy sales as a political weapon, but an attempt to use the 
energy reserves to benefit the economy (Simonov, 2006: 233). Simonov argues against the 
criticism of the dependence of the Russian economy on the energy sector. He says that 
“energy reserves are an advantage, rather than a disease” (Simonov, 2006: 233). However, 
not all Russian authors share this opinion. For instance, Andrej Kokoshin expresses concerns 
about the high levels of dependence of the Russian economy on raw resources (Kokoshin, 
2006: 50). Moreover, he argues that it is extremely important for Russian energy security to 
diversify its energy supplies and open up the Asian markets more in addition to the European 
one (Kokoshin, 2006: 50). Most of the authors, including Anton Olejnov are concerned with 
the decrease in oil and gas production and the depletion of the major gas fields (Olejnov, 
2008: 432). Despite the fact that Russian authors voice similar concerns to the ones 
expressed by the Western European sources (investment problem, depletion of the oil and 
gas reserves), they rarely criticize Russian foreign energy policy. For instance, the Russo-
European academic discourse on the issue of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is almost as 
intense as the political one on the same issue. For instance, Alexander Shkuta argues that the 
ECT is beneficial only for the energy consuming states, but has mainly negative implications 
for Russia. He is mainly critical of the Transit Protocol and says that its ratification would 
result in the reduction of the Russian share of the European energy market (Shkuta, 2008: 
163). This opinion is shared by other Russian authors, including Yurij Borovskij and Tatjana 
Romanova. Borovskij writes that the Energy Charter could benefit the EU-Russia energy 
relations if some of its provisions could be revisited (Borovskij, 2008: 198). Romanova 
expands on this by saying that it is important for the EU not to try to impose its values on 
Russia, but work together as partners to achieve the compromise (Romanova, 2008). 
European authors take different approaches. For example, Amelia Hadfield (2012) writes that 
Russian criticism of the ECT is based on the misinterpretation of the ECT provisions. This 
thesis looks at the ECT in more detail in Chapter 2.  
Among the authors who are trying to approach the EU-Russia energy relations in a 
more balanced way are: Jonathan Stern, Pami Aalto, and Andreas Goldthau. Goldthau takes a 
more cautious position on Russian energy policy as compared to the Western authors 
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described earlier. His earlier article Rhetoric versus reality: Russian threats to European 
energy supply could be considered a response to authors such as Smith and Goldman 
mentioned above. In this article Goldthau critically evaluates the myths about Russian 
threats to European energy security (Goldthau, 2008). Among other things, he argues that 
the level of the European dependence on Russian energy supplies is over-emphasised 
considering that Russia is even more dependent on the European energy market.  He 
acknowledges that energy policy is a part of Russian foreign policy, but says that “Russia is 
simply following a path that the United States, Japan and a number of European countries 
once took” (Goldthau, 2010: 25). He explains the Russian government’s support to 
“Gazprom’s expansion strategies abroad” (Goldthau, 2010: 31) by the high importance of the 
oil and gas industry for the Russian economy. He also disagrees with the opinion that the 
energy security is “in which one country’s energy security is another’s lack thereof” 
(Goldthau, 2010: 2). Goldthau sees the solution to the extreme politization of the energy 
trade in the further liberalization of the energy market through international governance. 
However, this may require liberalization of Russian energy sector, including Gazprom, which 
would be not acceptable to the Russian government. Thesis agrees that greater international 
cooperation is important, but it is just a part of a solution. For the international cooperation 
to be successful all the actors involved should be interested in it. At the moment all the 
attempts of the EU and Russia to strengthen international governance of the energy trade is 
undermined by the clash of interests and values. Simonov said in his interview “in reality, the 
EU-Russia energy dialogue is two monologues, where both sides are failing to hear each 
other” (Simonov, 2010). These rival arguments embody aspects of a valid interpretation, but 
it is an oversimplification to present accounts of Russian-EU energy policy or the intentions 
behind them as wrapped in a simple direct opposition, as later discussion in this thesis will 
evidence.  
An interesting solution to this problem is suggested by Aalto. In his analysis of EU 
energy strategy he evaluates the importance of values for the development of European 
energy strategy. He looks at different processes which affect the energy policy construction 
within the EU, including different perspectives of individual member-states on Russia as an 
energy producer. His chapter European Perspectives for managing dependence argues that 
such factors as historical context, level of dependence, as well as different levels (regional, 
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institutional, state and company ones) affect negatively the development of EU-Russia 
energy relations. His idea of European energy society, which should include both Russia and 
the EU is similar to the central argument of this dissertation: Russia and the EU need to work 
on the development of common values, norms and institutions in order to overcome the 
constraints to the energy trade caused by the extreme securitisation. Aalto applies the 
concept of the international society suggested by the English School of thought to EU-Russia 
energy relations (Aalto, 2009). He argues that at the moment the EU tries to create an Energy 
Security Society, but leaves Russia outside of its borders. Russia will not follow these rules, 
because they overlook Russian interests. To reach this stage it is important to look at the 
roots of the securitisation process. Chapter 5 of this dissertation unpacks these ideas in more 
details as a part of a broader discussion on de-securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations.  
Stern, the former director of the Natural Research Programme of the Oxford Energy 
Institute for Energy Studies, is one of the leading experts on the Russian natural gas industry. 
His book The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom focuses on the development of the Russian 
gas industry since the late 1990s. He looks at both internal and international aspects of 
Russian energy policy. Stern’s offers a very balanced insight on Gazprom’s investment 
strategy to the development of new gas fields and infrastructure in Russia. The majority of 
other authors (for example Smith and Cameron) who argue that due to the inability of 
Gazprom to invest into development of new supergiant natural gas fields, Russia may 
experience difficulty keeping its contract obligations to the EU. As compared to this opinion, 
Stern argues that Gazprom tightens the investment budget due to the economic recession, 
when the demand for hydrocarbon supplies declined for economic reasons as well. 
Therefore, Russia is in no immediate danger to fail in meeting its contract obligations. This 
thesis reflects on these ideas in both Chapters 3 and 5. Stern’s work provides in-depth 
analysis of the Russian gas industry and trade in natural gas with Europe. However, his 
approach to the analysis of energy security is different from the one applied in this 
dissertation. He focuses on technical and economic elements of energy policies, which are, 
indeed important, but overlook such important elements of security construction as national 
identity, values and collective memory.  
Stern, Aalto and Goldthau are among the authors situated in the middle of the 
academic spectrum. These authors try to produce more balanced overviews of the EU-Russia 
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energy trade, without presenting energy security as a zero-sum game between energy 
consumers and energy producers. Despite the fact that their ideas are very useful, there are 
a certain limits to the approaches suggested by them. First of all, even though these 
approaches are more balanced, they are still approaching the problem from the energy 
importer’s point of view. Stern focuses on the practical, economic part of energy security, but 
this research demonstrates that in the current situation the energy trade is highly securitised. 
The representative of the German Ministry of Economics said in his interview with this 
author that: “energy trade with Russia is affected by politics” (the German Ministry of 
Economics representative, May 2011). That is why this thesis takes into account political and 
socio-cultural aspects of security. Goldthau and Aalto do look at different dimensions of 
energy security, but they focus on the regulations of relations between Russia and the EU 
through the promotion and strengthening of international norms and institutions. The aim of 
this dissertation is to deconstruct the securitisation of the EU-Russia energy trade and to 
separate the factors leading to the high levels of securitisation and polarization, in order to 
understand how these problems could be approached to reach the final stages of the de-
securitisation process (discussed by Aalto and Goldthau). To answer this question, this 
dissertation looked at the works of the authors whose area of expertise is not energy 
security, but Russian and European politics and economics.  
It is important to deconstruct Russian energy policy into separate components: 
economic, political, and societal. Without this understanding the analysis of Russian foreign 
energy policy would be inaccurate and simplified. Some of the Western literature is highly 
critical on the influence which the Kremlin has over the Russian energy sector. For example, 
the Yukos affair is often presented as a crusade on private capital aimed at regaining 
governmental control over the industry. It is difficult to say that this is an entirely wrong 
assumption, but this issue is more complex than it may seem. Professor Richard Sakwa, a 
specialist in Russian politics and governmental structures, is one of the experts who studied 
the Yukos case in detail. Sakwa’s works are generally useful for understanding Putin’s place in 
the transformation of Russian energy policy in the mid-2000s. His book The Quality of 
Freedom: Khodorkovsky, Putin and the Yukos Affair (2009) provides a detailed overview of the 
consolidation of the energy sector under governmental control in general, and the Yukos 
issue in particular. He returns to this subject in his later work The crisis of Russian Democracy: 
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The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession (2010) he looks at the Yukos affair 
in the broader context of Putin’s attempts to transform the Russian political elite. He claims 
that from one side Putin wanted to ensure the regime’s prerogatives over the economy and 
the media, but at the same time hoped to create a new business elite loyal to the 
government, which could “act as a counter-weight to siloviki” (Sakwa, 2010: 144). This 
allowed Putin to avoid ‘becoming a hostage’ to one powerful and homogeneous group of 
political elite. As well as other authors, Sakwa defines Putin's regime as the central driving 
force in shaping Russian energy policy. This opinion is shared by other experts such as Philip 
Hanson and Heiko Pleins.  However, they look at this issue from a different angle, the 
economic one.  
Hanson is an expert on the Russian economy and EU-Russia economic relations. He 
looks at the importance of energy sector for Russian economy. He writes that the first decade 
of the 2000s was definitely a success story for the Russian economy, which among other 
things contributed to the improvements in the quality of life for many Russians. According to 
Hanson, the proportion of the population living in poverty reduced from over 40 per cent in 
the 1990s to 12 per cent in the mid-2000s (Hanson, 2009: 24). Energy export revenues are 
the main contributing factor in the economic growth of the previous decade. Hanson also 
looks at the down side of Russian economic success, which is the dependence of the Russian 
economy on the energy sector. He writes that “oil, gas and metals have accounted recently 
for around 80 per cent of merchandise exports. As far as tradable goods are concerned, 
Russian manufactures engaging mainly in making import subsidies” (Hanson, 2009: 29). This 
makes Russia especially vulnerable to energy price fluctuation. Considering that (due to the 
dual pricing policy) most Russian energy revenues come from the European market, it is very 
important for Russia to keep its share of the European energy market.  
To summarize this review, this thesis is situated in the middle of the spectrum of the 
existing literature on the subject, and aims to present a distinctive overview of EU-Russia 
energy relations, without presenting an extreme point of view (presenting either Russia or 
the EU as the main ‘architect’ of the securitising process).  
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Originality 
This dissertation provides an original contribution to knowledge, including some original data 
obtained through the empirical research: including a series of important original interviews. 
The extensive literature review revealed a gap in the existing literature on EU-Russia energy 
relations. This gap is caused by the biased coverage of the problem depending on the 
position of the author (either pro-EU or pro-Russian). The aim of this dissertation is to help 
to fill this gap by providing a more balanced analysis of the securitisation of the EU-Russia 
energy relations. The claims to originality are strengthened by the choice of the theoretical 
framework: the securitisation theory based on the assumptions of the Copenhagen School of 
Thought and its critique by Thierry Balzacq. This theory has never been applied to this topic 
before. The choice of theory contributed not only to the originality, but also to the 
significance of this research, because it resulted in the analysis of such factors as national 
identity and collective memory, which are often overlooked in discussions on energy security 
construction. Finally, the empirical research conducted in both Russian and English languages 
produced original findings and conclusions. Below is a more detailed overview of the 
originality of this dissertation. 
EU-Russia energy relations are well covered in the academic literature. There is a great 
body of academic work devoted to this subject in one way or another (briefly described 
above). Nevertheless, the literature review conducted for this dissertation discovered a gap, 
which this study aims to fill. Fillippos Proedrou writes about the literature on energy security 
as follows: 
“There is a bias in the literature to deal with the energy security of importers 
and not the exporters. This is because most of the scholarly work done deals 
with the energy security considerations of the West, which is comprised 
mainly by importing countries” (Proedrou, 2012: 3) 
This observation is valid, and this thesis will argue, even the most moderate and balanced 
scholarly work (Goldthau, Aalto), which takes the position of the energy producers into 
consideration; looks at the problem from the perspective of the energy security of supply. At 
the same time the majority of literature published in Russian language is also biased and 
focuses on the energy security of demand, and Russian interests (Simonov, Yakovenko). As a 
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result energy security is presented differently depending on the background of the author. 
This thesis aims to provide a more balanced overview of the EU–Russia energy trade. It is 
important to investigate the background and perspective of both sides to have a deeper 
understanding of the existing problems in energy trade between Russia and the EU. This 
dissertation argues that it is important to study both the perspective of the energy consumer 
and energy producer when analyzing the existing problems in the EU-Russia energy relations. 
This dissertation fills the gap in the existing literature by combining the analysis of Russian 
and European perspectives on energy security. Only the balanced analysis of the situation 
could provide an answer to the main research question of this dissertation: how the EU-
Russia energy relations became highly securitised. To answer the research question and to 
achieve the aims and objectives of the study specific theory has been selected, which also 
contributes to the originality of this dissertation. 
The theoretical framework is based on the assumptions of critical theory and CSS. 
Aristotle wrote, that a man cannot exist outside of the cultural context, we can assume that 
theorists also cannot as one’s position is also influenced by ideology, culture, and political 
and social context (Knutsen, 1997: 6). Critical theory uses contextual analysis of security; in 
other words different historical context creates different understandings of what security is 
(Knutsen, 1997: 6). Because the concept of security depends on the local political context, it 
can be argued that security is neither unchanging nor semantically homogenous (Knutsen, 
1997: 6). This thesis evaluates how the different political and socioeconomic context of 
Russia and the countries of the EU influence the development of energy trade between 
them. This dissertation uses the concept of the securitisation based on the critique of the 
Copenhagen School. The theoretical framework is discussed further in Chapter 1. The 
approach consists of two levels:  
1. The level of agent: the securitising actor, whose authority is recognized by the 
audience, and who has the power to present an issue as a threat; the context of 
securitisation; and the audience. 
2. The level of act: the linguistic process of negotiation of a threat to the audience and 
the context of securitisation. 
The detailed account of the theoretical approach is presented in detail in the theoretical 
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chapter of this dissertation. The choice of theory used in this dissertation allows us to look 
critically at energy security construction in both Russia and the EU, and to evaluate how such 
factors as national identity and collective memory, the domestic political and economic 
situation, and the clash of interests of different actors (states, energy companies, European 
institutions) contribute to the high levels of securitisation of the EU-Russia energy relations. 
Despite the extensive coverage of the energy security and the EU-Russia energy relations in 
the academic literature, this topic has never been analyzed through the perspective of the 
securitisation theory used in this dissertation. 
T imeframe 
At this stage it is important to mention the timeframe of this study. The thesis covers mainly 
the time period starting from 1999 onwards (from the moment Putin came to power for the 
first time). This choice is explained by the changes in Russian energy policy which began in 
the early 2000s. Current Russian government is presented as the major securitising authority, 
which put domestic and foreign energy policy on the top of the security agenda in Chapter 3 
of this dissertation. Despite the fact that this dissertation focuses on the last two decades, it 
is important to look at the historical background to understand the roots of the current 
problems in EU-Russia energy relations. In particular, one of the sub-sections of Chapter 3 
(Russia as the securitising actor) looks at the history of the FDI in Russia. The material 
presented in this section is collected from both Russian and English language sources, and 
demonstrates how the rights of foreign investors in Russia have been overlooked ever since 
the Bolshevik revolution. Seventy years of the Soviet Union’s hostility towards foreign 
investors formed the negative public opinion towards the participation of foreign capital in 
the development of Russian strategic industries (energy, military). Chapter 3 argues that this 
collective memory was used in the speech act by the Russian government to justify the 
introduction of the law of strategic industries in 2005). Chapter 2 offers another example of 
the importance of national identity and collective memory for the analysis of the 
securitisation of the EU-Russia energy relations. Chapter 2 includes an explanation of the 
historical problems in relation between Russia and Poland to explain how the historical 
difficulties between Russia and former members of the Warsaw Pact contribute to the 
securitisation of the EU-Russia energy trade after the Eastern Enlargement of the EU. This 
discussion on symbolic elements contributes to the significance of this study, because the 
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literature review (p. 19-26) demonstrates that the symbolic elements of energy security 
construction is often underestimated in the analysis of EU-Russia energy relations. 
The theoretical framework shapes the structure of this dissertation. The chapters are 
constructed around the definition of security as a speech act: Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted 
to the level of agent in the EU and Russia (accordingly), Chapter 4 looks at the level of act 
and looks at media coverage as a speech act, and Chapter 5 is concerned with the 
consequences of the securitisation of energy relations and evaluates the possibility of de-
securitisation of these relations in the future. The methods used to collect and analyze data 
to answer the research question and to achieve the aims of this research, contribute to the 
significance and originality of this study. For instance, the conclusions based on the media 
analysis of Russian and European media contribute to the significance of this dissertation. In 
the case of Russia, some of the major mass media sources take a pro-governmental point of 
view due to the funding sources. Considering the significance of the Russian government in 
shaping the securitisation process in Russia, the coverage of the issues relevant to energy 
security by pro-governmental media could be considered as justification of the securitising 
actions to the audience. The qualitative and quantitative analysis of the mass media sources 
(analysed in Chapter 4) in Russia and in the EU demonstrate that the issues of EU-Russia 
energy relations are presented differently to Russian and European audiences. For example, 
the media analyses demonstrate that different actors are presented as responsible for the 
transit conflict between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009. Russian newspapers blamed 
Ukrainian political competition for the crisis, and European sources reported that Russia 
failed to fulfill its contract obligations. These conclusions illustrate how the speech act is used 
to shape the public opinion and to negotiate the threats to energy security to the audience.  
This thesis benefits from the accessibility of literature, legislation and interviews 
conducted in Russian and English languages. The interviews conducted in Russia, Brussels 
and Germany contribute both to the significance and the originality of this work. The 
interviews with the representatives of Gazprom and the European Commission covered such 
issues as transit conflicts with Ukraine, the question of the FDI in Russia, and the ECT. All 
these issues are widely discussed in the literature and in media. However, the mirror 
structure of these interviews and the comparative analysis of the response given helped to 
achieve significant results. In particular, the analysis of the interviews supports the argument 
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that energy security is constructed differently in Russia and the EU due to the different 
priorities and the influence of the different internal factors. As a result, the EU and Russia 
interpret each other’s behaviour on key issues differently. For instance, Russian reluctance to 
participate in the ECT raises concerns in the European Institutions, but is explained as the 
rational choice in Russia.  
One special contribution to the originality is based on the analysis of the interviews 
conducted in the Altai Territory of the Russian Federation on the construction of the pipeline 
“Altai” from Russia to China. Among the interviewees were the representatives of Altai 
Gazprom, the government of the Republic of Altai, Non-Governmental Organization “Altai 
21st Century”, and the scientists and engineers engaged into the development of the pipeline 
route. The negotiations on the new gas deal between Russia and China began in 2006, and 
are mentioned in the literature (Lotspeich, 2010: 111-112), but the extensive analysis of the 
internal discourse on this pipeline is not covered in any of the existing academic sources (at 
the moment of writing up and submission of this dissertation). The analysis of these data 
provides an important insight on the development of Russian external energy policy, and is 
important for the study of EU-Russia energy relations. It contributes to the discussion on 
possibility of the diversification of Russian energy exports away from the European market 
and on EU-Russia energy interdependence. The detailed analysis of this subject is presented 
in Chapter 5. 
Understanding of the reasons and roots of the securitisation process is essential for 
the analysis of the future developments of EU-Russia energy trade. This understanding can 
be a basis for a more detailed study on de-securitisation of energy relations. This thesis looks 
briefly at the potential ways of de-securitisation in the final chapter (Chapter 5); however, 
more detailed study of this would be valuable in the future. In particular, the potential 
positive impact of EU-Russia cooperation on energy efficiency and energy saving technology 
transfer can contribute to the improvement of overall energy relations between Russia and 
the EU member states. Building on the claims to originality described above, this thesis offers 
an argument, which contributes to its originality: despite high levels of energy 
interdependence and the potential for mutually beneficial energy cooperation, EU-Russia 
energy relations are highly securitised. The narrow explanation of the problem focuses on 
the clashing interests of the energy producer (Russia) versus the energy consumer (the EU). 
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This argument is distinctive for a number of reasons: it fills the gap in the existing literature 
by providing more balanced overview of the problem; it draws on the original empirical 
research; and it is grounded on the theoretical approach, which has never been applied to 
this problem before.  
Chapter Outline 
The first chapter of the thesis establishes the theoretical framework of the study, including the 
theoretical approach and research methodology. The thesis applies the securitisation theory of the 
CSS. Chapters 2 and 3 study the level of agent suggested by this theory: in particular, how political, 
economic and societal context is interpreted and used by the securitising actors to securitise 
energy policy. Chapter 4 looks at the level of act: how security threats are negotiated to the 
audience. Chapter 5 evaluates the consequences of the securitisation on the energy trade 
between Russia and the EU, and the potential ways for de-securitisation. 
 Chapter 1 ‘Theory and Methodology’ presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
The thesis is grounded in the assumptions of CSS, in particularly the concept of securitisation. The 
chapter explains how this theoretical perspective can be applied to the discussion of the energy 
trade between Russia and the EU. The second part of the chapter is devoted to the methodology 
used in the thesis. 
Chapter 2 is entitled ‘The EU: securitising actors and agency’. This chapter explains how 
the EU contributes to the securitisation process. In particular the chapter how the lack of 
a coherent Common European Energy Policy and clashing priorities and perspectives of 
the individual member states contribute to the securitisation of EU-Russia energy 
relations.  
Chapter 3 ‘Russia as a securitising actor’ describes how the current Russian government 
contributes to the securitisation of the energy trade with the EU by putting the emphasis on 
energy sales as a way to reconstruct the Russian economy. In particular this chapter 
focuses on the legislation on FDI and the high level of state control of the industry. The 
chapter also includes a historical overview of the development of the energy sector in 
Russia to demonstrate the broader context of securitisation. 
Chapter 4 ‘Securitisation as a speech act: media analysis of print media coverage of the gas 
price dispute between Russia and Ukraine’ looks at another level of the securitisation theory 
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suggested by Balzacq: the level of act. This chapter studies how the threats to energy security are 
negotiated to the audience in Russia and the UK, and indicative analysis of broader European 
media frame. The author compares how the price dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 
January 2009 has been presented to the audience in Russia, in the UK and in the EU 
member states affected by 2009 gas spat through media analysis.  
The final chapter is devoted to the reasons for and strategies of de-securitisation. The first 
part of the chapter outlines the negative consequences of energy relations securitisation, 
including the controversial supply and demand diversification projects, and its implications for 
future EU-Russian energy relations. In the second part this chapter suggests ways to 
overcome these negative consequences. The final part of the dissertation is the conclusions, 
which explains how far the research questions have been asked, which some critical reflections of 
the process of research.  
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Chapter 1 
Theory and Methodology 
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Introduction 
This chapter presents the theory and methodology used in this research. The theoretical 
framework builds on the assumptions of critical theory and CSS. A critical understanding of 
security allows for the effective study of energy relations between Russia and the EU in all its 
complexity. In particular this thesis uses the securitisation theory based on the Balzacqian 
critique of the Copenhagen School. The definition of security as a speech act, which was 
originally suggested by the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al., 1998) and developed further by 
other critical thinkers (Balzacq, 2011; Macdonald, 2008) allows us to deconstruct the 
securitisation process on the level of agent and the level of act and to answer the main 
research question: why the EU-Russia energy relations are highly securitized? To answer this 
question one need to take into consideration not only practical political and economic 
problems in energy relations, but also how they are interpreted and presented to the 
audience with the use of symbolic elements (national identity and collective memory) as part 
of the construction of energy security in both Russia and the EU member states. Critical 
theory emphasizes the importance of contexts (historical, social, political, and cultural) for 
understanding the processes in international relations. These contextual differences are 
among the key reasons for the lack of understanding of the policies of each other between 
Russia and the EU which have led to the growing feeling of insecurity and, consequently, the 
escalation of the securitisation of energy trade. Chapters 2 and 3 address these issues in 
more detail. This chapter looks at the broader context of critical theory and defines the 
specific theoretical approach and methodology of this thesis. 
Broader theoretical background 
The securitisation theory applied in this thesis is grounded in broader theoretical context of 
the critical theory and the CSS. Before describing the specific approach to securitisation 
selected for the analysis of EU-Russia relations it is important to briefly introduce the broader 
theoretical background. The core ideas of critical theory were originally developed in the 
1920s by the group of scholars from the Institute of the Social Research at the University of 
Frankfurt. This group included Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse (See: 
Horkheimer, 1972; Marcuse, 2001) who are also known as the Frankfurt School. Horkheimer 
criticized the scientific approach of the traditional theory, which does not take into 
consideration the impact of the researcher’s interpretation of datum (Horkheimer, 1972: 
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244). He writes that “every datum depends not on nature alone but also on the power man 
has over it” (Horkheimer, 1972: 244). Critical theory appeared in post-World War I Germany 
and the first theorists focused their attention on “the changing nature of capitalism and the 
mutating forms of domination that accompanied this change” (Zou, et al. 2002: 87-88). 
However, critical theory is not a unified approach (Held, 1980: 14). This makes it difficult to 
give a single definition of critical theory as there are so many different critical approaches 
which try “to avoid too much specificity since there is room for disagreement among them” 
(Zou, et al. 2002: 89). David Held writes that “each of the critical theorists defended the 
possibility of an independent moment of criticism” (Held, 1980: 15-16).  
Critical theory offers an alternative to the traditional theoretical concepts in the 
discipline of International Relations (IR). It is concerned that the problem-solving theories try 
to explain the world from different immutable factors (human nature, anarchy of the 
international system and so on). From the critical perspective there is nothing immutable: 
the system is subject to change, depending on the historical and political context (Linklater, 
2007: 47). History provides a number of examples of how the ideas about what is real have 
been changing from one generation to another. It proves that nature and time are not 
features of reality out there, waiting to be discovered by human minds, but are inventions of 
the mind (Booth, 2007: 183). According to Robert Cox, critical theory has to be more 
reflective on the process of theorizing itself and must be clearly aware of the perspective 
which gives the rise to theorizing. It is theory of history in the sense of being concerned not 
just with the past but with a continuing process of historical change (Jahn, 1998: 617). In 
other words the process of interpretation, or hermeneutics, is very important in critical 
theory. Critical theorists argue that the hermeneutical act is the link in the chain of the 
understanding which transforms what has been observed into the conclusion, or our 
understanding of reality (Zou, et al. 2002: 97). John B. Thompson describes this as follows: 
“hermeneutic interpretation is a circular process which requires the preliminary provision of 
an interpretative scheme that anticipates the final result” (Thompson, 1981: 81). The 
problem of the hermeneutic circle involves a number of stages of research process, including 
epistemology, ontology and axiology of research. This chapter elaborates on each of these 
points in more detail. 
Critical theory also aims to change traditional understandings of security. Security is 
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about feeling safe from harm and danger (Fierke, 2007: 13). For a long time military security 
took the central stage in international security studies. During the cold war, realism was the 
dominant approach to security studies with the focus on states and their ability to use 
military power as well as the questions of preparation for and/or prevention of war. To put it 
simply, in the traditional Realist perspective, security is survival. But the post-Cold War years 
have brought new issues onto the international security agenda. The growing concern over 
such problems as global poverty and climate change, means the security agenda has been 
broadening. Moreover, for many, the focus of security is shifting from the state to the 
individual. The position of a state as the only referent object of security has been 
fundamentally questioned. States are often failing to fulfil their duty of providing security for 
their citizens: modern history knows many examples when the internal situations in general 
and governmental policies in particular are the main source of instability for the individuals. 
Such dangers include poverty, overpopulation and economic recession (Booth, 1991: 318). It 
was the appearance of CSS which allowed a more complex analysis of security. 
CSS appeared in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union brought new 
issues to the agenda of international security. The traditional Realist perspective which 
dominated the field of security studies for most of the fifty years of the Cold War era, 
associates security with military power. Like critical theorists, Critical Security theorists 
discuss the importance of historical and political context for understanding the object of 
security (Burchill, 2005: 139).  It was the arms race between the USA and the USSR which put 
the military aspects on the top of the security agenda. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
other theoretical approaches have begun to dominate IR. CSS aims not only to broaden the 
security agenda, but also to deepen it. Booth describes the deepening by “implications and 
possibilities that result from seeing security as a concept that derives from different 
understandings of what politics is and can be all about” (Booth, 1994).  
To put it simply, different understandings of what politics is, creates different 
understandings of what security is (Williams, 2005: 136). CSS poses the following key 
questions: what is the referent object of security? (not only states should be included); what 
made the referents insecure?;  and how security can be achieved? At first the label CSS was 
used for all approaches in the wide range of security studies which are critical towards 
traditional Realist understanding of security (Williams, 2005: 136). Critical Security 
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approaches include several directions developed by different theorists on the basis of critical 
theories. The Copenhagen School represented by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (Buzan et al. 
2009; Buzan et al. 1998) emphasize the importance of post-structuralism and constructivism 
for CSS. Another approach within CSS is the Welsh School, which is often associated with 
Booth (Booth, 2007) and Richard Wyn Jones (Jones, 2001). Among other representatives of 
CSS are two Canadian scholars, Michael C. Williams and Keith Krause (Krause, et al. 1997). 
This thesis uses the Balzacqian critique of the Copenhagen School, which expands the 
definition of security speech act to include such issues as symbolic and contextual attributes 
of securitisation. Balzacq argues that securitisation theory is largely constructivist in its 
nature. However, since there are different constructivist approaches, it is important to 
distinguish what type of “constructivism is present in securitisation” (Balzacq, 2010). The 
differences between constructivist approaches are rooted in different ontologies and 
epistemologies. According to Balzacq, the constructivist approaches could be described as 
modernist and critical ones. The modernist relies on positivist methodology, and critical is 
more hermeneutical in its nature. However, the successful securitisation theory need to 
combine both perspectives into an approach defined by Balzacq as “pragmatic securitisation” 
(Balzacq, 2010). Below this approach is described in more details.  
Security as a speech act 
The Copenhagen School represented by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (Buzan et al. 2009; 
Buzan et al. 1998) emphasize the importance of post-structuralism and constructivism for 
CSS. Waever and Buzan argue that an issue becomes a threat because it has been securitised, 
brought into the realm of security. ‘Security’ is thus a self-referential practice-a real 
existential threat does not necessarily exist but is presented as such a threat (Buzan et al. 
1998: 24). This definition has certain limitations for which the Copenhagen School has been 
criticized by other authors. For instance, Balzacq writes that “the assumption of a speech act 
approach ultimately reduces security to a conventional procedure such as marriage and 
betting in which the “felicity circumstances” (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the 
act to go through” (Balzacq, 2005: 172). The Copenhagen School’s definition of security as a 
speech act assumes that in principle, any actor has an opportunity to securitise any issue, 
which might be considered as an existential threat, or the concept of security is open. 
However, the securitising actor has to negotiate an issue with the audience, which has to 
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accept the definition of the issue as an existential threat, which may require the extra-
ordinate measures. And not all the actors have the possibility (power/authority) to construct 
an issue into a threat (Balzacq, 2005: 514). This process of negotiation between the 
securitising actor and the audience is ‘the security speech-act’ or the process of 
securitisation (Balzacq, 2005: 514). 
It is important not to reduce the concept of security speech act to a simply linguistic 
act. As it was described above just presenting an issue as a threat [linguistically] will hardly 
make this claim acceptable by the general audience. This thesis applies more complex 
understanding of security speech act suggested by Balzacq and summarized below. According 
to Balzacq the securitisation process has two levels: level of agent and level of act (Balzacq, 
2005: 172). The level of agent is dependent on three main factors: audience (its willingness 
to accept the securitisation measures offered by the securitising actor), context (current 
environment influencing how the events are interpreted) and securitising agent (capacity for 
convincing the audience) (Balzacq, 2005: 192). The level of act, in turn, depends on two 
levels: “action-type” (language used in communication with audience) and context (the same 
as on the level of agent: current environment) (Balzacq, 2005: 178). Chapters 2 and 3 look at 
the level of agent in Russia and the EU, and Chapter 4 looks at the level of act. It is important 
to explain briefly how each of the sub-elements (actor, audience and the context) are 
understood in this thesis.  
Relationship between the securitising actors and the audience 
The key question is who has an authority to define and construct energy security. 
Overall there are different levels of securitisation: individual, middle and the system one. In 
case of the EU-Russia relations the middle level represents the securitising actors, and the 
individual level represents the audience. The middle level refers to a collective political actor 
(often, but not always state). This level represents securitising actors, because the issues 
related to the energy security are most often decided by the national governments. 
Securitising actors need to negotiate security to the audience. That is why the individual level 
plays a certain role as well, because the consequences of the energy policy decisions do 
affect individuals (the energy shortfalls after Russian-Ukrainian crises of 2006, 2007 and 
2009). ‘Individual’ is not an abstract idea that is not grounded in any context (Krause, et al. 
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1997). Booth writes the following: “we do not come into the world as formed individuals but 
are constructed out of the interaction between our individual genetic makeup and the 
various social structures in which we develop” (Booth, 1994). It is important to explain, how 
this research understands interrelations between the securitising actors and the audience in 
relation to security construction. 
All people exist within some socio-cultural context (community, ethnic group, state), 
and the construction of threats is often influenced by this context. Both the securitising 
actors and the audience are integrated and interconnected by this context. Even though a 
state is no longer the only actor in international politics, it still is important in creating and 
maintaining structures of authority and responsibility that contribute to human security. To 
some extent states shape the securitisation context. This thesis does not share the 
traditional, Realist perspective which makes security “synonymous to citizenship” (Krause, et 
al. 1997: 43), when a state is protecting its citizens from the threats which come from the 
citizens of foreign states, in other words insecurity is created by the anarchy of the 
international system. Individuals are represented in this system only as the citizens, in other 
words the elements of the bigger whole, the sovereign state (Krause, et al. 1997: 43). 
However, history provides us with numerous examples when the main dangers to the 
individual come not from the citizens of a foreign state, but from the authorities of their own 
state (Krause, et al. 1997: 43). CSS argues that states do not always implement international 
obligations and distribute goods and services among its citizens. The lack of order within the 
state could be accompanied by economic and social collapse, lead to civil war and mass 
migration (Buzan, et al. 1998: 145). That is why it is important to critically analyse the actions 
and decisions of the state to evaluate which of these actions are aimed at protecting the 
interests of the individuals, and which actions may lead to instability and insecurity in future. 
For example, Chapter 2 of this thesis concludes that the energy policy of the current Russian 
government (including the securitization of EU-Russia energy relations) is designed to ensure 
economic and political stability of the state, however its implementation may lead to 
economic vulnerability in the long term. It is important to look at the context of the 
securitisation to understand the securitisation process better. 
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Context of securitisation  
Both the level of agent and level of act include such an important element as context, 
or current environment which affects the securitisation process. It is the idea of context 
(social, historical, and political) which distinguishes the CSS from narrow realist 
understanding of security. During the Cold War Realism was the dominant approach to 
security studies with the focus on states and their ability to use military power as well as the 
questions of preparation for and/or prevention of war. Realism as one of the problem-solving 
theories tries to explain the world from different immutable factors (human nature, anarchy 
of the international system and so on). From the critical perspective there is nothing 
immutable: the system is subject to change, depending on the historical and political context 
(Linklater, 2007: 47). History provides a number of examples of how the ideas about what is 
real have been changing from one generation to another. It proves that nature and time are 
not features of reality out there, waiting to be discovered by human minds, but are 
inventions of the mind (Booth, 2007: 183). It was the arms race between the USA and the 
USSR which put the military aspects on the top of the security agenda. The growing concern 
over such problems as global poverty and climate change, means the security agenda has 
been broadening and the traditional understanding of security has been fundamentally 
challenged. In other words, different understandings of what politics is, creates different 
understandings of what security is (Williams, 2005: 136). The context of securitization is not 
homogeneous, but includes different interconnected levels. For example, when talking about 
the securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations, it is possible to distinguish factual and 
constructed context. For example, the high level of dependence on a specific energy 
consuming market or energy producing state is the example of factual context, but the 
interpretation of this dependence is often constructed by the securitising actors to convince 
the audience in the necessity of the specific policy decisions.    
It is important not only to consider current economic and political context, but also to 
analyze how this context is interpreted and why it is presented in a specific way. To achieve it, 
this thesis uses the concept of symbolic power, originally developed by Pierre Bourdieu, and 
applied to the analysis of securitisation process by Balzacq. Symbolic in this case doesn’t 
mean insignificant or secondary, but refers to use of symbols, images, collective memories in 
order to shape the reality in a specific way. In relation to security it could be argued that the 
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symbolic elements are used to create the narrative of securitisation, make it acceptable for 
the audience. Bourdieu (1991: 181) wrote the following about it: “the proposals (motions, 
platforms, programmes etc) are immediately subjected to the approval of a group and thus 
can be imposed only by professionals capable of manipulating ideas… in such a way as to 
ensure that they gain the support of a group”. Due to the significance of this concept for the 
analysis of the level of agent in Chapters 2 and 3, it is essential to expand on the meaning 
and implications of symbolic power in general and in relation to securitisation theory in 
particular.  
Identity plays an important role in the speech act through the so-called “symbolic 
attributes of securitisation” (Balzacq, 2011: 17), utilized by the securitising actors to convince 
the audience of the existence of a threat which requires extraordinary measures. It is 
important to explain how identity is understood in this thesis. Buzan et al. writes that 
identity is “the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as 
members of the community” (Buzan et al 1998: 119). Identity is not homogeneous: even 
with the same community the multiple identities may exist (ethnic, language, political and 
professional groups) (Buzan et al. 1998: 120). It is important to emphasise that this thesis 
doesn’t argue that there is a single Russian and/or European identity. On the contrary, 
multiple identities exist both within Russia and the EU member states. Nevertheless, these 
identities are of key importance for the analysis of the securitization process: they shape the 
behaviour of securitising actors and the audience, and enable the use of symbolic attributes 
of securitisation. Balzacq writes that the actor’s “behaviour is a structured set of self-
attitudes made of internalized roles and statutes… In other words, actions are externally 
constrained, released from anterior and pre-existing social structures” (Balzacq, 2002: 478). 
In securitisation process identity plays two important roles: affect decision-making process 
and enable the negotiation of security to the audience.  Williams writes that symbolic power 
has two aspects “the utilization of a specifically dominant system of abstract symbols and 
concepts *…+and the occupation of a socially recognized position of symbolic power from 
which it can be spoken” (Williams, 2007: 66). Identity is not only used by decision-makers to 
get support for their policies, but also influences to a certain extent the decision-making 
process itself. For a long time in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) the important element of 
“human political choice” was missing (Mudson, 1995: 210). Some foreign policy analysts 
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emphasize the importance of the shift of focus of FPA from the “nation-states as unitary 
actors to the people and units that comprise the state” (Mudson, 1995: 210). These units can 
be the president, ministers, and governmental institutions. Similarly, “national interest” is 
constituted from the interests of the units mentioned above, “not all of which are related to 
anything resembling an objective national interest” (Mudson, 1995: 210). The state leaders 
make decisions depending on social and cultural context and personal history: “the personal 
characteristics of the individual leader can become central in understanding foreign policy 
choice” (Mudson, 1995: 218). For instance, the gradual consolidation of the energy industry 
in Russia in state-controlled hands and the growing importance of it for the Russian economy 
are associated with the personality of Putin, who as Goldman writes, “understood in 1997 
that with its oil and gas reserves and pipelines, Russia was well-situated to take advantage of 
this new dynamic” (Goldman, 2008: 139).   
The personal history and opinion of the decision-maker is not the only important 
factor. The threat presented to the audience, should be accepted by the population, 
especially in a democratic society. To make a decision in response to any situation in 
international affairs, the decision-maker should take into consideration the importance of 
“acceptability” (Franham, 2004: 443), in other words “to be effective, internationally as well 
as domestically, a policy must be acceptable to some minimum number of relevant groups 
and individuals” (Franham, 2004: 443), because it is difficult to take any kind of action in 
foreign affairs, if this policy is not supported by the population (Franham, 2004: 445). The 
identities of the population who must approve the decision to use the extraordinary 
measures vary from society to society and even within the same society over time.  
 The context (both factual and constructed) enables the securitising actors to define 
security threats. At this stage, it is important to discuss the difference between a threat and a 
risk. Authors such as Victor Kremenyuk, Dan Goldwell, and Robert Williams connect a threat 
with a traceable source (Kremenyuk, 2009: 163; Goldwell, et. al 2012: 13). For example, 
Kremenyuk writes “a threat comes from an identifiable source and may be traced to its final 
conclusion, a risk can be imagined and may exist only in the heads of those who believed in 
it” (Kremenyuk, 2009: 163). Williams also explains the difference between the understanding 
of a threat and a risk through the role of ‘the Other’. He writes that “if there is no other, then 
there can be no threat. Risk can be perceived independent of an identifiable actor” 
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(Williams, 2009: 17-18). How to define ‘the Other’ in this case depends on the theoretical 
approach used. In Realist understanding, another actor is a powerful state, which expresses 
intentions to cause harm to other states. This approach was popular during the Cold War 
(Williams, 2009: 19). However, now it is not so easy to distinguish specific actors who may 
impose danger to the security of another state (for example, terrorist organisations). In 
relation to EU-Russia energy relations, the existing literature presents either Russia or the EU 
(depending on the perspective and background of the author) as a threat to the energy 
security of the other side (p. 19-26). These authors see energy security as a zero-sum game in 
which security of one actor means the insecurity of another. For example, Smith defines 
Russia as a threat to European energy security (Smith, 2007).  
This dissertation argues that in the case of EU-Russia energy relations the perception 
of a threat is often constructed by the securitising actors through a speech act. Securitising 
actors evaluate risks and vulnerabilities and have an authority to present some of them as 
threats (Ciuta, 2009: 303). In security as a speech act, threats are constructed and the speech 
act itself is a process of securitisation. In other words, the high levels of dependence on a 
single source of energy supply or demand as well as potential problems with transportation 
and production of energy supplies do pose a number of risks to the energy security of both 
Russia and the EU member states. However, these risks are presented as the threats 
(connected with a certain actor) by the securitising actors. The securitising actors use the 
current context (including the collective memory and national identity) to present an issue as 
threat and justify it to the audience. The speech act is used to create threats on both internal 
and external levels. For example, the Russian government presented some of the 
representatives of big business as a threat to Russian economic security (such as, the Yukos 
case) (Chapter 3) to gain the support of the population for the reconsolidation of the energy 
sector under governmental control. The main reason, why this definition of security has been 
selected, is, because this approach gives an opportunity for indefinite broadening of the 
security agenda, including the expansion of the possible threats, actors and objects to be 
securitised (Williams, 2003: 513).  
Applying securitisation theory to EU-Russia relations 
When talking about securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations, it is important to answer 
what is the referent object of security, in other words who is securitising what? This thesis 
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argues that it is the EU-Russia energy relations that have been securitised by both Russia and 
the EU. The aim of this dissertation is to deconstruct the securitisation process and answer 
the question, why it has happened. Many economic approaches, including those using the 
institutional approaches to securitisation, will view this problem as mainly 
consumer/producer relations. More traditional realist-informed approaches could emphasize 
the realpolitik of Russian energy policy. However, both perspectives are offering only narrow 
and simplistic view of the problem. Indeed, the dynamics of consumer/producer relations 
are as important as the political motivation of Russian government. Therefore to offer more 
balanced analysis of this problem, this thesis uses a constructivist approach to political 
economy of EU-Russia energy relations, based on the Balzacqian critique of the Copenhagen 
School, and tries to analyse the securitisation of EU-Russia relation on both levels described 
above: agent and act ones. 
It is important to explain how these levels are unpacked and described in the 
upcoming chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the analysis of agent-level, and will look 
on how securitising agents use the current context to create a securitised narrative. Chapter 
4 in its turn will look at the level of act, and will illustrate on the example of the analysis of 
Russian and European media how the specific context (2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict) 
has been communicated to the audience. The specific categories to be used to unpack the 
securitisation process in both Russia and the EU are described below. 
Level of agent: 
Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the analysis of the level of agent. According to Balzacq this 
level includes three main elements: the securitising agent, the audience and the context of 
securitisation. This thesis uses the context of securitisation as the main focus of analysis in 
Chapters 2 and 3. However, it is important to specify which actors can act as securitising 
agents in EU-Russia energy trade and who the audience is. Energy policy and especially 
external elements of it are usually decided by the governmental institutions, which are 
considered to be the main securitising agents in this thesis. The government in the modern 
state cannot make the decisions on energy security without taking into consideration 
interests of major energy companies and political elites. However, it is important to mention, 
that the EU and Russia have different political structures, which shape the behaviour of the 
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securitising agents. This thesis doesn’t aim to compare the EU and Russia, but to analyse the 
causes of securitisation in both Russia and the EU. The audience is a broader concept and 
may include general population, industry and political elites. A variety of issue influence the 
decision-making process on energy policy: the structure of domestic energy complex, 
security of supply or demand, pressure from large energy corporations, environmental 
agencies, political and economic elements; or in the other words – the context of 
securitisation. The context of securitisation could be both factual (based on actual levels of 
production and consumptions, level of dependence on specific producer/consumer) and 
socially constructed (for example, the perception of the specific producer/consumer). To 
answer the main research question of why the EU-Russia energy relations are extremely 
securitised, it is important to deconstruct how the context of securitisation is interpreted and 
used by the securitising actors and why the audience responds to the securitising claims. 
Chapters 2 and 3 address these issues in the European Union and in Russia, but they do not 
focus on the linguistic part of the securitisation, rather than on the contextual one. Chapter 4 
in its turn is devoted to the level of act, including the linguistic element of it. 
Level of act: 
As it was already mentioned above, the security as a speech act should not be understood as 
a simply linguistic act. However, the language used in construction of specific narrative 
(which is also rooted in a specific context) is also one of the key elements of the 
securitisation process and cannot be overlooked. That is why Chapter 4 analyses the media 
frames created by Russian and European media to shape public opinion on the 2009 Russian-
Ukrainian gas crisis.    
At this stage it is important to emphasize that the criteria outlined above are not used 
to conduct a comparative analysis of Russian and European energy policies, or for that 
matter to compare Russia and the EU as actors, the purpose of the dissertation is to unpack 
the securitisation process of EU-Russia energy relations in general, by analysing how actors in 
both Russia and the EU contribute to the securitisation process for different reasons, and 
using different methods which are often not comparable like-to-like. 
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Critical Approach to Emancipation 
Emancipation is one of the key concepts in both critical theory and CSS and it is impossible to 
ignore it in this thesis. This section addresses critical approach to emancipation and evaluates 
the possibilities for emancipation in the EU-Russia energy relations. It is the quest for 
emancipation which encourages a theorist to criticize and reconstruct knowledge (Leonardo, 
2004: 12). Emancipation is understood differently depending on the approach of the critical 
theory. It is concerned with freedom from restraints of one sort or another (Booth, 2007: 
111). Booth suggests rather liberal definition of securitisation: 
“Emancipation seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop them 
carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the freedom of others. It 
provides a three-fold framework for politics: a philosophical anchorage for knowledge, a 
theory of progress for society, and a practice of resistance against oppression. Emancipation 
is “the philosophy, theory, and politics of inventing humanity” (Booth, 2007: 112).  
The meaning of emancipation may vary depending on the different critical 
perspectives one can choose. For instance, Brocklesby and Cummings speak about two kinds 
of emancipation: human emancipation and self-emancipation (Brocklesby, et al. 1996: 741). 
The human emancipation aims to emancipate the system globally, which can enable 
everybody to maximize their potential (Brocklesby, et al. 1996: 742). Self-emancipation, on 
the other hand, aims “to provide tools to be used by the individuals themselves as they see 
fit, to free their minds to alternatives by highlighting the ways in which power within systems 
subjugates them” (Brocklesby, et al. 1996: 741). However, in both cases emancipation is 
mainly concerned with the liberation of people from constraints of domination. There are 
different axes of domination, starting from class to gender discrimination. Considering that 
there are different perspectives on emancipation, the majority of critical theorists agree on 
the aim of the theory in regards to emancipation. It is important to remember that the 
process of emancipation creates a new problem in some sense, because improvement in the 
condition of one group may impact negatively the condition of another (Sheehan, 2005: 
159): “Emancipation is thus not a state of being but a condition of becoming” (Williams, 
2005: 139). The perspective of CSS on emancipation is often associated with Booth. He writes 
that “security, theoretically, is emancipation” and explains it as follows: “security means the 
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absence of threats. Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from 
those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely 
choose to do” (Booth, 1991: 319; Farrands, Worth, 2005). In the context of security studies, 
emancipation should be prioritized over more traditional concepts of power and order, which 
can be gained only at somebody’s expense (Booth, 1991: 319). Emancipation differs 
depending on time and space. History provides us with various examples of emancipating 
processes (women’s rights, racial rights) (Booth, 1994). In CSS the concept of emancipation is 
considered to be closely connected with the concept of security itself. Booth understands 
security as the means and emancipation as the end. The aim of security is to reduce the 
threats imposed on individuals and groups, or to free them from physical and human 
constraint or in other words to promote emancipation” (Williams, 2005: 139). 
 Other critical thinkers also talk about the important place of an individual in 
emancipation. For example, Jones argues that an individual should be treated as the ultimate 
referent object of security (Jones, 1999: 114).This view is shared by other critical thinkers, 
including Horkheimer who said that “theory… should shed a critical light on the present day 
society… in hope of radically improving human existence” (Horkheimer, 1973: 233). Aradau 
argues that “emancipation is not a privilege of the state, but the struggle is fought against 
the state’s practices of domination and securitisation” (Ardau, 2004: 404). Fierke emphasizes 
that it is important to shift the focus of security studies from the state to the individual. She 
argues that traditional state-centered approaches to security overlook such important 
elements as the security of women and children (Fierke, 2007: 190). In short, different 
approaches within the CSS define the emancipation as liberation of the individuals from 
different forms of domination. The individual is the key object and often the main driving 
force of emancipation. Taking this under consideration, it is important to answer the 
question on how the emancipation of individuals is applicable to this study. Booth said that 
emancipation is not universal concept and depends on the context (Booth, 1999: 41 – 42). In 
the case of EU-Russia energy relations we can talk about different groups of individuals. First 
of all, the individuals are the energy consumers, the end users of energy in both Russia and 
the EU. And individual consumers are, indeed affected by the extreme securitisation: the 
European consumers were the primary victims of Russo-Ukrainian transit conflicts in 2000s. 
However, in the case of energy security, the emancipation could hardly happen without the 
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participation of the governments, because of the sensitive nature of energy for the national 
security of the states.  
Energy security is a multi-layered problem, and the focus on the individual does not 
mean that such contexts as a state and a class should not be taken into consideration, rather 
“theorists should never lose sight of their effects on and implications for individual human 
beings” (Booth, 1999: 41–42). It is important to study how state structures and institutions 
affect the individuals. Thus, it could be argued that the domestic situation can not only 
influence the foreign policy, but is also capable to threaten international security. Booth 
writes, that “the repression of human rights, ethnic and religious rivalry, economic 
breakdown and so on can create dangerous instability at the domestic level which in turn can 
exacerbate the tensions that lead to violence, refugees and possibly inter-state conflict” 
(Booth, 1991: 318). The theorists of CSS see emancipation as the way to ensure security. It is 
argued that the states which are able to provide for their individuals’ high levels of individual 
freedom, justice and human rights protection do not exercise aggressive behavior with each 
other. So, the role of the state is to emancipate its domestic and foreign politics to provide 
security for its population (Buzan, et al., 1998). In other words, emancipation with regards to 
energy security, to some extent, should be a state-led process. This thesis explores the 
importance of liberalization of energy relations by the state leaders in both energy 
consuming and energy producing states. However, the analysis of potential emancipation 
driven by the individuals is limited considering the aims and the scope of this study, and 
leaves potential for future research. 
 It is important to expand on the limitations of Booth’s understanding of 
emancipation, when talking about energy security. As it has been mentioned above, and as 
the upcoming chapters (2 and 3) demonstrate states and energy companies are the main 
actors capable to influence the energy policies in both Russia and the EU member states. 
Therefore, the emancipation in its original understanding: from the bottom to the top is 
hardly possible in the context of EU-Russia energy relations.  Especially, in its current 
securitised state. This opinion is shared by some of the critical theorists as well (Aradau, 
2004; Behnke, 2006). For instance, Claudia Aradau criticized Booth’s understanding of 
emancipation. Aradau thinks that by equating security to emancipation, Booth limits the 
ability “to envisage social transformation outside the logic of security” (Aradau, 2004: 397). 
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She argues that emancipation should be seen as “the counter-strategy to securitisation in a 
realm beyond and outside the reach of exceptional politics, sovereign authority and 
exclusionary moves” (Behnke, 2006: 62 – 63). According to Aradau emancipation needs to be 
disaggregated from the context of national identity of one state towards the universal 
principles. She uses the example of struggle for equal rights for women and migrant 
minorities, and argues that people should see “women as not women, but equal citizens, and 
migrants are not migrants but workers with equal rights” (Aradau, 2004: 402). Following this 
logic, energy security should not be seen as a zero-sum game in which the security of one 
means the threat to security of the other. However, to achieve this level of emancipation, 
energy related issues should be first removed from the security agenda and from the realm 
of the exceptional politics. 
 It is important to explain the place of emancipation in this thesis. Emancipation is also 
a function of the possibility of a critical form of knowledge which in turn is dependent on a 
critical form of consciousness. In other words, it is important to constantly emphasize the 
importance of emancipation. This thesis aims to deconstruct the securitisation of EU-Russia, 
to underline the influence of such factors as identity, values and interests of securitising 
actors in the securitisation process. This in some sense creates the pre-condition for 
emancipation, but the analysis of actual ways to emancipate EU-Russia energy relations 
leaves the potential for future studies. In the context of this research the movement towards 
emancipation should begin from the de-securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations. De-
securitisation in this case could be considered a first stage creating potential possibilities for 
further emancipation. De-securitisation is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, however it is 
important to provide a brief overview of the concept in this chapter as well. The Copenhagen 
School defines de-securitisation as “the progressive removal of issues from the security 
agenda as they are dealt with via institutions and practices that do not implicate force, 
violence or security dilemma” (Krause, et al. 1996: 249). The Copenhagen School offers three 
approaches to de-securitisation: to avoid extreme securitisation in the first place, once the 
issue has been securitised “to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security 
dilemmas and other vicious spirals” (Roe, 2004: 284), and, finally, to remove the issue from 
exceptional politics to normal ones (Roe, 2004: 284). Aradau criticizes the Copenhagen 
School for their approach to de-securitisation. In the Copenhagen School of Thought 
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securitisation and de-securitisation are linked to the transition between normal and 
exceptional politics. Securitisation allows the security actors to move an issue towards 
exceptional politics, and de-securitisation. Aradau writes: “the question of de-securitisation 
therefore becomes one about the kind of politics we want. Do we want politics of 
exceptional measures or do we want democratic politics of slow procedures which can be 
contested?” (Aradau, 2004: 393).  Aradau sees the problem in regards to the approach 
towards de-securitisation proposed by the Copenhagen School in the unlikeliness of support 
to de-securitisation in the everyday. She argues that securitisation as a speech act is possible, 
because the audience can relate to the claims made by the securitising actor (Aradau, 2004: 
400). As has been presented on the example of the securitisation of energy policy in Russia, 
the government used the negative attitude of Russian people to both the oligarchs and to 
some extent the foreign investors to justify its policy of high levels of governmental 
interference into the energy sector. In this case, the population would not support the 
speech act aimed at de-securitisation, and the issue will stay the object of exceptional 
politics. 
Roe suggests that de-securitisation can be achieved either by transformation or 
management of securitised issues. The transformation is the complete removal of an issue 
from the security agenda and return of it to “normal politics” as the Copenhagen School 
would put it (Roe, 2004: 285). The management approach does not necessarily mean 
complete de-securitisation, rather than a controlled one (Roe, 2004: 285). Weaver writes that 
sometimes securitisation is necessary and, therefore de-securitisation is not always 
preferable (Waever, 2011: 469). Weaver implies that “securitisation might help society to 
deal with important challenges through focusing and mobilizing attention and resources” 
(Waever, 2011: 469). This thesis argues that even though de-securitisation is important for 
the future development of EU-Russia energy relations, due to the significance of energy 
resources for the economies of both Russia and the EU member states energy issues could 
not be completely removed from the security agenda. The more detailed description of the 
approach to de-securitisation suggested by this thesis is described in Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation.  
This section aimed to define the theoretical framework of this dissertation. This 
dissertation argues that the understanding of energy security in both Russia and the EU is 
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not only based on the actual threats (interruption of supplies and production decline), but is 
also socially constructed. This dissertation applies the assumptions of the securitisation 
theory (security as a speech act) to explain how the energy security is constructed and 
negotiated to the audience, including the use of national identity and collective memory to 
justify the policy. The choice of theory requires choosing the appropriate methodology. The 
following section is devoted to the methodology of this research. 
 Methodology 
The research is grounded in the assumptions of critical theory. The critical approach is an 
interpretive one: “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981: 126).  As 
opposed to mainstream theories critical theorists emphasize that there is nothing immutable 
(human nature) in the system, it is subject to change, depending on the historical and 
political context (Linklater, 2007: 47). Cox defines critical theory as a more reflective 
approach with higher awareness of the perspective which gives rise to theorizing (Cox, 1981: 
126). This thesis touches on such concepts as security, securitisation, foreign policy, and 
national identity. Critical theory as well as any other theoretical tradition supposes the 
choice of a specific methodology. The methodology used in critical theory is a holistic 
methodology where a specific structure or object (case study) is temporarily lifted from the 
context in order to be studied in isolation and then re-inserted into the whole in order to 
account for the totality of modern social relations (Jahn, 1998: 618). The research question of 
the thesis is “why the energy relations between Russia and the EU are extremely 
politicized?” Below is more detailed description of the methodology. 
As was already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the critical approach has different 
characteristics as compared to traditional, mainstream theories and that is why critical 
research needs to use different methodology as opposed to the empirical ones of the natural 
sciences. Comstock defines methodology as “a general procedure by which we go about 
studying society, including selecting research problems, constructing and evaluating theories, 
and disseminating our findings” (Comstock, 1982: 370). Methods used in natural sciences or 
positivist empirical methodology might not be so effective for critical social research. 
Positivist methodology in social research supports the traditional state-centric system, 
because this methodology “objectives the human subjects of an investigation by treating 
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their behavior as raw data which is external to our understanding and denying their socio-
historical construction”  (Comstock, 1982: 371). This dissertation argues that it is not enough 
to focus on state relations only when analyzing EU-Russia energy relations. In order to 
answer the research question, it is important to take into consideration the complex process 
of the European integration, the impact of traumatic history on relations between Russia and 
Eastern European member states, and the domestic economic and political situation in 
Russia. That is why this dissertation uses post-positivist methodology. Critical social research 
is not studying human nature, but human action. The way people act is pre-determined by 
values and norms which are rooted in the society. It is important to remember and 
understand that these meanings, values and norms are created and established as a result of 
human action themselves (Comstock, 1982: 375). Critical methodology is aimed at inclusion 
the subjects of research into the dialogue rather than “a distant observation or experimental 
manipulation of people” (Comstock, 1982: 371).  
Epistemology 
Epistemology is one of the important elements of any research methodology. The word 
epistemology in translation from Greek means “theory of knowledge” and answers such 
questions as “What is knowledge?”, “What do you know?” and “How do you know?” Each 
theoretical tradition answers these questions differently. This section focuses on critical 
perspective on knowledge. Habermas defines knowledge as follows: “knowledge is formed in 
virtue of three interests: information that expands our power of technical control, 
interpretation that make possible the orientations of action within common traditions; and 
analyses that free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized power” (see in 
Comstock, 1982: 297). However, this is just one of the numerous definitions. The way one 
understands knowledge depends on the theoretical and epistemological perspective. This 
thesis applies a post-positivist approach to knowledge. Post-positivists believe that there is 
no single truth to be discovered. Everything is socially constructed and subject to change due 
to the contextual changes (values, historical period of time, culture). That is why empirical 
testing and objectivity (distinction between observer and observed) play a very small role in 
post-positivist epistemology. Terriff understands objectivity as a “perspective-less gaze”, and 
this is impossible in a socially constructed world; rationality is not transcendental but 
historically specific, learned activity; and methods are necessarily contextual and therefore 
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shaped by culture and particular values” (Terriff, et al. 1999: 101). This thesis argues that 
there are some ‘real facts’, but the interpretation of these facts depends on the context. 
 Post-positivism appeared as a critique to positivism which appeared a long time ago 
to criticize dogmatic values of religion and speculative metaphysics (Held, 1980: 296). That is 
why to understand what post-positivism means one needs to know what positivism is? 
Positivism is based on the following assumptions (Terriff, et al. 1999: 100): 
1. There is a ‘real’ or ‘objective’ world out there to be discovered by the researcher, 
2. The observer is capable to distance him/herself from the subject of research in order 
to see the ‘objective’ truth, 
3. The truth can be discovered mainly by the use of empirical methods.  
In other words, the post-positivist approach, challenging traditionalist theory’s 
assumption that there is an external world ‘out there’ to study, and that an inquiring subject 
can study this world in an objective manner by withdrawing itself from the world it 
investigates, in other words the theory must be value free (Burchill, 2005: 138 – 141). Critical 
theory and CSS argue that the cultural and historical context is of high importance for the 
understanding of international relations. There is no theory that does not contain political 
motivation. The levels of political involvement in epistemology are extremely high (Booth, 
2007: 192). Critical research does not focus on the empirical re-presentation of the world, 
but on posing the research itself as a set of ideological practices (Denzin, et al. 1998: 273). 
Facts can be understood only in the context of real social process (Jahn, 1998: 615). The 
meaning of an experience or an observation is not self-evident, but depends on the struggle 
over the interpretation and definition of that experience (Denizn, 1998: 273 – 274). In other 
words, nothing can exist outside the context which may change from time to time and may 
vary within one time period in different parts of the world depending on the political, 
economical and cultural situation. This perspective fits the purposes of this research, because 
EU-Russia energy relations are influenced by political, economic and cultural contexts. 
Amelia Hadfield argues that “neither the EU-Russia relationship nor the content of energy 
cooperation can remain value-free” (Hadfield, 2008: 239). Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to 
the influence of context on the securitisation process.  
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 It is important to mention the place of security in post-positivist epistemology. As was 
said earlier in this chapter critical thinkers emphasize that security is not something 
unchanging and universal. On the contrary, the understanding of security depends on the 
socio-historical context. For example, 9/11 brought global terrorism to the top of the security 
agenda in the USA (and to some extent in Western Europe), but it does not mean that all the 
states in the world see global terrorism is the most significant threat to their survival (for the 
small Pacific islands it would be the consequences of the climate change). In other words the 
understanding of security depends on the context in critical theory. Terriff writes that the 
concepts of ‘state’ and ‘security’ are closely connected. The establishment of the state is not 
natural, it was socially constructed and there is no guarantee that societies will be organized 
this way in the future. Terriff also mentions that “this has implications for our understanding 
of security, for the meaning of security is tied to specific forms of political community. Only 
to the extent that other forms of political community begin to become thinkable (again), 
does it make sense to think about security at other levels” (Terriff, et al. 1999: 102). Turning 
to the subject of this research, it is important to remember that the difference in 
understanding energy security by the energy-producer (Russia) and the energy-consumer 
(the EU) as well as different political, cultural and historical contexts lead to the growing 
process of securitisation of energy relations between two sides. As a result Russian leaders 
are afraid that Europeans are trying to influence the decision-making process in order to get 
easier access to Russian energy resources and slow down the development of Russian 
economy, at the same time the EU member states is blaming Russia for the manipulation of 
its position as an energy-producer in order to achieve its own aims in international relations. 
This confrontation creates additional constraints on the development of the mutually 
beneficial energy relations between Russia and the EU. So the place of de-securitisation is to 
remove these contradictions caused by the difference in perspectives. The potential ways of 
removal of these constraints are discussed in Chapter 5. 
John Searle calls a speech act ‘an institutional fact’, when a securitising actor presents 
an issue as a threat, because he or she wants an audience to believe that it is actually 
threatens their security (Searle as quoted in Rust, 2009: 120). Consequently, the ‘institutional 
facts’ may be more important than real ones in determining outcomes:  the perceived power 
of a state, and therefore its ability to determine outcomes, may exceed (or under-state) its 
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real capabilities. In the positivist conception there is reality, and perceptions: ‘real’ facts and 
‘perceived’ facts, and the analyst may compare the two. However, for the post-positivist, 
there only socially constructed knowledge; there is no ‘real world’ in the positivist sense 
(Brocklesby, et al. 1996: 742). Rather, perceived facts and real facts are one and the same. In 
case of EU-Russia energy relations, there are certain undeniable facts, including the volumes 
of production and export. However, these facts need to be explained and presented to the 
audience in a certain way to be accepted as risks or threats to security. For example, the fact 
that the Russian government owns 51 per cent of Gazprom’s shares raises concerns in the EU 
(see Chapter 3 for more detail). Gazprom is sometimes presented as a foreign policy tool in 
the literature (Smith, 2006:1). However the Norwegian state owns on even bigger share (67 
per cent) of the major Norwegian company Statoil (Proedrou, 2012: 108). But, this fact does 
not cause any tension in EU-Norwegian energy relations, because “contrary to Russia, the 
Norwegian gas sector adheres to liberal principles” (Proedrou, 2012: 108). This example 
demonstrates that it is the perception of the real facts and figures, which matters for the 
security construction. And this construction of reality is often created by institutions and 
actors whose authority is recognized by the audience (Rust, 2009: 120). As mentioned in the 
beginning of this section, epistemology focuses aimed on answering the question “What do 
we know?” This question is closely connected with the other one ‘How do we know what is 
real?’ The study of ontology tries to answer this question. The next section of this chapter 
describes ontological assumptions of this research in more details. 
Ontology 
It is argued that the term ontology was introduced by Aristotle as a theory of being as such or 
an investigation of the principles of things. His definition is the following: “there is a science 
which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue by its own 
nature” (Kajpayil, 2008: 1-2). In more recent and widely accepted understanding ontology 
refers to theory of what exists (Kajpayil, 2002: 26). Kajpayil defines ontology as follows: 
“Ontology means discourse on being as such” (Kajpayil, 2002: 26). Because ontology is 
important for the understanding and explaining the nature of reality, this idea has been 
introduced in all philosophical traditions all over the world. Wyn Jones (Jones, 2001: 45-46) 
writes about the two main meanings of ontology: Universality I and Universality II: 
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1. Universality I is rooted into the European Enlightenment and Christian religion. 
The main idea of the Universality I is that humans have been created Godlike 
(including our mind), which makes us capable for understanding or discovering 
the truth of the universe, 
2. Universality II is based on the assumption that there are specific structures which 
are characterizing the being of the particular historical epoch. These structures 
are collectively constructed by intellectual tradition of particular historic period of 
time; “the purpose of defining them is to construct a base point for considering 
the problems of maintenance or transformation of a particular historical order. 
Universality II is universal in a transitory way, the synchronic picture of something 
that is diachronically changing” (Jones, R. 2001: 46). Kajpayil argues that 
Universality II can be compared with Hegel’s ideas on ontology, who also 
emphasizes the importance of the historical context for the understanding of 
being (Kajpayil, 2002: 27).  
In Kajpayil introduces the idea of being-principles as the central for ontology. To know 
something we need to know its being-principles or in other words the principles of its 
existence (Kajpayil, 2002: 28). The being-principle is the reason for existence. Each 
phenomenon in the world has its own being-principles to exist, since nothing can exist 
without it (Kajpayil, 2002:  29). Both scientific and philosophical research is orientated to 
understanding the being-principles of the subject to be investigated. However, these 
traditions have different methods: science is focused on the empirical methodology. 
Philosophical tradition in its turn “goes beyond empirical explanations and asks questions 
about ultimate principles of things, the principles that are the ultimate reasons of the world’s 
constitution and meaning” (Kajpayil, 2002:  30). In the 1990s there was an epistemological 
turn in International Relations which gave way to a greater attention to ontology. 
There is no single point of view on the study of being and ontological perspectives 
may vary from thinker to thinker. Every theoretical tradition has its own discourse on the 
question of ontology. This thesis is based on the assumptions of critical theory and this 
section is concluded by the summary of critical ontology. Critical ontology argues that 
empirical and non-empirical methodology should be combined in order to know the 
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“ultimate principles of the world” (Kajpayil, 2002:  30). The aim of ontology is to organize, 
describe and analyze the experience to build up our understanding of being, existence 
(Kajpayil, 2002:  27). Critical ontology also criticizes more traditional ontological traditions for 
the focus of the state. Ontology should be more open and include other categories of being 
(non-state, post-sovereign ones) (Buzan, et al. 2003: 75). This critical shift in ontology is an 
ongoing process with the focus on the agency which is stimulating and shaping transition of 
the structures from the past to the future (Jones, 2001: 46).  
Axiology 
Axiology refers to the grounding of values in social research. The positivist approach argues 
that research should be value free. On the other hand, the critical, post-positivist approach 
acknowledges the influence of the values of a researcher on the research process. Karin 
Klenke argues that: “all research is value laden and biased. The value system a researcher 
brings to his or her research informs the research methodology” (Klenke, 2008: 17). The 
impact of the values on the research includes different levels. First of all, critical social 
research studies the social environment created by human actors (including individuals, 
groups and institutions) but not always controlled by them. This social environment includes 
also meanings, values, norms and beliefs, the interpretations of which often influence human 
actions (Comstock, 1982: 388). This discussion is relevant to the idea of reflexivity. Elliot 
defines reflexivity as “world of self-monitoring of our own lives, the lives of others (both 
proximate and distance), and wider social happenings” (Elliot, 2008: 133). Giddens writes 
about it as follows: “all forms of social life are partly constituted by actors’ knowledge of 
them” (Giddens, 1990: 38). In other words, the reflexivity is an important part of social life. 
From one side, social practices could be reformed as a result of critical reflection and 
evaluation of these practices (Giddens, 1990: 38). From the other side, reflexivity in social 
research helps to evaluate how researcher’s personal values affected the research process. It 
is important to take into account values and beliefs not only while analyzing the decision-
making process of Russian and European leaders, but also to be reflective on how the 
personal values and beliefs of the author of this thesis affected the research process 
(including the interpretation of the results). The conclusions (p. 219-220) reflect on the role 
of reflexivity for this research in more detail. The post-positivist approach allows the 
researcher to be both critical and self-critical. Traditional positivist methodology claims that 
58 
 
the outcomes of any research are supposed to be value-free: “a researcher took care to 
separate his or her everyday life… for making value free judgments” (Bailey, 1994: 29).  
The post-positivist approach acknowledges that it is hardly possible for a researcher 
to be objective, because each researcher is influenced by his own background. Critical theory 
acknowledges the influence of researcher’s values and ideologies on the research process 
and outcomes. Moreover, the researcher’s values and beliefs are influenced by the research 
process as well (Canagarajah, 1999: 324). Kenneth Bailey writes the following about value-
free research: “The value-full approach views scholarship as not only value-laden but also 
inherently political. Thus, according to this position, a researcher can never be value free but 
in reality is always representing some political position, be it overt or covert” (Bailey, 1994: 
31). Thus, the approach to the collection of data and the presentation of its analysis in this 
thesis has to some extent been influenced by the values of the researcher. As stated above, 
this process is defined as reflexivity in social research. Etherington writes that reflexivity is 
“the capacity of the researcher to acknowledge how their own experiences and contexts 
inform the process and outcomes of inquiry” (Etherington, 2004: 31-32). At the same time, I 
have tried to achieve some measure of critical distance from the evidence and argument 
deployed here, and reflexivity has formed one of the means of achieving this. Lynch talks 
about “additional level of reflexivity regarding our own assumptions and intentions, and how 
much of our experience and background we reveal in the research process” (Lynch, 2008: 
717). In other words it is important to talk about the positionality of a researcher and how 
the positionality affects the research process.  I am a Russian citizen; I grew up in Russia and 
got my undergraduate degree in Russia. My personal background influenced the original 
perspective on the subject as well as an interpretation of the data collected through 
secondary and primary research. The in-depth knowledge of Russian language and culture is 
an advantage in studying the EU-Russia energy relations, because it made it possible to 
access a wider variety of sources in Russian language (including the interviews), and 
therefore, contributed to the originality of this dissertation and helped to provide more 
balanced overview of the problem. A CSS approach requires that the researcher recognises 
her own position, and manages the implications of that position through the continuing 
practice of reflexivity. This is not to eliminate bias, but to make closer approximation to a 
least biased argument possible, understanding one’s position more as a resource than as an 
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obstacle to research (Booth, 2007; Fierke, 2007).  
Method 
The term methods refer to the set of techniques which are used in order to collect and 
analyze data. The term ‘method’ came from ancient Greece and the original meaning was “a 
route that leads to the goal” (Gibrium, et al. 2001: 86). The central question is “how it comes 
that EU-Russia energy trade is highly politicised/securitised?” Below is a brief summary of 
the methods used in this thesis to answer the research question: literature review and the 
analysis of legislative documents, semi-structured interviews, and media analysis of Russian 
and British printed media. 
Literature Review 
Conducting a literature review is an important milestone in the research process. The 
analysis of the existing publications devoted to the EU-Russia energy trade allowed both to 
find the gap in the literature and to place this research within the existing academic context. 
The in-depth review of literature in both Russian and English languages demonstrates, that 
despite a lot of books and articles being published on the subject of energy security in 
general, and EU-Russia energy trade in particular, the majority of these authors focus on 
either the position of the energy consumer (the EU) (Smith, 2004; Smith 2007) or the energy 
producer (Russia) (Simonov, 2008; Rahr, 2008), with an exception of a few more moderate 
opinions (Goldthau, 2008; Aalto, 2009). This thesis argues that the analysis of the 
securitisation process of EU-Russia energy trade requires the complex understanding of 
socio-political contexts in both Russia and the EU member states. The literature review helps 
to achieve two goals: to locate this dissertation within the existing academic context, and to 
acknowledge the sources which were especially useful for the development of the argument. 
There is a large body of literature on energy security and EU-Russia energy trade. For the 
purposes of this literature review the existing literature was located within the imaginary 
spectrum. Russian and Western literature, which argues that the energy security of Russia 
and the EU is threatened by the other side, are situated on the extreme ends of the 
spectrum (p. 19-26). The authors with more moderate views are situated in the middle of the 
spectrum (Goldthau 2008, Aalto, 2009). This dissertation fits into the middle of the spectrum 
as well, but even though the author of this thesis agrees that the international governance of 
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energy trade is important, it is necessary to critically deconstruct both Russian and European 
understanding of energy security. Without the awareness of all the factors influencing the 
securitisation process, it could be very difficult to establish the mechanism of the 
international governance which would satisfy all the sides involved. 
This dissertation argues that to understand the complexity of the securitisation of EU-
Russia energy trade, it is not enough to look at the problem from the perspective of either 
the energy consumer (the EU member states) or from the perspective of the energy 
producer (Russia). It is important to look at the different levels and actors influencing energy 
policy construction, including the perception of the actors on the actions of one another and 
their response to these actions. That is why neither of the extremes of the literature 
spectrum explains why the energy trade between Russia and the EU are securitised? In 
between the two extreme ends of the spectrum there are authors who represent more 
balanced views of EU-Russia energy relations. Talking about the most influential publications 
in English language, the works of the following authors were especially useful for the analysis 
of the securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations: Stern, Pleins, Hanson, Sakwa, Rutland, 
Lane, Goldthau, Orttung, and Aalto. Not all of these authors are talking about security and 
securitisation per se, but their in-depth analysis of economic, political, social or technical 
issues contribute to deconstruction of the securitisation of EU-Russia energy trade. The 
review and reflection on their ideas are presented throughout this dissertation, and the 
introduction includes the indicative literature review, which positions this dissertation on the 
spectrum of the existing literature. The methods used to collect the primary evidence are 
described below in this chapter.   
Analysis of legislation,  official documentation, and international agreements in 
energy sphere 
To study the official perspective of policy-makers to the problems of energy security for 
Russian and European states the analysis of the official documents is conducted, which 
includes Russian legislation in the sphere of energy resources and energy trade, international 
agreements on energy trade regulations (for example, ECT) and European legislation. For 
instance, the high levels of dependence on energy imports are reflected in the official 
documents of the EU.  For instance, the Second Strategic Energy Review aims to draft a plan 
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for decreasing the dependence of the EU on energy imports. One of the EU plans, the so-
called 20-20-20 strategy is developed to reduce greenhouse emissions by 20 per cent, to 
increase the share of the renewable energy by 20 per cent, and to improve energy efficiency 
by 20 per cent, all of it by 2020 (EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan). The EU’s 20-
20-20 strategy is orientated to the medium and long-term development, because it requires 
serious and time consuming changes in the energy system of the European states (with 
public authorities, energy regulators, infrastructure operators, the energy industry and 
citizens all actively involved) to create a diversity of non-fossil fuel supplies, flexible 
infrastructures and capacities for demand management (EU Energy Security and Solidarity 
Action Plan). In its turn, the Energy Strategy of Russia for the period of up to 2020 is stated 
that the energy security is the important element of the national security (Energy Strategy of 
Russia, 2003). This proves that Russia as energy producer also feels vulnerable to threats of 
energy security. Other remarkable example of Russian legislation on energy related issue is 
the Federal Law on Gas export. In July 2006 the State Duma of the Russian Federation passed 
the law on gas exports, which gives Gazprom the undivided right for the export of gas 
(Federal Law of Russian Federation N117, 2006).  
 The results of the analysis of the official documents can be found in Chapters 2, 3 and 
5 of this dissertation. For example, Chapter 3 looks at the development of Russian legislation 
on foreign direct investment over time. This analysis demonstrates that historically, the 
protection of the rights of foreign investors has been a weak point in Russian legislation and 
could not be blamed on the decisions of the current government. Chapter 5 looks at the 
latest European legislation (the so-called Third Energy Package) on the development of 
common European energy policy, which focuses on protection of the European consumers 
from the high levels of dependence on the external energy suppliers. However, the 
important element of the securitisation process is the negotiation of the security related 
decisions to the audience. To analyze this process the media analysis of European and 
Russian newspapers has been conducted. 
Media Analysis 
Securitisation through the speech act argues that a securitising actor can present an issue as 
a threat by negotiating it to the audience. This dissertation is structured in a specific way in 
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order to present the different levels of the speech act of security on the example of EU-
Russia relations. Chapter 4 is devoted to the analysis of the level of act, and looks at the 
negotiation process on the example of the media analysis. This section tries to explain why 
the media analysis is a valid choice of the negotiation process. It is important to differentiate 
between different types of ownership of media companies. There is a difference between 
how the same issue may be presented in private, independent mass media sources and the 
so-called elite media, which represents the official point of view. Chomsky defines the elite 
media as “the agenda-setting media because they are the ones with the big resources, they 
set the framework in which everyone else operates” (Chomsky, 1997: 1). The New York 
Times, BBC and CNN are examples of the elite media. Typically they are large and influential 
corporations and comprise part of the power system within states (Chomsky, 1997: 2). Mass 
media might be used as the source of the negotiation of the securitisation of the problem 
with the audience. Ivan Zassoursky describes it as follows:  
“The recognition issue is best solved through a system of culture codes, which are at 
the disposal of the audience, and through comparison with the images of other public 
personas, both living and dead. A favorable political image is always a multi-layered 
construct in which various “prompts” for mass consciousness are present on a 
symbolic level” (Zassoursky, 2004: 132) 
Media analysis is chosen as a research method, because it is the only accessible way 
to study and compare how energy related issues are presented in both Russia and the EU. It 
helps to answer the following questions: 1) how the problem is shaped in mass media? It 
could be understood from the analysis of which elements of the story are mentioned more 
often, which people are quoted? 2) Who has been quoted, how often and in what context? 
3) What elements of the story are covered, and what are ignored? 4) How often the issue is 
mentioned in media, is it prioritized by media over other problems? (Gould, 2004). In other 
words through media analysis one can get an understanding of shared knowledge and 
common identity within the society (O’Keefe, 2006: 127). For the purposes of this research 
eight newspapers have been selected: four Russian ones (Rossijskaya Gazeta, Kommersant, 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Nezavisimaya Gazeta) and four British ones (The Guardian, The 
Independent, The Daily Telegraph, and the Observer). In the case of Russian media, some of 
the newspapers have more pro-governmental orientation (Rossijskaya Gazeta) and the 
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others position themselves as independent ones (Nezavisimaya Gazeta). British newspapers 
selected also do have unofficial political affiliation with the parties situated on the different 
ends of the political spectrum. The time frame for media analysis is two months: December 
2008 and January 2009. The purpose of the media analysis is to compare how the energy 
crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009 has been presented in Russia and in 
Europe. The result of the media analysis is described in Chapter 4 of this thesis. British 
newspapers were selected as an example of the European mass media, because of its 
accessibility to the author of this dissertation, and the language constraints in the analysis of 
the printed media of other member states. However, in order to prove that British 
newspapers share the general media frame with the rest of the EU member states, the 
indicative analysis of cross-European media sources has been used as well. 
 Interviews 
Gillham defines an interview as follows: “Interview is a conversation, usually between two 
people. But it is a conversation where one person – the interviewer – is seeking responses for 
a particular purpose from the other person: the interviewee” (Gillham, 2000: 1). The 
interviews are used in both qualitative and quantitative research practices, but they have 
different structure and purpose. Quantitative researchers prefer to use structured interviews, 
which are built from the same questions to be asked to each interviewee. In general, 
questions in structured interviews leave little freedom for the interviewee’s response. The 
interviewer controls the conversation as if “it were a theatrical script to be followed in a 
standardized and straightforward manner” (Denzin, et al. 2003: 68). The main difference 
between structured and unstructured interviews is that the former is to use coding patterns 
to interviewee’s response in order to prove pre-established assumptions, the latter in its 
turn, “attempts to understand the complex behavior of members of society without 
imposing any prior categorization that may limit the field of inquiry” (Denzin, et al. 2003: 74-
75). Gubrium and Holstein: “The purpose of most qualitative interviewing is to derive 
interpretations, not facts or laws, from respondent talk” (Gibrium, et al. 2001: 83). In other 
words the qualitative interview does not aim to quantify data, but tries to understand the 
interviewee’s personal interpretation of the subject (Kvale, 1996). 
 The interviews conducted as part of this research are aimed at the personal opinion 
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of the interviewees. That is why qualitative semi-structured interviews have been used. 
Gubrium and Holstein are defining qualitative interviewing as “a guided conversation in 
which the researcher carefully listens “so as to hear the meaning” of what is being conveyed” 
(Gubrium, et al. 2001: 85).  Since an interview is a conversation between two people: 
interviewer and interviewee, both of them may have different social backgrounds (including 
gender, race, and education) which has influenced their perspectives (Gubrium, et al. 2001: 
84). The background of the researcher may influence the interpretation of the respondent’s 
words (Gubrium, et al. 2001: 97). Qualitative interviewing could be described as follows: 
 “The social contexts of the interview process are not viewed as something to be 
controlled, but instead are seen as an important part of meaning making in its own 
right. Qualitative researchers, in other words, treat the unfolding social contexts of 
the interview as data, not as something that, under ideal conditions, can be 
eliminated from the interview process” (Gubrium, et al. 2001: 91). 
 There are different types of qualitative interviews: unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews. Both of them have their own strengths and weaknesses. One may argue that 
unstructured interviews give the respondent an opportunity to speak more freely without 
the constraints of the interviewer’s questions, and so the research may get more information 
to analyze (Denzin, 2003: 74). Semi-structured interviews were used in this research, since it 
gives a necessary balance: the interviewer has a list of the topics to be covered, but the 
interviewee has enough freedom to say whatever he or she considered to be important in 
relevance to this or that topic (Bryman, 2004: 321). Uve Flick describes the aim of the semi-
structured interview as follows: “A goal of semi-structured interviews in general is to reveal 
existing knowledge in a way that can be expressed in the form of answers and so become 
accessible to interpretation” (Flick, 2002: 84). 
The interviews have been conducted in three cohorts: two in Russia (Moscow and the 
Altai Territory) and one in Europe (Belgium and Germany). The interviews conducted in 
Moscow and Brussels were centered on the similar topics: the diversification of energy 
supplies, the transit conflict with Ukraine, the construction of new pipelines North Stream 
and South Stream, and the question of foreign investment to the Russian energy sector. 
Apart from these interviews some of the comments have been collected during 
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presentations delivered by the experts on energy security, which have been attended during 
the years of research (for example, a presentation on the EU energy legislation by the EU 
commission in Brussels, in April 2009). The analysis of interviewees’ responses to these 
questions is important for a number of reasons. First of all, it gave an opportunity to get a 
deeper understanding of these problems by getting comments from people who are involved 
in the decision making on energy security in Russian and in the EU. Secondly, asking the 
same questions in Russia and in the EU aimed at testing the hypothesis that the same issues 
in energy trade are understood and addressed differently in Russia and the EU. The data 
collected from the interviews also demonstrate the detailed texture of the differences of 
understanding energy security, which are grounded in the political, economic and symbolic 
contexts. The second cohort of interviews conducted in Russia in April 2011 was aimed at 
collecting data on construction of new pipeline “Altai” to China. Altogether 13 interviews 
were conducted (the interview schedule could be found in the list of bibliography). The 
interviews are not the only key source of data in this dissertation and that is why the 
emphasis was made not on the quantity of the interviews, but on the specific places 
(Gazprom, European Commission). There were some limitations in access to the 
interviewees. For example, unfortunately the representative of Russian ministry of energy 
cancelled the interview due to the sensitive nature of energy security for Russian national 
security. Moreover, time and language constraints limited the access to a wide range of 
interviewees in other European member states (for example, Poland). 
The interviews provided a valuable contribution to both the development of the 
argument throughout the thesis and to the claims of originality. The analysis of the 
interviews conducted in Brussels and in Moscow allowed: 1) to collect primary data on the 
key issues in EU-Russia relations (ECT, FDI in Russian energy sector, transit conflicts with 
Ukraine) instead of relying on the secondary sources. These data is used in Chapters 2 and 3; 
2) the mirror design of the interviews allowed to support the argument, that Russia and the 
EU explain the same energy related issues differently. The interviews collected in the Altai 
Territory on the construction of the pipeline “Altai” to China provided the original data on the 
development of the Asian vector of Russian energy policy. At the moment of the submission 
of this thesis, there are no published academic sources which cover the pipeline construction 
to China in detail.  Some of the comments and interviews helped to strengthen some of the 
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conclusions presented in this dissertation. For example, the comments on the development 
of Russo-German energy relations were especially valuable for the analysis of German policy 
towards Russia. The combination of the methods described above allowed collecting the 
data necessary to answer the research questions rose in the introduction. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework of this research and the 
choice of the methodology, as well as to provide a discussion of the methods used. The 
theoretical framework of this research builds on the assumptions of CSS, in particular the 
Balzacqian critique of the Copenhagen School. CSS are chosen for the analysis of the EU-
Russia energy relations, because they offer a more complex approach, as compared to 
traditional state-centric schools of thought; it looks at the problem from the different angles: 
political, economic, and socio-cultural ones.  Balzacq argues that the security speech act 
should not be simplified to the linguistic act only (Balzacq, 2010): the securitisation happens 
on two levels: the level of agent, and the level of act. The level of agent studies the 
securitising actor (whose authority is recognized by the audience); the audience and the 
context of securitisation. This thesis underlines the importance of the context of 
securitisation, which is used by the securitising actors to negotiate an issue to the audience. 
The level of act is concerned with the linguistic element of securitisation. The choice of 
theory informs the structure of this thesis. Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the level of 
agent, and focus mainly on the context of securitisation and its interpretation by the 
securitising actors. Chapter 4 uses the media analysis to deconstruct the securitisation 
process on the level of act.  The choice of theory and methodology contributes to the 
originality of this research. The literature review demonstrated that despite the fact that 
there are a lot of academic sources published on the EU-Russia energy relations, none of 
them applied the concept of the security as a speech act to the same extent as this study. 
Moreover, the primary data collected through media analysis and interviews in Russia and 
the EU also support the claim to the originality.  
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Chapter 2 
The level of agent: the EU 
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Introduction1 
As stated in Chapter 1, the securitisation process happens at two levels: level of agent and 
that of the act. Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the level of agent. This chapter will look at 
the level of agent in the EU, and Chapter 3 will move on to Russian example. The level of 
agent includes three main elements: actor, audience and context. Due to the specific nature 
of EU-Russia energy trade the main actors involved are the governments of energy 
consuming and energy producing states and major energy companies. The audience (when 
talking about the EU) consists of both European officials and the national audiences. 
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the context of securitisation as the main variable when analyzing 
the securitisation process in Russia and the EU. This thesis argues that the context is of key 
importance for understanding both the reasons and the process of securitisation. According 
to Spitzel, “an actor cannot be a significant actor and a speech act cannot have an impact on 
social relation without a situation that constitutes them as significant” (Spitzel, 2007: 367). 
The context enables the securitising actors to ‘speak security’, to interpret the context in a 
way which could be understood and supported by the audience. To present an issue as a 
threat, the securitising actors mobilize the symbols rooted in the identity and collective 
memory of their target audience (Bourdieu, 1991: 181; Williams, 2007: 63).  The symbols 
used by the securitising actors are embedded into the social context of securitisation 
(Balzacq, 2002: 479). Chapters 2 and 3 look at the contexts of securitisation, how they 
influence the securitisation actors and how the actors manipulate these contexts in the 
securitisation process.  
Despite the high levels of interdependence in energy relations, EU-Russia relations are far 
from perfect due to the securitisation process initiated by both Russian government and the 
EU member states. Therefore, the main aim of these two chapters is to analyze what leads to 
the securitisation of energy policy in general, and EU-Russia energy relations in particular. 
However, this thesis doesn’t try to compare energy policy construction in Russia and the EU, 
because both Russia and the EU have very different political and economic structures, and 
                                                 
1
 Some of the material presented in this chapter contributed to the following publication: 
Khrushcheva, O. (2011), The creation of an Energy Security Society as the way to decrease 
securitization levels between the EU and Russia in energy trade, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research, 7 (2), p. 216-230, 
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different understanding of energy security. This thesis argues that the securitisation in the EU 
caused by the following reasons: the complex structure of competence division between 
European institutions and the member states; member states differ in their approach to 
energy policy; the national energy policies of the member states often clash and contribute 
to securitisation both within the EU and in EU-Russian relations.  
To illustrate and support this argument better this chapter looks at the European context 
of securitisation: the division of competences between the EU and member states, with the 
limited ability of the European institutions to influence the national policies of the member 
states. The second part of this chapter is devoted to the national level of securitisation, how 
member states affected by the European and domestic context in development and 
implementation of their energy policies. Poland and Germany are selected as case studies of 
the individual member states as the securitising actors. Both Germany and Poland depend on 
Russian energy supplies and are potentially vulnerable to energy supply interruptions by 
Russia. Germany is largest consumer among the original 15 member states, and Poland is a 
former member of the Soviet bloc. Moreover, these two countries have a different history of 
relations with Russia and pursue very different energy policy approaches towards it.    
European Context  
CSS promotes a hermeneutical approach in which facts can only be understood in the 
context of social process (Jahn, 1998: 615). However, it is impossible to look at interpretation 
of facts, before studying facts first. In case of EU energy policy and EU-Russia energy relations 
these facts include the levels of self-sufficiency and dependence on the external energy 
suppliers of the EU member states. That is why this chapter begins from a brief overview of 
the facts which are particularly relevant to the context of securitisation. The self-sufficiency 
of the EU, in terms of energy consumption, is gradually declining. At the present moment, 
the EU imports around 45 per cent of its natural gas consumption from outside the EU 
(Egging, et. al 2006: 2763) and it is expected that this import share will grow in the near 
future. In next 20-30 years, EU dependence on external natural gas supplies could reach up 
to 70 per cent (Umbach, 2010: 1236). In the case with oil, it becomes easier to transport gas 
long distances and, consequently, it could be imported from the remote geographical 
locations. The natural gas market, in contrast to the oil market, is much more limited to the 
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regional level, due to transportation limitations. At the moment, the EU imports natural gas 
from three main sources: Norway, Algeria, and Russia. Among these three countries, the 
Russian company Gazprom is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe. Presently, Russia 
accounts for around 23 per cent of overall European natural gas imports (Umbach, 2010: 
1236). The Russian Federation is one of three main suppliers of natural gas to the EU and is 
also an important oil exporter to the region. However, the different member states of the EU 
are not equally dependent on Russia. Central and Eastern European states are more 
dependent on Moscow, importing between 50 to 100 per cent of their energy consumption 
requirements from their Eastern neighbour; whereas the original fifteen member states are 
far less dependent on Russian supplies. Due to the different level of dependence of the EU 
member states on Russian energy supplies, individual member states often prefer to develop 
bilateral approach in relations with Russia. Some of the member states might have 
contradictory policies towards Russia, and the lack of coherent energy policy makes the 
coordination of EU-Russia energy relations even more complicated. That is why it is 
important to look at the development of the Common European Energy Policy. 
 The EU is a multi-level system of governance, with the decision-making powers 
shared between the EU institutions and the member states. The division of powers between 
the member states and institutions is a part of the context of securitisation, because there is 
a clash between the bilateral national energy policies of individual member states and “the 
broad consensus over the need for a more integrated energy policy” (Natorski et al. 2008: 
72). Spitzel writes about a structural context of actor-ness; this context “constitutes actors 
and provides a frame of enabling and constraining conditions” (Spitzel, 2007: 368) of 
securitising powers of different actors. That is why an overview of the European legislation 
defining competences of both the EU institution and the individual member states is 
essential for understanding which actors have an ability to present an issue as a threat.  
In spring 2011, new European legislation on further liberalization of the European energy 
market and unification of approach towards external energy suppliers came into power. 
However, in reality, this process began as early as in 1980s, when the main provisions of what 
is known now as the Third Energy Package (liberalization of energy markets and integration 
of energy infrastructures) had been formulated. This process can be divided into three 
stages: 1) the end of the 1980s–the beginning of the 1990s; 2) the early 2000s; 3) the third 
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energy package, which came into power in spring 2011. A brief overview of this process, as 
well as the development of energy policy prior to 1988, is presented below.    
It is well-known that two out of the three original treaties of European integration have 
been concerned with the energy industry and trade. They are the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) (1952) and the European Atomic Energy Committee (Euroatom) (1957) 
(Matlary, 1997: 14). The former was created in order to ensure the economic reconstruction 
of post-Second World War Europe and, at the same time, to facilitate peace between 
Germany and France. Janne Haaland Matlary (Matlary, 1997: 15) describes these intentions: 
“…it seemed an excellent idea to try to forge integration between the two old foes – 
France and Germany – by creating a common policy for coal and steel production. This was 
an instrument to advance peace building; a functional tool of economic policy that would 
lead to lasting peace, it was hoped”  
The ECSC basically created a common market for coal, which was the main source of 
energy at that time. The treaty proposed to put the coal industry in Germany and the steel 
industry in France under the control of a supranational body – the High Authority. Apart from 
France and Germany, the Benelux countries and Italy also took part in the treaty (Matlary, 
1997: 15). The Euroatom, in its turn, was developed to support the nuclear industry of the 
European countries by controlling them through the Euroatom Supply Agency (De Long, 
2008: 96). Euroatom also had the ambitious goal to sell nuclear power to non-Community 
countries.  Among other things, Euroatom has been responsible for funding nuclear research 
(Matlary, 1997: 17).   
It is important to answer, why, considering that two of the founding treaties of the 
European Community have dealt with energy problems, energy policy is considered to be 
one of the weak points in European integration? Matlary explains that both the treaties were 
designed to facilitate the political and economic integration of Europe, but not to create a 
comprehensive energy policy (Matlary, 1997: 16). In the first decades after the end of the 
Second World War, energy has been an important element of the economic reconstruction of 
European states.  Each member state considered it to be an important part of national 
security and, consequently, resisted delegating any authority in this area to the supranational 
level of the European Community (Padgett, 1992: 53). However, at the end of 1950s, three of 
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the EC supranational bodies decided to attempt to develop a Common European Energy 
Policy (De Jong, 2008: 96). This policy was not successful due to changes in the internal 
energy sectors of the member states. According to de Jong, since the early 1960s, six 
European member states have been using different energy sources domestically. France and 
the Netherlands have become more and more dependent on oil, Germany and Belgium 
“opted for a very gradual transition away from coal” (De Jong, 2008: 96).  It may be 
concluded that in the post-war era, the member states preferred to protect energy security 
on the national level and did not see how the integration and unification of energy sector 
may benefit them. The situation started to change with the growing dependence on oil and 
gas, and, consequently on external energy suppliers. The importance of security of supply 
became especially evident after the oil shocks of the 1970s. 
The growing importance of oil also played a role in the development of a Common 
European Energy Policy. All the mechanisms and bodies established by the ECSC and 
Euroatom were mainly concerned with coal and following the increase of oil consumption 
gradually became obsolete (Matlary, 1997: 18). Even the oil shock of 1973–74 did not 
facilitate the development of a single approach towards energy security. As Matlary notes, 
“EC countries opted for bilateral agreements with [the] Arab oil producers, who rewarded 
them according to their stance on the Arab–Israel question” (Matlary, 1997: 17). It was US 
Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger who pressed for the establishment of an oil-sharing 
mechanism, developed in 1974 (De Jong, 2008: 97). This decision was followed by the 
creation of the International Energy Agency (De Jong, 2008: 97). The European Community 
did not make a lot of progress on the question of a Common European Energy Policy up to 
the middle of the 1980s. Even when, in 1986, the Single European Act introduced the 
decision to create an internal market, energy was not included in the White Paper (Matlary, 
1997: 19 -20). Due to the instability of energy markets and, consequently, the vulnerability of 
energy supply, European countries have been mainly concerned with security of supply, 
rather than with market integration.  
In 1988, the European Commission designed an inventory, outlining an action plan for the 
creation of the Internal Energy Market (Padgett, 1992: 57). The action plan included the 
following points: 1) the harmonization of taxation and technical standards, as well as the 
opening up of public procurement; 2) the liberalization of the energy market, by application 
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of the Community law on free movement of goods and services; 3) the harmonization of 
cost-price structures in Member States, and the integration of energy infrastructures 
(Padgett, 1992: 57). From the early 1990s, key elements of the European energy programme 
have been formulated; these elements are markets and competition and environmental 
factors of energy security. Jacques de Jong notes that, at this period of time, “fuel supply *…+ 
gradually entered *…+ the domain of EU competence” (De Jong, 2008: 98). 
In 1994–1998, the EU began the development of a programme for the liberalization of 
the electricity and natural gas markets. In 1998, Directive 98/30/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the European Council of 22 June 1998, concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas, was issued. This Directive was replaced by Directive 
2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003, concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas (Maican: 6-7). The second Directive gave 
an opportunity to commercial consumers to choose suppliers starting from July 2004. 
Residential consumers received this right three years later, in July 2007 (Maican: 7). In 
September 2007, a new Directive on energy has been adopted, which was supposed to 
create legal framework for “complete ownership unbinding” (Maican: 7). However, due to 
opposition from the individual member states, the European Commission adopted the 
original provisions, in favour of the creation of an independent system of operators, “which 
allow the big European energy firms to maintain ownership of transmission networks but 
leave management decisions to the Independent System Operators” (Maican: 7).  
At the moment the Common European Energy Policy aims to achieve the following:  
“A European Energy Policy will firmly commit the EU to a low consumption economy 
based on more secure, more competitive and more sustainable energy. Priority energy 
objectives involve ensuring the smooth functioning of the internal market in energy, security 
of strategic supply, concrete reductions in greenhouse gas emissions caused by the 
production or consumption of energy and the EU's ability to speak with a single voice on the 
international stage”  (An Energy Policy for Europe, 2007).  
 To put it simply, the EU is aiming to unify the internal market and acknowledges the 
importance of diversification of supplies by developing renewable energy sources. This 
communication also demonstrates the intention of the EU to coordinate relations with 
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energy producers. These provisions are known as the Third Energy Package. However, it is 
important to note that “the Third Energy Package didn’t involve a significant amount of 
adding primary legislation, no new policies” (Lewiner, 2010) and is mainly concerned with 
development of internal market. Considering that the main provisions of what is now known 
as the Third Energy Package had been formulated in the late 1980s, it is difficult to say 
whether the EU has achieved these aims yet. From an overview of the struggle towards the 
Common European Energy Policy, it demonstrates that the states’ willingness to implement 
incentives proposed by the European institutions is influenced by domestic energy security 
needs, and the competence of the European institutions over energy is still limited. Energy 
related issues are shared competence between the EU and member states. According to 
Hadfield (2012) “as of 2009, the European Commission has competence in issues where 
energy relates to internal and external trade, environmental requirements (climate change 
and sustainable development), and various aspects of competition” (443). The completion 
aspects are mainly related to the anti-trust issues. For example, in February 2010 the EU DG 
Competition reached an agreement with Italian company Eni over the ownership of its 
European gas pipelines, as a result Eni agreed to renounce its ownership of these pipelines 
(Lewiner, 2010). The European Commission also has some competence to scrutinise energy 
contracts between the member states and external parties (Hadfield, 2012: 443). However, 
the overall power of decision-making and control of external energy policy is still limited. 
Guild et al. defines it as “the logic of intergovernmentalism (Guild et al. 2008: 15). The multi-
level decision-making structure together with a certain level of mistrust between individual 
member states create a securitisation context in which a variety of actors operate (Guild et 
al. 2008: 21). 
Considering that the EU is dependent on the energy supplies from non-EU member 
states, it is important to discuss external energy relations when analysing the development 
of the Common European Energy Policy. As it was mentioned above the competence of the 
European institutions are limited to spill-over of the internal market, these developments 
also shaped framework for external energy market relations with energy-producing states, 
and transit states. This was reflected both in internal policy development and through 
international agreements with non-EU countries. The Council Directive 2004/67/EC (26April 
2004), concerning measures to safeguard the security of natural gas supply states: 
75 
 
“In order to meet growing demand for gas and diversify gas supplies as a condition for a 
competitive internal gas market, the Community will need to mobilize significant additional 
volumes of gas over the coming decades much of which will have to come from distant 
sources and transported over long distances”. 
Rudolf Egging and Steven Gabriel outline several legislative, informative and 
infrastructural measures in an attempt to secure energy supplies (Egging et al. 2006: 2763). 
This includes legislative provisions for the separation of gas-supplying companies from 
transportation network operators, legal requirements for open access to transportation 
networks of third parties and the establishment of a Monitoring Agency that “should develop 
a database of production volumes, demand estimates and stock levels” (Egging et al. 2006: 
2763). These provisions are part of the Third Energy Package, and are also rather limited in an 
ability of the European institutions to influence energy relations with external energy 
suppliers and are mainly spillover effects of internal energy market.  
Finally, as it was mentioned above the EU also has a certain degree of authority when 
dealing with renewable energy and energy efficiency, one of the most important and recent 
steps in this direction is the Second Strategic Energy Review, which aims to draft a plan of 
decreasing the dependence of the EU on energy imports. One of the EU plans, the 20-20-20 
strategy has been developed to reduce greenhouse emissions by 20 per cent, to increase the 
share of the renewable energy by 20 per cent, and to improve energy efficiency by 20 per 
cent; all of these tasks are to be completed by 2020. The EU’s 20-20-20 strategy is orientated 
to the medium and long-term development, because it requires serious and time-consuming 
changes in the energy systems of the European states (with public authorities, energy 
regulators, infrastructure operators, the energy industry and citizens all actively involved) to 
create a diversity of non-fossil fuel supplies, flexible infrastructures and capacities for 
demand management (Egging et al. 2006: 2763). The EU is looking for ways to diversify its 
energy supply; for instance, through the development of supply from Caspian and Middle 
Eastern sources, or through the development of an infrastructure for Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) transportation, and usage to and between Member States (Egging et al. 2006: 2763). A 
more detailed description of the EU plans to diversify the supply routes are described in 
Chapter 5, which focuses on the consequences of the securitisation of the energy trade and 
demonstrates the result of lack of coherent energy policy on the attempts of supply 
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diversification. 
The section above demonstrated the limited authority of the EU in relation to internal 
and external energy policies. Energy is one of the shared competences between the EU and 
member states. Both in internal and external energy relations, the European institutions 
mainly have decision-making powers in aspect related to internal market and renewable 
energy. The additional complication in relations with Russia is the lack of coherent 
international agreement which would coordinate both Russian actions and the actions of all 
EU member states in the same way. In the 1990s an attempt was made to develop such a 
network – the ECT.  The ECT covers a variety of issues related to the security of supplies, 
starting from markets and competitions, to dispute settlement and transit regulations, as 
well as environmental provisions. In a sense, the ECT is supposed to be a soft power or 
external government mechanism, developed in order to promote internal European values to 
non-Community countries. Originally, it was mainly aimed at the CIS, Central and Eastern 
Europe. At the moment, 51 countries have signed the treaty, and another 20 states and 10 
international organizations have observer status. Only five countries did not ratify the treaty: 
Norway, Iceland, Australia, Belarus and Russia (Maican). Moreover, in 2009, the then Russian 
Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, renounced Russian participation in the ECT (Hadfield, 2012: 
448), because it overlooks the interests of the energy producers and transit states, and 
focuses only on the security of supply. The clash of opinions between Russia and the EU on 
the ECT demonstrate how the securitising actors can attach different meanings to the same 
issues. Balzacq writes that “the meaning of the world is framed… by the members of a 
specific society” (Balzacq 2002: 475). The ECT affects members of different societies, which 
are embedded into different contexts and share different identity and collective knowledge, 
hence proving that security is “multi-perspectival” (Balzacq, 2002: 478). At the moment, 
Russia and the EU are negotiating possible amendments to the ECT, to include the interests 
of the energy-producing states as well. The ECT is described below in more detail.  
The Energy Charter Treaty  
The idea of developing an international treaty on energy trade first appeared in the European 
Council in 1990. The so-called European Energy Charter was developed in 1991. The Charter 
is “a concise expression of the principles that should underpin international energy 
cooperation, based on a shared interest in secure energy supply and sustainable economic 
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development” (Energy Charter website 1). The ECT was developed on the basis of the EEC, 
“the latter document was drawn up as a declaration of political intent to promote energy co-
operation, the ECT is a legally-binding multilateral instrument” (Energy Charter website). The 
treaty was intended to serve as a political and legal foundation for cooperation in the energy 
sector. The ECT was signed in 1994 and is a legally-binding multilateral agreement (Haghighi, 
2007:188). The ECT is based on five main elements (ECT, 1994):   protection of foreign 
investment, on the basis of national or most favoured nation treatment and protection from 
non-commercial risks; the energy materials, products and energy-related equipment trade on 
the basis of WTO regulations; the provision for reliable cross-border transit of energy 
products; the resolution of conflicts between participating states, or between investors and 
host states; and the promotion of energy efficiency, in order to minimize negative 
environmental consequences. Russia signed the treaty, but never ratified it. Moreover, in 
2009 the Russian government “terminated its provisional application of the ECT in August 
2009” (Hadfield, 2012: 448). 
 In the 1990s Russia took part in negotiations of the ECT and signed it. Therefore, 
Russia agreed to apply the ECT provisionally subject to its ratification by Russian Parliament. 
However, the treaty has never been ratified by Russia. Moreover, in 2000s Russian official 
rhetoric in regards to the treaty has changed and in 2009 the Russian government 
“terminated its provisional application of the ECT in August 2009” (Hadfield, 2012: 448). As 
the main argument for denunciation of its participation in the ECT, Russia uses the process of 
third-party access, which obliges signatory states to provide access to their pipeline networks 
wherever there is available capacity in these pipelines (ECT, 1994). Russia did not want to 
lose control over the pipeline network, which connects Central Asian gas with the European 
market. Current Russian leaders argue that the ECT focused only on the interests of energy 
consumers, and it was not beneficial for energy producers and transit states to participate in 
it (Milov, 2008). Moreover, Putin claims that the ECT proved itself to be invalid during the 
energy crises with transit states. In particular he uses an example of Ukraine, which signed 
and ratified the ECT and transit protocol, but it did not prevent Ukrainian officials from 
siphoning off gas destined for Europe (Milov, 2008). The current Russian regime presents the 
ECT to the Russian population as the treaty signed during a period of political weakness, 
when Russia was obliged to accept the rules of the game imposed from the outside, which 
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did not take into consideration Russian interests and needs. At the same time, Putin’s 
government presents Russia as the stronger player, which would never agree to the 
provisions of the ECT or any other international agreement that would contradict Russian 
interests (Rahr, 2008: 316–317). For the ‘new’ Russia, it is a question of prestige and 
recognition.  
The Russian decision to denounce its participation in the ECT was criticized by the EU. 
Finon and Locatelli write that this decision by the Russian Federation demonstrates that, 
“Russia had moved towards a model of traditional power, deployed diplomacy backed by 
force to reassert its influence in its ‘near abroad’, and was determined to use its energy 
resources to exert geopolitical influence” (Finon et al. 2008: 425). Moreover, some authors 
argue that the Russian position is based on the misinterpretation of the ECT in regards to the 
third-party access mentioned above. Hadfield writes that “the ECT’s provisions specifically 
exclude mandatory third-party access to pipeline systems” (Hadfield, 2012: 448). Some of 
Russian authors also write about the negative impact of Russian withdrawal from the treaty. 
For instance, according to Milov if Russia did ratify and apply the treaty it may minimise the 
negative consequences of Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict on Russia’s reputation, because the 
fact of supply interruptions would be investigated following the rules and provisions of the 
ECT (Milov, 2008). Nonetheless, the current Russian decision to withdraw from the ECT 
contributes to the securitisation process both in the EU and in Russia. The lack of coherent 
international agreement and the limited ability of the European institutions to coordinate 
external energy policy inform the current context of securitisation in the EU.  
The EU is a multi-level system of governance, in which the main decision-making powers 
are shared between the European institutions and the member states. This division of 
competences contribute to the securitisation process. In particular, energy is an area of 
shared competence, where the EU has a decision-making powers in areas related to internal 
energy market, renewable energy and sustainability.  The fact that the European institutions 
have a limited ability to influence the national energy policy of the individual member states 
means that the crucial decisions on the energy policy are made on the intergovernmental 
level (Guild et al. 2008: 15). This leads to the competition between different securitising 
actors embedded in different political, economic and social contexts (Guild et al. 2008: 21). 
The majority of the EU member states share the same understanding of the priorities of 
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energy security. These priorities are market liberalization, integration of energy-transmitting 
networks, increasing the usage of renewable energy sources, developing energy efficiency 
and diversifying energy supplies. However, different member states promote different ways 
of achieving these priorities. Furthermore the high levels of dependence of the EU on 
Russian energy supplies and incidents of supply interruption in 2006, 2007 and 2009, 
demonstrated the importance of developing a Common European Energy Policy towards 
Russia (the EC representative, 2011). However, so far the European institutions have a limited 
ability to influence national energy policies of the member states. Moreover, in regards to 
EU-Russian energy relations there is no coherent international agreement to regulate energy 
trade. As a result, the current context allows the individual member states to develop their 
own national energy policies in general, and energy relations with Russia. The analysis of the 
European context of decision-making powers divisions helps to draw the following 
conclusions: 
1. Despite the attempts of the European Commission to increase its ability to control 
energy trade and distribution both within the EU and in its relations with external 
suppliers its powers are still limited. Therefore, the member states have a relative 
freedom to make decisions on energy related issues, including energy trade with 
Russia. 
2. Due to the limited ability of the EU institutions to control bilateral relations of the 
member states with external energy suppliers, it often doesn’t have competence 
required to stop the individual member states from making controversial policy 
decisions, which may clash with interests of other member states and with the EU-
wide attempts to develop a Common European Energy Policy. 
The section below demonstrates how individual member states contribute to the 
securitisation process in the context described above. The case studies of Poland and 
Germany are selected for analysis. Both these member states are highly dependent on 
Russian energy supplies: Germany is the biggest consumer among the original fifteen 
member-states, and Poland is one of the new member-states highly dependent on Russian 
supplies.  Moreover, each of these member-states takes very distinct approach towards 
energy relations with Russia. Germany is often criticised for developing bilateral relations 
with Russia which contradict the mutual European efforts to develop a Common European 
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Energy Policy. At the same time, Poland promotes development of the Common European 
approach. In 2007 Poland vetoed the negotiations on new Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement between Russia and the EU.  Furthermore, a number of authors distinguish 
Poland and Germany as important actors in EU-Russia energy relations (Aalto, 2009; Natorski 
et al. 2008; Simonov, 2007; Rahr, 2008; Hanson, 2009).  
Domestic Context  
The previous section was devoted to the context of development of EU’s external and 
internal energy policy. The lack of coherent energy policy on the European level allows the 
member states and Russia to develop bilateral relations. Some of the decisions of individual 
member states might contradict the overall interests of the EU and contribute to the 
securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations. The former EU Commissioner for Trade Peter 
Mandelson once stated: “The incoherence of European policy towards Russia over much of 
the last decade has been, frankly, alarming. No other country reveals our differences as does 
Russia” (Mandelson, 2008). The different attitudes towards Russia within the EU, largely due 
to the different levels of dependence on Russia and the different historical experience with 
Russia, also contribute to the securitisation process. When talking about the high level of 
dependence of the EU on Russian energy sources, it is important to remember that not all 
member states are equally dependent on Russia in this sense. There are seven member 
states who are 100 per cent dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies, and another six who 
are around 50 per cent dependent. Overall, Russia provides only around 40 per cent of the 
total EU energy consumption (Leal-Arcas, 2009: 351). Goldthau divided European consumers 
into two groups, on the basis of their dependence levels on Russian energy supplies. The first 
is “old” Europe, which is less dependent on Russia and imports less than half to no energy 
resources from Russia (Germany is the biggest consumer in this group with a 46 per cent 
import share); the second group is made up of the so-called “new” European states, which 
are almost 100 per cent dependent on Russian supplies, for instance, the Baltic Republics or 
Poland and the Czech Republic, who import around two-thirds of their supplies from Russia 
(Goldthau, 2008: 687). The second group includes some states that have had a difficult 
history of relations with Russia, which can contribute to the securitisation process (for 
example Poland and the Baltic States).  To better demonstrate how the policies of individual 
member states may contribute towards the securitisation of the energy trade, case studies of 
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two countries have been chosen: Germany and Poland.  
The case of Poland demonstrates how the European enlargement influenced the 
securitisation of European energy policy. A number of authors consider Poland to be one of 
the key securitising actors in EU-Russia relations (Raszewski, 2012; Spruds, 2009). Both the 
high levels of dependence on Russian supplies and history of Polish-Russian relations 
contribute to these policy developments. However, all these reasons lead to the same goal: 
to decrease Polish dependence on Russian energy supplies, through diversification of energy 
supplies (Spruds, 2009: 111), and by “closer inter-connectedness with the wider EU energy 
market” (Raszewski, 2012: 138).  Germany is highly dependent on external energy supplies: 
“in 2009 Germany had to import 97 per cent of its oil and 84 per cent of its gas” (Demakova 
et al. 2012). And energy cooperation is the central element of German-Russian relations. 
German relations with Russia are often influenced by economic interests of energy 
companies and close political links between Russian and German state leaders. Bilateral 
relations between Moscow and Berlin often raise concerns in the EU in regards to the overall 
European aims in developing a Common European Energy Policy (Smith 2008; Demakova et 
al. 2012). 
Poland 
It is easier to present a specific issue as a threat if it fits into a specific social context (Spitzel, 
2007: 370). That is why collective memory and national identity play an important role in the 
securitisation process. The securitising actors use the symbols, shared by all members of 
society, to negotiate collective understanding (Balzacq, 2002: 475). Balzacq also writes that 
“security takes place in a particular society, a network of intricate meanings” (Balzacq, 2002: 
480). In this case, Poland is a good example to demonstrate the role of national identity and 
collective memory in the securitisation process.  This section looks at how high level of 
dependence on Russian energy supply and difficult history of relation with Russia shapes 
Polish perspective on EU energy policy towards Russia.  
Misik argues that European enlargement has brought the security of energy supply to 
the top of the European agenda. The states of Central and Eastern Europe, which joined the 
EU in 2004 and 2007, are eager to use the EU institutions to ensure their energy security 
(Misik, 2010: 102). The new member states feel particularly vulnerable in terms of energy 
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trade with Russia, because of their much higher levels of dependence on Moscow, than the 
EU-15 (Misik, 2010: 102).  Moreover, due to the fact that the majority of the transportation 
networks connecting Russia with the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe have been 
constructed during the Soviet times, they are directed mainly one way, from East to West. 
This limits the ability of new member states to diversify their natural gas supplies away from 
Russia. The majority of the new member states are insisting on the construction of South-
North interconnections within the EU to decrease their vulnerability, in case of supply 
interruptions by Moscow (Misik, 2010: 102). 
The Polish communist past makes Poland, as well as other Eastern and Central 
European states, more dependent on Russian energy supplies, than the so-called “old 
Europe”. Poland imports around two-thirds of their gas from Russia (Goldthau, 2008) due to 
the fact that during the Cold War Russia was natural supplier of oil and gas for Poland. The 
traditionally negative perception of Russia escalates the securitisation process in Poland. 
Moreover, ironically enough, membership in the EU is likely to increase, rather than 
decrease, Polish dependence on Russian energy supplies. EU environmental policies are 
pressing Poland to reduce their dependence on coal, which would increase Polish demand 
for other energy sources, including natural gas (Smith, 2004).  Warsaw fears it will be the 
“subject of Russia’s good will in energy deliveries if future demand increases render their 
import dependency even more” (Goldthau, 2008) and tries to lessen dependence on Russian 
energy supplies.  First of all, Poland is trying to resist the further expansion of Gazprom in 
their internal market. Gazprom controls around 35 per cent of the Polish Gas Trading 
industry. Currently, Poland resists the initiative of Russian energy companies to buy shares in 
local energy companies, to avoid the growing influence of Russian companies on the internal 
market (Smith, 2004). In a sense, the Polish perception of Russia as a threat, is rooted in the 
Polish past and is important part of Polish national identity.  
Chapter 1 explained that the securitisation process depends not only on the decisions 
made and negotiated to the audience by the securitising actors, but also from the context, 
which can be both based on facts and influenced by socio-political factors. Previous section 
demonstrated the factual context of Russo-Polish relations: high level of dependence on 
Russian energy supplies. This sections analyses how the symbolic elements, such as national 
identity and collective memory contributed to the securitisation of Russo-Polish relations, 
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and consequently EU-Russia relations as well. Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams 
write that it is easier to present an issue as a threat, “where history of hostile sentiments 
exist*s+” (Peoples et al. 2010:79). Throughout the history, Polish security and sovereignty has 
been violated by Russia. A short summary of Russo-Polish relations deduces that their 
relationship consists of 16 wars (14 of them have been initiated by Russia), three partitions of 
Poland and 45 years of imposed communism. This history has created the sense that Russia is 
a threat in Polish national identity. Public Opinion conducted by Public Opinion Research 
Centre (CBOS) supports this argument. According to CBOS around 40% of Poles described 
Russo-Polish relationship as bad; 51% as neither good nor bad; and only 4% said they were 
good (www.cbos.pl). To compare the results, a similar public opinion survey in Russia 
demonstrated that 57% of respondents in Russia consider Poland to be a friendly state, and 
only 25% as unfriendly (Geoproject: Poland).  
  The perception of Russia as a threat is accompanied by the self-perception of Poland 
as “the bulwark of Europe” (Walicki, 1990: 32). For centuries, Poland has associated itself 
with Western Europe, rather than so-called Eastern Europe. First, this link was related to its 
belonging to the pan-European community, which is based on the common religious values 
of the Western world, documented in the fifteenth century. Later, in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the religious community was replaced with the concept of the Western 
world as one of common civilization, sharing values of freedom and solidarity (Tornquist-
Plewa, 2002). Later, in the interwar period and during the Second World War, the Polish elite 
still associated themselves with the wider Western European community. Poles believe that 
they were among the founding fathers of the ideas of European integration.  During the 
Second World War, the governments of a number of European states, occupied by the Nazi 
Germany, were based in London. During the war years, these governments-in-exile started to 
discuss the first plans for European integration. General Wladyslaw Sikorski, the head of 
Polish government-in-exile, took active part in these negotiations. On the 11 November 
1941, Sikorski and Eduard Benes2 announced their intention to enter into a “political and 
economic association” (Wilfried, 2009: 24), which could be joined by other Eastern European 
states. In January 1942, the Polish and Czech governments agreed to form a Polish-
Czechoslovakian confederation after the war. Even though similar ideas were developed by 
                                                 
2
 The head of the provisional Czech government. 
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other representatives of the Eastern European resistance, Sikorski wanted to gather “the 
whole of Eastern – Central and South-Eastern Europe into one federation”. In 1942, he 
organized a round of negotiations between the representatives of the governments of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Greece, Yugoslavia 
and the “Free France” Committee to discuss the organizational principles of the European 
Confederation to be created after the war (Wilfried, 2009).  When, after the end of the 
Second World War, Poland as well as other Central and Eastern European states found 
themselves under Communist rule, Poland felt unfairly cut out of Western Europe. 
From this example, you can see the constant presence of the Russian threat, both as an 
aggressor, who had attacked the Polish lands in 1939, and an oppressor, who had suppressed 
the Polish right to political self-determination for the 45 years of communist rule. Secondly, 
the sense of belonging to Western Europe and pan-European ideas had already begun to be 
developed during the Second World War. And finally, the unfair segregation from Western 
Europe, a decision taken by the Great Powers, which, as Polish elite believed, designed the 
Yalta Agreement to provide a balance of power between the Soviet and the US-led blocs. 
Renata Stawarska writes that Western countries sacrificed “the political and economic 
freedom of countries which happened to end up on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain” 
(Stawarska, 1999).  In other words, another defeat of Poland saved Europe from the further 
spread of communist rule. Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc Poland has endeavoured a 
long journey of political and economic reforms to join the European Union. After Poland was 
finally ‘reunited’ with Western Europe, Warsaw saw itself as an expert on Russia (Walicki, 
1990) and emphasised the importance of development and implementation of more 
coherent European policy towards Russia. For example, Poland insisted on the ECT 
ratification by Russia as a condition for a new EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (Smith, 2007). Furthermore, in 2006, Poland proposed the creation of an energy 
form of NATO to protect the EU from growing Russian leverage (Aalto, 2009).   
Moreover, the feeling of vulnerability caused by high levels of dependence on Russian 
supplies is intensified by Russian energy supplies interruptions. Even though, for a long time, 
Russia was considered to be a reliable supplier of energy resources and the question of 
energy dependence on Russia was not that crucial for the EU, the situation changed after a 
number of altercations with the transit states (Ukraine and Belarus) in 2006, 2007 and 2009. 
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The energy shortfalls, due to price disagreements, demonstrated the vulnerability of the EU, 
due to its high levels of dependence on energy imports. However, for some of the new 
member states, energy cut-offs have not been something completely new. Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania had already faced energy supply interruptions during the winter of 1992 – 
1993. Russia explained these cut-offs as being the result of the refusal of these countries to 
pay world prices for energy supplies in hard currency. However, some researchers (for 
instance Keith Smith) argue that the real reason for the cut-offs was that they were a Russian 
attempt to prevent policy change in the Baltic States (Smith, 2004: v). Additionally, the 
Central and Eastern European states are more vulnerable to these supply interruptions, 
because of the higher levels of dependence mentioned above.  
The context of Polish-Russian relations allows Polish government to shape public opinion 
in a way to present Russia as a threat to Polish (and European) energy security. Some of 
these claims are justified and are based on the factual context of dependence, and some are 
questioned and debated by both Russian and European experts. The context, especially 
symbolic one, allows the securitising actors to select “the certain features of the concept, 
while others are elided” (Balzacq, 2010). Buzan argues that the issue becomes a security 
issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is 
presented as a threat; since only extraordinary situation may require extraordinary 
measures. For instance, the Nord Stream pipeline project3 was described by Poland as the 
new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Gilbert, 2009: 131). Polish criticism was based on such 
reasons as: questions of environmental security in the Black Sea, the lack of control of transit 
states over energy supply, which can increase the risk of energy cuts from Russia, and 
potential complications to the development of a Common European Energy Policy (Gilbert, 
2009: 131). However, some experts (Cameron, 2011; Simonov, 2010) explain this Polish 
position, not by security concerns posed by the Nord Stream, but due to the economic 
considerations: Warsaw didn’t want Russia to prioritise the Nord Stream over the traditional 
overland pipeline, which was supposed to go through Polish territory, and consequently to 
lose the fees from the transit of Russian gas through Polish territory (Cameron, 2011; 
Simonov, 2010).  
                                                 
3
 The Nord Stream (NS) pipeline goes under the Baltic Sea. The NS aims to connect Russia and Germany, 
bypassing transit states. The NS is expected to have annual capacity of 55 bcm. 
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Poland as well as the majority of the new member states share similar perspectives of the 
priorities of the EU in terms of energy security. Misik summarized them as follows: 1. the 
need for the creation of a Common European Energy Policy; 2. the need for a diversification 
of energy supply and the construction of new transport routes; 3. The solidarity among the 
member states on the energy related issues (Misik, 2010: 114-115). The example of the EU 
presidencies of new member states proves that energy security is one of the major priorities 
of Central and Eastern European states, in terms of European integration. For example, 
during the Czech Republic presidency in the first half of 2009, the Southern Corridor Summit 
took place, where the plans for diversification of energy supplies were discussed (Misik, 
2010: 114).  New member states also expressed support for the necessity of “speaking with 
one voice”, with regards to energy relations with Russia. For instance, the Baltic States 
introduction to the provision on solidarity in the Lisbon Treaty states that, “this measure 
should safeguard the supplies of energy by the mutual help of member states in the case of 
shortages” (Misik, 2010: 119). Moreover, some of the member states have hoped that the 
new provisions of the Third Energy Package would help to minimize the risks related to the 
high levels of dependence on Russian supplies. For example, Latvia demands Gazprom to sell 
its share in Latvian transportation networks to ensure the third-party access to gas pipelines 
and decrease Gazprom’s control over the Latvian energy market (From an interview with the 
representative of German Ministry of Economics). Overall, the majority of new member 
states promote a more coordinated approach in future EU – Russia energy relations. New 
member states support a more unified approach to Russia for a number of reasons: due to 
the difficult history of relations with Moscow; higher levels of dependence, compared to the 
rest of the EU; and, finally an opportunity to ensure economic interests using the EU 
mechanisms. The case study of Poland illustrates each of these three issues in more detail. 
Polish attempts to influence Russian energy policy through the EU mechanisms are often 
undermined by the lack of coherent European policy towards Russia. The internal discourse 
between the EU member states over directions of EU-Russia energy dialogue is explained in 
Russia as the failure to ‘digest’ the enlargement and using internal disagreement for its 
benefit – by reaching bilateral agreements with individual member states which express 
more favourable position towards Russia.  For example, Russia enjoys good, strong relations 
with Germany. Germany is one of the main Russian trading partners and one of the largest 
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investors in the Russian economy. Due to the unique nature of the EU, even good energy 
relations with Russia could contribute to the securitisation of the energy trade. Some experts 
(Smith, 2007) argue that Germany undermines the overall European attempts to develop a 
Common European Energy Policy. The section below describes bilateral relations between 
Russia and Germany, and explains how these relations contribute to the securitisation 
process. 
Germany  
German’s decision-making process is also affected by a specific context. Factually Germany as 
well as Poland is highly dependent on Russian energy supplies. According to Westphal, the 
shares of Russian energy imports to Germany have increased significantly since 1991 
(Westphal, 2008: 96). Russian natural gas imports rose by 55.5 per cent between 1991 and 
2003, and accounted for 41.7 per cent of overall imports in 2005 (Westphal, 2008: 96). At the 
same time, Germany is the largest European investor in Russia (Riley, 2006: 5). Berlin is also 
an important trading partner to Moscow: “Germany ranks first in Russia’s imports with 13.5 
per cent originating in Germany, and second in Russia’s exports with 8.2 per cent directed to 
Germany” (Westphal, 2008: 97).  Moreover, Germany and Russia also share a difficult history 
of relations following the two World Wars and the Cold War. However, as compared to Polish 
case Russia and Germany have also a history of positive relations both political and 
economic. That is why, for German and Russian politicians, the disturbing events of the past 
are considered to be anomalies, rather than long-lasting tendencies (Wallander, 1999: 50). In 
1991, “on the anniversary of *the+ German attack in June 1941”, Gorbachev and Kohl, “issued 
a statement observing that the countries had overcome their past history” (Wallander, 1999: 
51). In the beginning of the 2000s, 60% of the Russian population considered Germany to be 
the second friendliest nation after Belarus (Rahr, 2008: 282). This proves that “identity is not 
fixed, it can be shifted and broken. Thus, identifying a friend or a foe is not permanent” 
(Balzacq 2002: 479). Therefore, the securitising actors can choose which symbols to use and 
how in order to convince the audience in the necessity of the specific course of action.  This 
section looks at the context of Germany-Russia relations and how it contributes to the 
securitisation process. 
 Factual context of energy dependence on Russia is similar in both Poland and 
Germany, but the historical and political contexts are different from the Polish one. If Warsaw 
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insists on ‘talking with a single voice’ with Russia, Germany prefers to develop bilateral 
relations with Moscow.German leaders, in its turn, don’t perceive dependence on Russian 
energy supply as a threat to German security. According to Wallander (1999: 48), “German 
politicians say that the main threat *from Russia+ is instability from various sources”. In other 
words, in the opinion of the German government, the main priority in relations with Moscow 
should be the stabilization of the political and economic situation within Russia (Wallander, 
1999: 48). This point of view is also supported by Graham Timmins, who wrote that 
Schröder’s support to Putin’s controversial domestic policy could be explained by his desire 
to support the internal stabilization process. Schröder himself said that “he had no intention 
of changing governmental policy on the basis that the state was the only guarantee of 
stability in Russia and that to criticize Putin’s strategy was to… run the risk of destabilizing the 
country to the detriment not just of Russia but also to the European continent” (Timmins, 
2009: 181). Bilateral relations between Russia and Germany are often criticized by other 
European leaders and some experts; because they undermine the overall European attempts 
to develop a Common European Energy Policy (Smith, 2007). The section below describes 
bilateral relations between Russia and Germany, and explains how these relations contribute 
to the securitisation process. 
In an interview, a representative of the German Ministry of Economics said that “good 
political relations influence the development of economic and commercial cooperation 
between Russia and Germany. There is always a lot of politics in relations with Russia” 
(Representative of German Ministry of Economics, 2011). An overview of Russo-German 
relations over the past decade demonstrates that politicians, both in Moscow and in Berlin, 
have been gradually building strong political ties between the top political leaders. 
Cooperation between the two countries developed from the top to the bottom. In the early 
1990s, the German ex-Chancellor Helmut Kohl supported Yeltsin’s government by providing 
the Kremlin with multimillion of dollars’ worth of loans. In the 1990s, Germany became the 
largest credit grantor in Russia. By the end of the Yeltsin presidency, Russia owed 42 million 
US Dollars to the German government. Some of this money had been borrowed by Yeltsin 
during a difficult time in his political career - the 1996 presidential election campaign. (Rahr, 
2008: 264) According to Rahr:  
“Kohl as no other Western European state leader supported Russia on the way towards the 
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European Institutions, such as Paris Club, London Club, and the Group of Seven. With 
German assistance Russia signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU” 
(Rahr 2008: 267) 
 Close political ties between Yeltsin and Kohl has been used against Helmut Kohl by his 
opponent in the Chancellor election campaign (in 1998), Gerhard Schröder used criticism of 
Kohl’s generosity in sponsoring Yeltsin’s government in his elections campaign. After the 
default in 1998, Moscow failed to meet its debt payments and Germany, as the one of the 
largest creditors, faced the negative financial consequences of this (Rahr, 2008: 267). Gerhard 
Schröder might have been critical of the personal friendship between Kohl and Yeltsin, and 
its impact on the development of Russo-German relations, but soon after being elected, he 
also established strong relations with Vladimir Putin. Putin’s background could also explain 
his interest in cooperation with Germany. While working in the Soviet intelligence service, 
Putin spent five years (from 1985 to 1990) in Germany (Grib, 2009: 145). That is why, after 
coming into power in 1999, Putin re-orientated Russian foreign policy in general, and 
external energy policy in particular, towards the EU. Furthermore, relations with Germany 
play a central role in his foreign policy decisions. Under the Putin administration, Gazprom 
started to cultivate a positive image of the Russian gas monopoly in Germany. One of the PR-
campaigns used to achieve this aim was Gazprom’s sponsorship of the German football club 
Shalke-04, which, however, did not bring the desired outcomes and was not very popular 
among German population (Grib, 2009: 145 – 146).  
The most debatable point in the ‘Putin - Schröder’ alliance is their agreement on the 
Nord Stream pipeline, which met a lot of opposition from other EU member states (in 
particular Poland). After the end of his term as a Chancellor of Germany in November 2005, 
Schröder became the honorary chairman of the Nord Stream Company. This decision 
resulted in a lot of criticism from the Western press. Timmins writes that the appointment 
“had provoked calls for a code of conduct on private sector involvement of former senior 
politicians” (Timmins, 2009: 180) Why has this decision been made about this controversial 
appointment? In the Russian literature (Rahr, 2008; Panushkin, Zjgar 2008), they explain this 
decision as a poorly designed PR-campaign. It was considered in Moscow that the 
appointment of a former European politician would create a positive image for the Russian-
led pipeline project. Russia hoped that Schröder would be able to lobby for Nord Stream in 
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the EU (Zjgar et al., 2008: 197).  Moscow was surprised by the consequences of this decision 
on the perception of the Nord Stream project and the Russo-German energy cooperation 
under Schröder in general (Rahr, 2008: 282).  
 Angela Merkel took over the post of Chancellor of Germany in 2005. In the beginning 
of her term, Angela Merkel distanced herself from the policy of friendship with Russia. At 
first she emphasized the differences in values between Russia and the EU and supported the 
European developments in terms of energy security. However, by 2007, her attitude towards 
close cooperation with Russia had begun to change. In January 2007, Merkel criticized Russia 
for a debt dispute over oil supplies to Belarus, but by August 2008, during the Russo-
Georgian war, Merkel took a relatively mild position in relation to Russia. Ever since 2008, 
Angela Merkel has been mainly supportive of the growing cooperation between Russia and 
Germany in energy sphere (Grib, 2009: 144). 
It is important to understand why the three last chancellors opted towards a policy of 
‘political friendship’ with Russia.  Kohl’s motives seem to be a little bit more understandable. 
His close friendship with Yeltsin emerged from the euphoria, which followed the re-
unification of East and West Germany. However, both Schröder and Merkel were quite critical 
of Russia at the beginning of their political terms and disapproved of the unnecessary 
support towards Russia from their predecessor. What made them change their original point 
of view? The most likely answer is the economic benefit and the lack of coherent European 
energy policy, which allows Germany to develop bilateral relations with Russia in the most 
beneficial way for German national interests.  
Large German companies and Russian energy firms are interested in close Russo-
German cooperation. Gazprom cooperates closely with such German companies as E.ON 
Ruhrgas, BASF Wintershall and Gazprom also holds some of RWE’s shares (Westphal, 2008: 
103 – 104). Gazprom cooperates with German companies mainly through the swapping of 
assets. For instance, E.ON Ruhrgas gained a 24.5 per cent stake in the Yuzhno Russkoe field 
and Gazprom gained assets in three Ruhrgas controlled companies in Hungary (Aalto, 2009: 
171). Since 2008, Gazprom holds 49 per cent of shares in the German company Wingas 
GmbH (this company is the BASF trader in the EU), and also 49 per cent in Wintershall AG 
(which gives Gazprom the opportunity to explore fields in Libya). In return, BASF obtained 
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stakes of the Yuzhno Russkoe field (Grib, 2009: 145). But this swapping of assets is not the 
only site of the growing Russian influence on the German market. Russia is also interested in 
obtaining access to ordinary German consumers. To achieve this aim, Gazprom bought shares 
in German energy companies and transportation networks. For example, in 2006, Gazprom 
bought 5 per cent of shares in the gas distribution network Leipziger Verbundnetz Gas. The 
same year, Gazprom’s subsidiary Efet obtained membership in the Union of German suppliers 
of energy and resources (Grib, 2009: 148).  
Evidence from interviews suggests that Gazprom aims to continue its expansion in the 
German energy market. After the earthquake in Japan in March 2011, and as a result of this, 
the crises on the Fukushima nuclear power station, Germany decided to close its nuclear 
power stations by 2022. As a result of this decision, Germany needs to find alternative 
sources of electricity to substitute for the closed nuclear power stations. According to the 
German Ministry of Economics, Berlin’s priority is renewable energy sources. However, 
Germany will have to increase its natural gas consumption and some of this gas would most 
certainly come from Russia. Moreover, Germany plans to build new gas power stations and 
Gazprom is interested in participating in this project. At the moment, the Russian gas 
monopoly negotiates its participation in the construction of gas power stations with such 
German companies as E.ON and RWE. The German government does not mind such 
cooperation; however, before the energy companies can move forward with their plans, it 
has to be approved by anti-monopoly regulations (representative of the German Ministry of 
Economics, 2011). 
Both German and Russian companies gain something from such cooperation. Westphal 
writes that for large German oil and gas corporations, which are highly involved into the 
energy markets of the Central and Eastern European states, the cooperation with Gazprom 
gives an opportunity to re-sell Russian gas to the Central and Eastern European states. Such a 
situation limits new European member states in the ways which they can diversify their 
energy supplies, since they are buying Russian fossil fuels either from Russia itself or from 
German companies.  Local German authorities are also interested in cooperation with Russia. 
They believe that, to a certain extent, Gazprom’s access to local energy companies and 
distribution networks may help to reduce the price for German consumers (Grib, 2009: 149). 
In turn, Gazprom sees the cooperation with German companies as a way to get direct access 
92 
 
to EU consumers. According to the data provided by Grib, in 2008, Gazprom sold gas to 
Germany at 50 US Dollars per thousand cubic meters and domestic consumers paid twice as 
much for this gas. For this reason, direct access to the German energy grid could increase 
Gazprom’s income dramatically (Grib, 2009: 149: 148).    
The domestic dynamics in Germany demonstrate the complexity of ‘actor-ness’ when it 
comes to defining energy policy. Balzacq (2002: 475) writes that both the securitising actors 
and the audience they are trying to negotiate to members of a certain ‘social world’, which is 
based on shared meaning and understanding. This shared knowledge is “embedded in a 
cluster of formed social acts, merged and dissolved by its current members” (Balzacq, 2002: 
477). Therefore, the securitising actors do not exist in isolation; they are affected by other 
actors and members of the social worlds. Coming back to the example of German energy 
policy, interests of major energy companies influence the overall direction of German energy 
policy towards Russia. And some of German-Russian bilateral deals may lead to the 
securitisation speech acts in other member states.   
The outcomes of Russo-German bilateral relations are controversial from the 
perspective of overall EU-Russia energy relations. From one point of view, some experts, 
including the director of the EU-Russia Centre Cameron, believe that such strong bilateral 
relations with Russia, undermines the development of a Common European Energy Policy 
(Cameron, 2011). He is not the only person who perceives the situation in this way. Both 
Aalto (2009: 171) and Westphal (2009: 111-112) argue that the German government 
concentrated on the national energy security and commercial interests of large German 
energy corporations and, as a result, abandoned the joint EU attempt for energy market 
liberalization and supply diversification. This point of view could be illustrated by German 
support for Russian interests related to the Third Energy Package. According to the provisions 
of the latest EU legislation on energy market liberalization, which is described in more detail 
earlier in this chapter, the same company could not sell gas and transport it at the same 
time. Some countries, such as Latvia, are insisting on Gazprom selling its shares in 
transportation networks. Germany is not going to push for the same solution. According to 
interview results with the representative of the German Ministry of Economics, the main 
priority for Germany is to make sure two different companies are selling and transporting 
gas. However, it is not a problem if Gazprom would be selling gas, and its subsidiary or joint 
93 
 
venture with a German company, would be responsible for the transportation 
(representative of the German Ministry of Economics, 2011). Other European countries also 
criticized Germany for their support of the Nord Stream pipeline, which is more expensive, 
compared to alternative overland routes and does not help to diversify European energy 
supplies; on the contrary, it increases Russian leverage on the European energy market.   
From the other point of view, there are also some positive developments which might 
potentially benefit the overall EU-Russia energy relations. According to an interview with a 
representative of the German Ministry of Economics (2011), one of the priorities in relations 
with Russia is the development of energy efficiency. Assistance is provided both on the 
bilateral level and through mechanisms of the EU. In particular, Germany controls the 
committee on energy efficiency, which was established as part of the EU – Russia energy 
dialogue. In 2009, a German-Russian agency on energy efficiency was established.  According 
to German Ministry of Economics representative, Russia has great potential in this sphere 
and a lot could be achieved with relatively low investment required. Even though the new 
law on energy efficiency had been released in Russia, progress is still slow (representative of 
the German Ministry of Economics, 2011). Germany, in its turn, has expertise in the field of 
energy efficiency and alternative energy sources. Aalto (2009: 171) writes that “Germany 
produces half of the windmills and one-third of the solar cells worldwide, and has one-third 
of the hydropower installations market, in addition to producing bio-fuel plants”. Germany 
began to develop renewable energy sources and improve energy efficiency at the end of 
1990s, with the German government supported by the Kyoto Protocol and related 
environmental policies introduced by the EU (Westphal, 2008: 99). Potentially German 
support for the development of green energy in Russia could counterbalance its dependence 
on Russian oil and gas exports (Aalto, 2009: 171).   
German interest in the development of energy efficiency in Russia could be explained as 
a way to secure future volumes of oil and gas supplies from Russia. Due to the high levels of 
dependence on Russian energy supplies, Germany wants to protect itself from shortages of 
supplies, in the case that Russia might fail to invest in the development of new major gas 
fields in time. If Russia might fail to keep contract obligations and to supply the required 
volumes of gas, the German economy would face dangerous consequences. Considering that 
the German economy is one of the largest within the EU, the consequences of Russian supply 
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shortages on the German economy would also have negative effect on the EU as a whole 
(Riley, 2006: 5).  
Moreover, German officials argue that they did not abandon overall European incentives 
all together. For instance, in relation to the ECT (which has been already discussed above), 
Germany believes that Russia should sign and ratify the ECT. Berlin is not planning to support 
Russian incentives to develop a new international agreement, since the majority of the ECT 
does not think it is necessary (representative of German Ministry of Economics, 2011). Apart 
from this, Germany evaluates the activity of the EU – Russia energy dialogue positively and 
expects it to contribute positively to the development of energy efficiency in Russia 
(representative of German Ministry of Economics, 2011).  The German government is trying 
to balance good relations with Russia, whilst also trying to protect the interests of the EU. For 
instance, in spite all Russian attempts to integrate into the domestic German energy market, 
Angela Merkel signed an agreement with the former French president Jacques Chirac not to 
allow any non-EU companies into the domestic market in 2006 (Grib, 2009:149). Recently 
Germany announced its intensions to support the construction of the NABUCCO pipeline, 
which may help the EU to diversify its supplies (representative of the German Ministry of 
Economics, 2011). 
Nonetheless, even considering German attempts to balance overall European policies 
and bilateral relations with Russia, strong political ties with Russia and expanded cooperation 
between the energy industries of the two countries, Russo-German energy relations 
contribute to the securitisation of energy trade between Russia and the EU. Spitzel writes 
that “a given social context is… in some very rare cases truly symmetric, actors are usually 
endowed with an unequal ability to influence the evolution of an individually proposed 
meaning into a collectively held representation” (Spitzel, 2007: 369). Even though the EU 
institutions have only limited competence over the energy policy, both Poland and Germany 
are part of the same context: European energy consumers importing energy from Russia. The 
EU has restricted ability to control bilateral deals between the member states and external 
energy suppliers, and therefore Russia can have an opportunity to secure deals with some of 
the member states which may undermine the policy goals of other member states, or even 
the ones contradicting the overall attempts of the EU in developing the Common European 
Energy Policy. That is why German-Russian energy relations contribute to the securitisation 
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process within the EU, and to EU-Russia relations. For example, German support for the Nord 
Stream project, resulted in criticism from new member states, especially Poland. Such 
disagreement between member states demonstrates the inconsistencies of the EU energy 
policy and the lack of solidarity between the EU members.  
Conclusion 
 The security as a speech act is a complex process, going beyond the linguistic element of it. 
According to Balzacq (2010) securitisation process includes two levels: level of agent and 
level of act. This chapter was devoted to the level of agent in the EU. The level of agent 
includes an actor, the audience, and the context of securitisation. The introduction to this 
chapter and Chapter 1 identified the main actors of securitisation as governments of energy 
consuming and energy producing states and energy companies (p. 44-45). The audience in its 
turn is different in Russia and the EU. This chapter focused on the EU, and, therefore, we can 
divide the audience into European bureaucrats and the national audiences. Since the level of 
act, or the negotiation process itself is analyzed separately, this chapter focused mainly on 
the analysis of the context of the securitisation and its effects on the actors. This chapter 
tried to demonstrate that the securitisation is influenced by both the context of dependence 
on Russian energy supplies and historic, political and cultural context which is used to 
interpret and to shape public’s opinion on this dependence.  
The EU is a multi-level system of governance: the decisions are made on 
supranational, national and regional levels. Therefore the context of securitisation should be 
understood on both European and national level. The involvement of the European 
institutions depends on the policy area. In case of energy security, the member states still 
have a lot of freedom in defining their national energy policies with an exception of some of 
the issues related to the internal market (including competition) and sustainability. It is the 
lack of coherent Common European Energy Policy which shapes the European context of 
securitisation. 
 The European context is a part of the securitisation process due to the limited 
progress in development of coherent energy policy within the EU and the lack of the 
international legally binding agreement on energy trade with Russia. The EU has been trying 
to develop a Common European Energy Policy for decades. Ever since the oil shocks of 1970s, 
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European institutions have been trying to establish common principles of external energy 
relations with non-EU member states. However, so far these attempts have proved to be 
ineffective. Russia has tried its best to promote its interest on the bilateral level. Russia did 
not ratify the ECT, but has applied it provisionally until 2009, when Putin announced Russian 
withdrawal from the treaty (Bohme, 2010: 46). The Russian government claims that the ECT 
focuses only on the interests of energy consumers and overlooks the interests of energy 
producers. However, some Russian experts say that Russia could gain from participation in 
European incentives. For instance, Andrei Konoplyanik, one of the leading Russian experts on 
oil and gas, argues that the Russian decision to withdraw from the ECT would result in higher 
credit risks for Russia; the amount of credit would decrease and, without the ECT, Russian 
investments in the EU are not protected (Konoplyanik, 2011: 125). 
 Due to the lack of a coherent Common European Energy Policy, the individual 
member states are developing their own energy policies in general and their relations with 
Russia in particular. This chapter looked at the case studies of Poland and Germany. These 
two member states were selected for a number of reasons. Firstly, both Germany and Poland 
are highly dependent on Russian energy supplies: Germany is the largest consumer among 
the original 15 member states, and Poland as a former member of the Soviet bloc is 
traditionally more dependent on Russian supplies. Secondly, Germany and Poland have very 
distinct approaches towards Russia which sometimes clash, partly deeply rooted in their 
respective histories. Poland promotes more coherent and assertive EU energy policy towards 
Russia (Szczerbiak, 2012: 55). For example, Poland suggested creating an “Energy NATO” to 
guarantee the EU’s energy security (Szczerbiak, 2012: 97). Poland promoted an inclusion of 
the solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty. However, “the reference to energy policy needing 
to be in accordance with a ‘spirit of solidarity’ between member states was less committal 
and specific than Poland had wanted” (Youngs, 2009: 26), hence contributing to the feeling 
of vulnerability and lack of support from the EU.  
Germany is one of the member states criticized for developing strong bilateral 
relations with Russia, which contradict the aims of the Common European Energy Policy. Last 
three German Chancellors enjoyed close political ties with Russian leaders, and energy 
relations are one of the key elements of German-Russian cooperation. The cooperation is 
supported by major energy companies in both Germany and Russia. However, German 
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approach to Russia is often criticized. For instance, Poland referred to the agreement on the 
Nord Stream pipeline project as a new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (Liuhto, 2009: 168). Some 
authors (Cameron, 2011; Smith, 2008) also claim that Russo-German relations undermine 
the overall EU attempts to develop common approach towards energy policy in general, and 
EU-Russia relations in particular. 
To sum it up, this chapter argues that the EU as a multi-level system of governance 
consists of multiple and interdependent ‘social worlds’, “the meaning of the worlds is socially 
framed and shared by all the members of a specific society” (Balzacq, 2002: 475). The 
securitising actors are embedded into these worlds and negotiate the security threats to the 
audience using the symbols understood by all the members of this society (Balzacq, 2002: 
477). The EU is in itself a ‘social world’ which imposes a certain power structures on its 
members, and securitising actors (for example, member states) are trying to negotiate their 
proposed understanding of energy security to both other member states and the EU 
bureaucrats and to national audiences. The European context is not symmetric, and the 
individual member states don’t have an equal ability to “influence the evolution of an 
individually proposed meaning into a collectively held representation” (Spitzel, 2007: 369). 
For example, Poland is promoting more coherent European approach towards Russia, and 
Germany finds bilateral cooperation to be more fruitful. Thus, the lack of a coherent 
European energy policy towards Russia and the clashing perspectives of the member states 
contribute to the securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations. The next chapter will address 
the securitisation process in Russia. In particular, Chapter 3 looks at the context of 
securitisation on the level of agent, and how it is used Russian securitising actors. 
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Chapter 3 
The level of agent: Russia 
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Introduction4 
This is a second of two chapters devoted to the level of agent. According to Balzacq the level 
of agent consists of the three following elements: actor, audience and context. As in case of 
the EU, the main actors involved in the securitisation process are Russian government and 
the major energy companies. The audience of securitisation includes Russian population, 
political and business elites in Russia. An introduction to the previous chapter stated that the 
context of securitisation and its interpretation by the actors is of key importance for 
understanding securitisation process. That is why this chapter will focus on the context of 
securitisation in Russia.  
 The previous chapter demonstrated that the high levels of dependence of the EU on 
external energy supplies, different approaches to energy policy and the lack of a coherent 
Common European Energy Policy resulted in the securitisation process in the EU. It is 
important to understand that the energy policies of the EU member states do not develop in 
isolation, and Russian policy decisions influence the EU’s perspective on reliability of Russian 
energy supplies. The EU is concerned with the increasing governmental control over the 
energy sector (in particular, limited rights of both Russian and foreign private investors). 
Some experts (Smith, 2008; Cameron, 2011; Baran, 2007) are concerned that the increased 
state control over the energy production and export can result in the attempts to use energy 
sales as a foreign policy tool. This chapter aims to demonstrate that Russian energy policy is 
directed not by the foreign policy needs (as a lever in relations with energy consumers), but 
by the domestic needs: economic and political stability. Current Russian government sees the 
energy industry as a guarantor of economic growth, and consequently, of the political 
stability. Therefore, the Russian government is the most important securitising actor in 
Russia. A number of authors (Hober, 2009; Rutland, 2008; Hanson, 2010) write that the 
current Russian leaders put the energy security on the top of Russian security agenda. For 
instance, Hanson writes that ever since the late 1990s Russian government moved towards 
“control of parts of the economy *energy+ – both by direct state ownership and by ensuring 
                                                 
4
 Some of the material presented in this chapter contributed to the following publication: 
Khrushcheva, O. (2012), The Controversy of Putin’s energy policy: the problem of foreign investment 
and long-term development of Russia’s energy sector, Central European Journal of International and 
Security Studies, 6 (1), p. 155-179, 
 
100 
 
that politically compliant businessmen are running things” (Hanson, 2010: 197). According to 
the current regime the state should play a pivotal role in regards to key decisions on natural 
and energy resources (Hober, 2009: 424). Since the current government is the key 
securitising actor, this chapter will mainly focus on the analysis of the securitisation process 
since the early 2000s, however, in some cases the chapter refers to historical background 
outside of this timeframe to better illustrate the context of securitisation. 
In order to understand the reasons for the securitisation process, this chapter looks at 
the context of governance of energy sector in Russia.  The symbols used in the securitisation 
process are rooted in this broader context of securitisation, and the securitising actors use 
these symbols for “the construction of a standpoint for common understanding”. When 
talking about the securitisation defined through the speech act, it is important not to reduce 
it “to a purely verbal act or a linguistic rhetoric: it is a broader performance act which draws 
upon a variety of contextual, institutional, and symbolic resources for its effectiveness” 
(Williams, 2003: 526). In particular, this concerns the “the dominant narratives of identity” 
(McDonald, 2008: 571), which contribute to the construction of security in general.  
McDonald writes that “those interested in the construction of security must pay attention to 
the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security… become 
possible” (McDonald, 2008: 573). The context influences the construction of security 
throughout time and space. Depending on the identity of the specific audience, certain 
issues may or may not be accepted as threats. McDonald emphasizes the importance of 
context for the success of the securitisation. That is why, when deconstructing a 
securitisation it is important to take into consideration contexts and symbols shared by the 
securitising actors and the audience (Balzacq, 2002: 475). This chapter looks at the case 
studies of the FDI and the establishment of the vertically-integrated companies to 
demonstrate how the context has been used by the securitising actors.  
Before talking about the securitisation process, it is necessary to explain why the 
energy sector is so essential for Russia. Russian economy depends on revenues from the 
energy sales. In case of natural gas, the energy exports are especially important, because 
domestically gas companies have to sell gas cheaper than on international market. This 
section describes these and other elements of Russian energy sector in more detail. Energy 
industry and trade plays an important role in Russian politics. This section presents an 
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overview of Russian energy potential as well as Russian vulnerability caused by high levels of 
dependence on energy sales. According to Oleinov, the fuel and energy sector contributes 
around 25 per cent of the overall Russian GDP, 30 per cent of industrial production, 50 per 
cent of federal budget income and 65 per cent of export earnings (Oleinov, 2008: 429). In the 
Russian domestic consumption, the share of this contributed by natural gas prevails 
significantly over other energy sources – around 55 per cent; the share of oil is 19 per cent, 
coal – 15 per cent, water power – 6 per cent, and nuclear power – 5 per cent (Oleinov, 2008: 
429).  In the electricity sector, the gas share is even higher – from 70 to 90 per cent 
depending on the region (Oleinov, 2008: 429). According to the Russian energy strategy, this 
share is supposed to be reduced to 46 per cent by 2020, by increasing the share of water 
power and nuclear power, as well as oil and coal (Borovsky, 2008: 63). Russia is one of the 
world’s leaders in hydrocarbon production and export. In 2011, Russia produced 169 billion 
cubic meters (bcm) of gas and 247 million tons of oil have been produced. The Russian 
Federation is also the world’s largest exporter of gas and the second biggest exporter of oil 
(IEA, 2012). Russia is also a major consumer of natural gas. In 2006, Russia consumed 432.1 
bcm of gas (Borovsky, 2008: 62).  
Domestically Russian government exercises a great level of influence over the energy 
sector. At different stages of Russian history, Russian government had a different level of 
control over the energy sector. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the private sector 
significantly increased its presence in energy production. The speech act of securitisation in 
Russian case is in regaining governmental control over the energy sector and its justification 
to Russian audience. At the moment, 51 per cent of the largest gas-producing company 
(Gazprom) belongs to the state. Gazprom is not only Russia’s largest producer of natural gas, 
but also the owner of the world’s biggest gas pipeline network, which connects Europe with 
Central Asian and Caspian states. The monopoly of Gazprom over the trade and 
transportation of Russian gas is secured by Russian legislation. In July 2006, the State Duma 
of the Russian Federation passed a law on gas exports, which gives Gazprom undivided rights 
for the export of gas. Gazprom has specific duties in providing domestic population with 
natural gas. Domestic consumers enjoy lower price as compared to external consumers. This 
is known as a dual-pricing policy. The price of gas for domestic consumers is set by the 
Federal Tariff Service. Gazprom is obliged to supply domestic consumers with gas on set 
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prices according to the Russian Federation Act on Natural Gas Supply (Grigoryev, 2007: 
3038). Non-Gazprom producers supply only around 28 per cent of domestic consumption 
requirements (Boehme, 2010: 68). Gazprom, together with the Russian authorities, 
established an annual gas consumption balance (Dudek et al., 2006: 1661). There are 
different tariffs for households and industrial consumers. The household price is 25 per cent 
lower, than the tariff for industrial consumers (Pleines, 2009: 80). Since January 2005, there 
are 13 pricing zones, depending on the distance from the wellhead (Pleines, 2009: 80). Prior 
to this, there were 7 pricing zones (Grigoryev, 2007: 3038). Moreover, up to 80 per cent of 
households are not paying according to their consumption volumes. The prices are calculated 
according to the size of the living space and the number of people living there (Grigoryev, 
2007: 3039). Industrial consumers have a certain volume of gas which they can buy at a 
regulated price; if they consume more than this limit, they have to pay a higher price. 
According to Ahrend and Tompson, “some large industrial consumers are able to buy all their 
gas from Gazprom at regulated tariffs, while many others buy 30 – 50 per cent of their needs 
at much higher prices” (Ahrend, et al. 2005: 809). 
According to Dudek et al., the Russian domestic pricing policy for natural gas could be 
considered as a cross-section subsidy. According to data from 2006, “the long-term marginal 
cost of natural gas production is equal to US$44-50/toe” and this is “well above household or 
industrial prices” (Dudek, et al., 2006: 1662). Of course, the natural gas industry (including 
Gazprom) would benefit from the deregulation of domestic prices from the commercial point 
of view. The deregulation of prices on the Russian gas market was part of the requirements 
for Russia’s ascension to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and is an important issue in 
EU-Russia cooperation in the energy sphere (Interview with a representative of the European 
Commission, February 2011). The main argument in favour of price liberalization is the 
potential financial benefits. Yuli Grigoryev writes that if domestic price reached the European 
level, it would bring an additional US$60 billion in profit to Gazprom. And this, in turn, would 
allow Gazprom to invest into the infrastructure and the development of new gas fields 
(Grigoryev, 2007: 3039). 
However, at the moment, this is impossible for several reasons. Prior to a significant 
increase of the gas price for domestic consumers, the Russian government will need to 
ensure that domestic consumers are capable of paying this price. Non-subsidized natural gas 
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would “be unaffordable for the majority of Russian population” (Grigoryev, 2007: 3041). As a 
result, it may lead to a decrease in gas demand at the domestic level in favour of coal 
consumption, which, in turn, would cause a negative impact on the environment (Dudek, et 
al., 2006: 1662). Independent gas producers do not have to regulate their prices and are 
allowed to sell their gas at a higher price than Gazprom. However, since Gazprom controls 
access to the pipeline network, their access to consumers becomes difficult. That is why 
independent producers, such as Novatek5, have had to sell their gas with a significant 
discount (up to 20 per cent) (Pleins, 2009: 81). The situation concerning independent gas 
producers causes concern in the West. It is important to understand the roots of these 
decisions. Independent producers are not going to be interested in selling gas to domestic 
consumers, because, in order to be competitive domestically, they need to set prices at the 
same level as Gazprom, or lower. That is why, if they were to have free access to the 
transportation networks, they would prefer to export natural gas abroad; however, this 
would undermine the interests of Gazprom, which is already affected by the dual-pricing 
policy.  
Due to the specific pricing policy, Gazprom’s revenues from domestic sales and sales 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are significantly lower than from the 
European market. The domestic pricing-policy requires Gazprom to sell gas internally at 
prices below the full recovery costs. According to Ahrend et al., exports to Europe, which 
count for one third of Gazprom’s output, account for three-thirds of its total income. For 
these reasons, up until 2004, Gazprom was losing money on the domestic market (Ahrend et 
al., 2005:804). In recent years, Gazprom started to raise the prices for natural gas on the 
domestic market. Between 2000 and 2006, average domestic prices for gas were raised 
almost threefold (Pleines, 2009: 81). According to Russian obligations to the WTO and as a 
part of EU–Russia energy cooperation, Moscow agreed to gradually lift prices by 2015 
(Interview with a representative of the Energy Commission, February 2011).  
Nevertheless, Gazprom is currently in desperate need of investment.  The Russian gas 
                                                 
5
 Novatek is the largest Russian independent gas producing company, founded in 1994. Novatek is involved in 
the exploration, production and processing of natural gas and liquid hydrocarbons. In 2010, Novatek produced 
37.78 billion cubic metres of gas and 3,632 thousand tons of liquids. The majority of Novatek’s activity is 
concentrated in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District. 
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monopoly needs to invest in the upgrade of existing infrastructure, the development of new 
gas fields and in the gasification of the Russian territory. The development of new fields is 
the key priority. At the moment, the biggest share of Gazprom’s output comes from three 
major fields: Urengoy, Yamburg and Medvezhie. All three fields have been in decline since 
the beginning of the 2000s. Stern estimates that they are declining by 18–25 bcm per year 
(Stern, 2009). At the same time, domestic demand will continue to grow. In such a situation, 
investment into the development of new fields is crucial for Russia to maintain its current 
contract obligations (Ahrend, 2005: 804).  
The economic recession affected the implementation of Gazprom’s investment 
strategy. As pointed out by Stern, due to the economic recession, Gazprom had to reduce 
funds for investment into the development of natural gas fields situated on the Yamal 
Peninsula and for the construction of essential infrastructure (railway and pipelines) (Stern, 
2009: 8). Stern provides us with the following data: “By July 2009, the reduction of Gazprom’s 
investment programme included a reduction of Yamal-related investment by RR62 to RR147 
billion” (Stern, 2009: 8). Another important consequence of the reduction in investments is 
the delay of the development of the supergiant Shtokman gas field, located in the Barents 
Sea. According to Russian estimations, the Shtokman field holds 3.8 trillion cubic metres of 
gas and 37 million tons of gas condensate (Laaksonen, 2010: 160). The potential output of 
the Shtokman field is primarily going to be used for exports, through the second-string of the 
Nord Stream pipeline and through a LNG terminal to be constructed near Murmansk (Stern, 
2009: 9). The Shtokman development costs are estimated at US$30 billion (Laaksonen, 2010: 
160). However, due to the economic problems, the development of the field has been 
postponed and final decisions with regards to the investment plans are to be made by July 
2012 (RIA Novosti, 2012). The question of investment becomes even more pressing because 
the out-of-date infrastructure contributes to energy losses. As Boehme writes, “transmission 
and storage amount for 65 per cent of total losses, production and processing for 12 per cent 
and distribution and end use for 23 per cent” (Boehme, 2010: 64).  
Delays in Russian investment plans are expected to have negative impacts on the 
Russian production capacity. As pointed out by Sheffield, in order to meet domestic demand 
and export contract obligations, Russia needs to invest around US$11 billion annually in the 
natural gas sector (Sheffield, 2007: 4). However, Stern does not support this argument. He 
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writes that concerns about Russia’s inability to meet contract obligations are over-rated. 
Stern points out, that the economic recession influenced not only Gazprom’s investment 
strategy, but also the demand on energy in the world market (Stern, 2009: 10). Stern writes: 
“*…+if Gazprom had made the investments to start the Bovanenko field in 
2011 or even earlier as many of its critics were urging – it would during 
2009- 2012 be facing an even larger problem of shutting in production, 
having invested as much $20 billion on a gas delivery system that turned 
out not to be needed for several years” (Stern, 2009: 10). 
The factors described above are essential for answering the question why the 
securitisation process is happening in Russia? Russian government plans to use the energy 
sector to ensure economic and political stability. For example, low domestic prices on natural 
gas both provide cross-section subsidies to Russian industry and guarantee the access to 
affordable natural gas. In order to sustain these policies and to ensure the maximum of 
revenues from the energy sector goes to the treasure, and not to the private sector, the 
government tries to keep energy industry under control, by presenting private capital (both 
Russian and foreign) as a threat to societal and economic security. Specific historic context 
allows the securitising actors to negotiate these threats to the audience successfully.   
This thesis argues that current government uses symbolic power to securitise energy 
policy and to justify its [sometimes] controversial policy decisions. The decision-makers refer 
to national identity and symbolic power to justify its strategy in regards to energy sector. An 
important element of identity construction is the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
According to Buzan et al. (1998: 137), Russian identity might be vulnerable to the 
strengthening of other identities, in comparison to the Russian identity. Buzan et al. (1998: 
137) writes the following: “Russia is worried about… a ‘world order’ of concentric circles, 
with Russia somewhere in the second circle”. At the same time, this desired self-image could 
be used as an argument for the securitisation of particular issues, in order to achieve political 
goals. For instance, Sheehan illustrates this with the following example: “U.S. foreign and 
defense policy are seen as playing a crucial role in creating the very identity they defend” 
(Sheehan, 2005: 86). In the case of Russia over the last ten years, the authorities have used 
the image of a resurgent Russia in international relations to support the securitisation of 
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energy production in Russia. For example, the ECT is presented in Russia as an attempt by the 
West to take advantage of Russia by imposing values and rules, which contradict Russian 
interests. Ultimately, the decision on whether or not to ratify the ECT has been presented as 
a zero-sum game: either Russian national interest would prevail over European interests, or 
vice versa. 
Identity was used in the construction of security not only in relations with external 
actors, but also internally. Putin often implied that certain developments in energy policy 
were the result of unsuccessful decisions taken by his predecessor. Using the concept of 
securitisation as a speech act, it is possible to argue that Putin labeled the issues and actors 
in the Russian energy sector who were threatening the security of the state. Buzan et al. 
write the following: “if securitising actor ‘A’ on behalf of community ‘A’ claims A is threatened 
by B, he or she will present B as actor, as responsible for the threat as an agent who had 
choice” (Buzan et al., 1998: 44). The oligarchs who became rich in the early 1990s, due to the 
imperfections of the privatization reforms, were transformed into actors in the way described 
by Buzan. One of the first steps of Putin’s regime was the prevention of the oligarchs from 
influencing domestic politics and the consolidation of the energy sector under governmental 
control. One of the best known examples of this policy is the Yukos case. Putin used the 
negative image of the oligarchs, which the majority of the Russian population has, in order to 
justify Russian actions (which were rather questionable from the Western perspective). The 
securitisation of the FDI legislation followed the same logic. For over the seventy years, 
Russian economy has been closed to foreign investment. The liberalization reforms 
conducted in the 1990s haven’t been thought through and are often associated with the 
period of political weakness. The securitisation of the FDI legislation is negotiated as a 
responsible governmental policy aimed at regaining control over the strategic industries for 
the benefit of the majority of population. This chapter aims to demonstrate the role of the 
symbolic power in the securitisation of Russian energy sector on the example of creation of 
vertically integrated companies and policy on the FDI. In order to explain each of these 
examples fully, it is important to provide some background information. 
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Creation of vertically-integrated energy companies  
The Russian government, during the period of Putin’s first terms as president, believed that 
large vertically-integrated financial-industrial groups should be established, and that both 
“the state’s role and the nature of property rights in the resource sector” should “be open to 
multiple institutional options that might co-exist in time” (Balzer, 2005: 214). The changes 
introduced by the government had to be justified and explained to the audience. Buzan 
suggests that political security emerges as an outcome of “the battle of ideas, information 
and traditions” (Buzan et al., 1998: 77). For the successful consolidation of the energy sector 
under the state control, Russia needed to explain it to the audience. Peoples et al. (2010: 79) 
argues that “it is easier to present an issue as a threat if objects associated with the issue 
carry historical connotations of… harm, or where a history of hostile sentiments exists”. The 
majority of the Russian population evaluates the consequences of the privatization 
negatively and believes that the majority of tycoons who got their capital in the 1990s, got 
rich by abusing the underdeveloped privatization laws for their personal benefit. Below is an 
overview of the privatization process in Russia, which Balzacq (2010: 98) would call the 
broader socio-cultural context of securitisation. In order to provide a deeper understanding 
of these policy changes, this chapter will go beyond the set timeframe of this dissertation 
(2000-2011) and will provide a brief historical overview of post-Soviet privatization reforms.  
To better understand the negotiation process of security threats and the justification, 
which the state leaders used to explain the consolidation of the energy sector under the 
governmental control, it is important to look back at the history of privatization reforms. 
Back in the 1990s, the privatization reform was developed by young and inexperienced 
politicians, inspired by liberal ideas (such as those of Yegor Gaidar). The privatization reform 
was not thought-through and is regularly referred to as an unsuccessful experiment. Instead 
of giving a wider percentage of the population access to the shares of the major industrial 
enterprises, the privatization process resulted in the appearance of oligarchs in Russia: a 
small group of extremely rich people who had a lot of influence on both the Russian 
economy and Russian politics (Hass, J., 2007, 167). The pre-conditions for the appearance of 
the oligarchs were created by the Soviet government in the second half of 1980s. For 
instance, the Russian researcher Kryshtanovskaya argues that the majority of the oligarchs 
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started their careers as komsomol6 leaders (for example, Khodorkovsky), who were 
responsible for the Centres for the Scientific – Technical Creativity of Youth. Such Centres 
were allowed to sign contracts with industrial companies to produce particular products, 
which were then paid for in cash (Kryshtanovskaya, 2002: 3). It is important to explain that 
there were two types of money in the Soviet Union: cash and non-cash. “Non-cash was 
virtual money, which was used only by directors of state enterprises as an accounting device” 
(Rigi, 2005: 58-59).  The Communist Party thought that by giving the Komsomol an 
opportunity to transfer non-cash money into cash, it would have a positive effect on the 
economy. The side effect was that the transfer of non-cash money into cash caused inflation 
(Kryshtanovskaya, 2002: 3). However, the Communist Party considered this to be a way to 
allow people to do business and, at the same time, to keep them under control. For these 
purposes, many ministries were transformed into group of companies and state-owned 
banks into commercial banks in 1989 - 1992. In this period of time, the first stock-exchange 
markets appeared and big financial companies became extremely rich. Not only did they 
become rich, but they also started to accumulate influence in the political sphere as well 
(Kryshtanovskaya, 2002: 4). This ‘Soviet privatization’ was followed by the liberalization 
reforms of the new government in 1990s, which is described below.  
Privatization in Russia started in 1991 and can be divided into two stages:  
I. ‘Voucher’ privatization which took place between 1992 and 1994. A voucher gave the 
right of ownership to shares in the majority of State production companies. 
Through the voucher system, the government was going to transfer between 29 
and 45 per cent of shares of state-owned companies, into private hands. Starting 
from October 1992 and lasting until February 1994, the government distributed 
vouchers to one hundred million Russian citizens (Pivovarov, 2004: 49). The aim of 
this stage of the privatization process was to allow common citizens to own shares 
in the main industrial enterprises in Russia. However, the majority of the Russian 
people did not know what to do with these vouchers and were preoccupied with 
the tremendous decline in the level of living standards. Soon, most of these 
vouchers were sold to speculators or to investment funds, who afterwards resold 
                                                 
6
 Komsomol – is an abbreviation for the Communist Union of Youth. Komsomol was the youth division of the 
Communist Party during the Soviet Union times, 
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it to people who understood the real opportunity that the vouchers offered. In 
the end, neither Russian citizens, nor the Russian government benefitted from the 
privatization. Thousands of companies, factories and plants were sold at a fraction 
of their real price. For instance, Pivovarov writes that the overall price paid for the 
companies, who were privatized, was slightly more than 40 million US dollars 
(Pivovarov, 2004: 50). To compare, the market value of Gazprom alone estimated 
at US$251 billion in 2007 (O’Connell, 2007). 
II. After 1994, the vouchers became invalid and shares were sold through stock-
exchange companies and auctions. The characteristic of this stage of privatization 
is that foreign investors were not allowed to participate in the auctions, during 
which shares of major oil, metallurgy, telecommunication companies were sold. It 
was explained by two reasons: firstly, to avoid protests by the public about the 
expansion of foreign influence  and secondly, because it would not be fair to sell 
the companies to foreign investors for such a small price (Pivovarov, 2004: 53-54). 
At first, the government was trying to keep control over the energy sector. In order to do 
this, the oil sector was divided into a dozen large companies (such as Surgutneftegas, Lukoil, 
Sibneft), which would create competition on the domestic market and would represent 
Russia on the world energy market at the same time. The companies created were of two 
kinds: holdings and subsidiaries, in which the latter was subordinated to the former (Lane, 
1999: 17 - 23). In the early 1990s, when the holdings were just established 100 per cent of 
the shares belonged to the state, which allowed the government to appoint the directors and 
top managers. After the privatization process of the oil industry began, the level of 
governmental control over shares in the industry changed. Depending on the company type, 
during the first three years after 1993, 45 per cent of shares belonged to the government and 
40 per cent were to be sold. For companies which were set-up between 1994 and 1995, the 
share owned by the federal government increased to 51 per cent (Lane, 1999: 25). In 1995, 
the State Duma prohibited the sale of shares in oil companies (Pivovarov, 2004: 53 - 54).  
Nevertheless, the government did not manage to keep control over the oil industry for 
long. In the 1990s the Russian economy was declining as a result of the collapse of the Soviet 
economy (Wehrheim, 2003: 2). In the middle of 1990s, due to the budget deficit, the 
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government needed money to protect the regime. Boris Yeltsin had to rely on the help of 
private businesses to stay in power (Dixon, 2008: 15). A group of powerful bankers and 
businessmen offered to give a huge loan to the government against shares in the big 
industrial enterprises owned by the government. This idea was suggested by Vladimir 
Potanin, the head of Oneksim bank, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of Menatep bank, and 
Alexander Smolensky, the head of Stolichnii bank. In September 1995, The State Property 
Committee issued a list of 44 industrial enterprises, including such companies as Norilsky 
Nikel, LUKoil and Yukos, Surgutneftegas and Sibneft’ (Kryshtanovskaya, 2002: 29 - 30). This 
was known as the “loans for shares” scheme (Dixon, 2008: 15). Officially, this was not 
considered to be the selling of shares in oil companies to private hands as the government 
was supposed to get them back after it repaid the debt. The only way for creditors to get 
ownership of these shares was if the government failed to return the money it borrowed 
from them on a one year term. The value of shares was lower than the market price 
(Pivovarov, 2004: 53- 54). However, it is clear that, for both the government which agreed to 
the deal and the investors who initiated it, the “loan for shares” scheme was effectively 
selling the companies to a group of bankers. According to Kryshtanovskaya, the “loan for 
shares” scheme is an important stage in the development of Russia, but also because the 
“loans for shares” scheme resulted in the creation of oligarchs in Russia. Therefore, the 
business-elite not only controlled the biggest industrial companies, but could also influence 
the weak government, which depended on their money to stay in power.  
The history of privatization described above is the broad social context of securitisation 
process, which was initiated by the Russian government to justify the consolidation of energy 
industry under the governmental control. Balzacq (2010: 98) writes that these social and 
cultural settings could be used by the securitising actors to negotiate the securitising moves 
to the audience. In Russian case, the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a traumatic 
experience, when the majority of the population faced the deterioration of the standard of 
living in contrast to a small group of people benefited from the ill-designed privatization 
reforms. The securitising actors use the negative perspective of the general population 
towards the tycoons to justify its energy policy. In the late 1990s, after Putin came to power, 
the official policy changed towards consolidation of Russian energy sector under 
governmental control. Kaj Hober (2009: 424) provides with the summary of this policy: 
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“[The]Russian government should play a decisive role in major decisions about 
energy and natural resources. Total control is not necessarily required, but 
rather a “managed” market with the possibility of multiple forms of 
ownership. While the importance of market forces and private property is 
recognized, it is clear that the primacy of the state in Russia’s energy sector is 
non-negotiable”. 
This means that according to the current Russian leaders private property could still exist, but 
the rights of the property owners are not absolute and that the state’s interests are superior 
compared to those of private firms and market regulations (Olcott, 2004: 30). Therefore, 
governmental control over mineral resources would protect the interests of the society as a 
whole, by ensuring economic security (Balzer, 2005: 218). For instance, according to Putin, 
Russia needs annual economic growth of 4 to 6 per cent for a sustained period of time in 
order to catch up with the world’s leading economies. Balzer summarizes Putin’s views as 
follows: 
“If used effectively, mineral resources can provide the basis for Russia’s 
entry into the world economy. This means the raw materials sector is 
crucial to all aspects of the state supporting industry and providing fifty per 
cent of GDP and seventy per cent of export revenues. It represents the 
basis for modernizing Russia’s military-industrial complex. It promotes 
social stability and can raise the well-being of the population” (Balzer, 2005: 
217). 
When Putin came to power, his regime began a slow re-organization of the energy sector 
according to the ideas expressed in his aforementioned article. At the end of Yeltsin’s term, 
the Russian oil sector consisted of 13 major vertically-integrated companies; eight of these 
were in private ownership and three were under governmental control. However, by the end 
of Putin’s second term, the number of oil companies was reduced to five. Heiko Pleines 
divides this process into two stages, which are interlinked with Putin’s two presidential 
terms: 
1. From 1999 to 2004: During this period, the number of major oil companies reduced 
from 13 to 8. Federal state remained in control of only one oil company – Rosneft, 
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which reduced governmental ownership of the oil sector to less than 15 per cent 
(Pleins, 2009: 74 – 75). 
2. From 2004 to 2008: The energy sector in Russia was dominated by five major 
companies: Gazprom (with Gazprom Neft), Rosneft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegaz, and TNK-
BP, with two former companies being under state control and the latter three  being 
in private hands. As a result of this consolidation process, the state share in oil 
production had risen to nearly 40 per cent (Pleins, 2009: 76). 
At the centre of Putin’s beliefs is the idea that the state, as the guarantor of social well-
being and stability, has exclusive rights over those of the industry and local authorities. He 
believes that “the Russian state had fallen victim to the very reforms, which it had 
sponsored” (Sakwa, 2009: 74) and needed to fight back. This opinion is supported by the 
audience; that is why it was relatively easy to justify some of the controversial decisions to 
Russian audience (for example, the Yukos case). Spitzel (2007: 370) writes that it is easier to 
justify a specific threat if it fits into a specific context. Starting from his time as Russian Prime 
Minister7, he began to take action to reduce the presence of oligarchs in Russian politics and 
began to consolidate the energy sector, with a higher level of governmental control. These 
actions had significant impact on the oil and gas sector. The securitisation process in the each 
of these sectors had its specifics. If in case of the oil sector, the Russian government needed 
to change the division of power between big business and the state by presenting a group of 
actors as threat, then in the gas sector it was mainly a question of preserving the situation. A 
brief overview of the changes introduced in both the sectors is given below. 
The oil sector 
Collective identity plays an important role in the securitisation theory proposed by the 
CSS. Robaek writes that “the construction of a collective identity is dependent on the 
designation of the other or in the security terms a threatening other” (Robaek, 2012: 276). 
The securitisation happens by the creating “a self versus other” dichotomy by the securitising 
actor. Coming back to the consolidation energy sector under the governmental control, the 
Yukos case is a good example of the securitisation process. The process of the legal 
                                                 
7Putin first became Prime Minister in 1999, shortly before Yeltsin’s resignation.  
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prosecution and arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his business partner Platon Lebedev 
were presented as a case against “oligarchs who had reached the pinnacle of their wealth 
first and foremost through suspicious means” (Burret, 2011: 129). The Yukos case was a part 
of the broader governmental policy.  
 Starting from October 1999, the state began to impose limits on the ability of the energy 
magnates to influence the decisions of the Fuel and Energy Ministry (Sakwa, 2009: 80). 
Another important step in the anti-oligarch campaign was the removal of important 
instruments of public opinion influence from the control of big businesses, such as ownership 
of the mass media. This measure affected mainly Boris Berezovsky (used to control ORT 
television) and Vladimir Gusinsky (created NTV channel) (Sakwa, 2009: 76). In early 2000, the 
biggest businessmen faced criminal prosecution mainly for economic crimes. In particular, 
Gusinsky and Berezovsky were persecuted (Volkov, 2003: 1). Nevertheless, Putin’s regime 
was not planning to destroy the large businesses all together. His aim was to introduce a 
hierarchy in the system and to keep the oligarchs away from politics. The Russian 
government used the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (established in the 
1990s) as a way to institutionalize dialogue between major businesses and the state. The 
oligarchs had the opportunity to carry on their business, as long as they paid their taxes and 
did not interfere in politics (Sakwa, 2009: 79).   
Since not all the oligarchs were willing to go along with the new governmental policy 
towards major businesses, the biggest attack on the post-privatization oligarchs was yet to 
come. The most disturbing development of the conflict between the Russian government 
and big businesses for Western observers was the dismantlement of Yukos, and the 
controversial sale of its largest part to Rosneft. According to Vladimir Volkov, in the 2000s, 
Yukos was the largest Russian company in terms of the market value of its assets, second 
largest in terms of profit, and fourth in sales (Volkov, 2003: 1). Mikhail Khodorkovsky was not 
ready to give up his influence in either domestic politics or the freedom of decision-making 
over the development of his business. Khodorkovsky was negotiating the potential sale of 
the larger share of Yukos to either ExxonMobil or ChevronTexaco; a move which was 
considered by the government, as an attempt to sell strategic resources to a foreign company 
(Volkov, 2003: 4). Moreover, it is argued that Khodorkovsky was trying to interfere in the 
development of domestic politics, by offering financial support to such parties as Yabloko and 
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the Union of the Right Forces (Volkov, 2003: 2).  
In other words, Mikhail Khodorkovsky undermined the newly established hierarchy of 
relations with the Kremlin. The response of the state resulted in the arrests of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev8 for financial fraud and tax evasion in October 2003. The 
arrests of Lebedev and Khodorkovsky were followed by the freezing of 44 per cent of YUKOS’ 
stock (Volkov, 2003: 1). It is argued by Balzer that such consequences for Yukos were not 
unavoidable. If Mikhail Khodorkovsky had respected the informal “social contract” with the 
government and respected the rule of consultation with the government prior to making 
major decisions (such as sale of shares to a US-based company), he may still be running his 
business (Balzer, 2005: 221).  
Coming back to the securitisation theory, the Khodorkovsky’s arrest is a good example 
demonstrating the complexity of the securitisation as a speech act. Balzacq emphasizes “the 
practices, contexts, and power relations underpinning securitisation in addition to its 
discursive basis” (Robaek, 2012: 275). This means that it is not enough to simply ‘name’ an 
issue as a threat. For the securitisation process to be successful the authority of the 
securitising actor should be recognized by the audience. The use of symbols shared by the 
audience, such as references to collective memory and national identity is often an 
important part of the securitisation process: “agent works persuasively to prompt a target 
audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, thoughts), that concurs with 
the actor’s reasons for choices and actions” (Balzacq, 2010).  Robaek emphasizes the 
importance of the “visual presentation of a protagonist” (Robaek, 2012: 276).  For example, 
Khodorkovsky’s arrest was broadly covered by the state television with around 77 per cent of 
Russian population following the development of the situation (Burret, 2011: 129). Burret 
(2011: 129) argues that “the nature of Khodorkovsky’s arrest9 played to create a television 
situation that would elicit maximum support for the move among the Russian public”. In all 
the public interviews president Putin was commenting on the Yukos issue explaining it as a 
campaign against corruption and economic crime: “The crimes of mister Khodorkovsky’s has 
been proven in the court, and a thief’s place is in prison” (Rossijskaya Gazeta, 2010).  
                                                 
8
 Platon Lebedev is the chief executive of Group Menatap, the holding company that owned YUKOS and other 
businesses. 
9
 Khodorkovsky was arrested at Novosibirsk airport at dawn on 25
th
 of October 2003 
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After the dismantlement of Yukos, the next step was taken in the re-consolidation of the 
energy sector under governmental control: the creation of a major national oil company. 
Putin’s administration believed that the major national oil and gas companies, with 
governmental support, would be able to concentrate on integration into the world energy 
market, instead of focusing on competition in the domestic market. It is argued that the 
governmental control over these companies is temporary, and “once they become 
competitive, they would return to private ownership” (Sakwa, 2009: 323). Rosneft was the 
obvious choice for becoming national champion of the oil sector. After the arrest of 
Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, the government expropriated its most valuable part – 
Yuganskneftegas, which was later acquired by Rosneft. As a result, Rosneft became the 
eighth largest stock-listed company in the world with the larger oil reserves than Exxon 
Mobile (Sakwa, 2009: 325 – 326). The existence of the major national gas company was also 
important, especially considering the dual-pricing policy for natural gas, which was 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. The section below describes the securitisation 
process in the gas sector. 
The gas sector 
As it has been already mentioned in the previous chapters, it is important to know the 
context of securitisation, to understand its reasons. According to Huysmans (2006: 128) 
securitisation is a process of knowledge construction; manufacturing the feeling of 
vulnerability or insecurity. At the same time the securitisation can lead to both “a strategy of 
political legitimization and sustaining a political unity” (Huysmans, 2006: 128). In case of the 
oil sector, the state had to legitimize its actions towards private business, but in case of the 
gas industry, it was mainly a question of sustaining and strengthening the existing structures. 
It would be easier to explain it, after describing the case study of the gas sector in more 
detail.  
The gas sector also faced an increase of governmental control during the two first 
terms of Putin’s presidency. However, in the case of the gas sector, the situation was 
completely different; the Russian government did not have to spend as much time and effort 
on the creation of a ‘national champion’ in the gas sector, since such a champion, Gazprom, 
had been established long before Putin came to power. Gazprom is the largest gas producer 
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and exporter in Russia. In 2009, Gazprom controlled 69.8 per cent of Russian gas reserves, 
was responsible for 79.2 per cent of total gas extraction and 8.4 per cent of oil and gas 
condensate extraction in Russia (Statistics on Gazprom). Gazprom was created in 1989, when 
the Ministry of Gas Industry was transformed into the state company Gazprom. This 
transformation was initiated by the former Soviet gas minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who 
intended to save the assets of the Russian gas system. Before the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, Gazprom had been extracting 800 bcm of gas annually, controlled 160 thousand 
kilometres of pipelines, owned 350 compression stations, several thousand wells and dozens 
of underground storage facilities. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gazprom lost one 
third of its pipelines and gas fields (Panushkin, et al., 2008: 20). In the past 20 years, Gazprom 
has never been privatized. In the 1990s, this decision was explained by the potential 
difficulties, which could be created if Gazprom was divided into smaller independent 
companies. Unlike in the oil sector, it is important to control all the elements of the chain of 
extraction, production and transportation of gas, for the whole system to be effective 
(Panushkin, et al., 2008: 20). 
From the history of Gazprom, it seems that in the gas sector, Putin’s regime did not have 
to put a lot of effort into the re-consolidation of Gazprom under state control and into 
making it a national champion. Ever since Gazprom was established, it has enjoyed an 
exceptionally strong position in Russian natural gas production. Attempts were made to 
liberalize Gazprom in the early 1990s. In the middle of 1990s, Gazprom had a much more 
diverse ownership structure in comparison to the present moment. In 1994, private 
individuals owned 48 per cent of the company’s shares, companies (independent from 
Gazprom) owned a further 10 per cent and the government owned 40.87 per cent of shares. 
This means that, in 1994, the controlling bloc of stock belonged to individuals (3.5 million 
Russian citizens) (Butrin, 2002). However, Gazprom was slowly buying its own shares back 
from the individuals. By 31 May 1995, Gazprom had bought 10 per cent of its stock from 
independent shareholders. By 1998, only 800,000 (compared to 3.5 million in 1994) Russian 
people owned shares in the gas monopoly (Butrin, 2002). 
The number of presidential decrees demonstrates the exceptional position of Gazprom 
particularly well. For instance, in the summer of 1992, President Yeltsin signed Decree No. 
538 from 01.06.1992 on the “Maintenance of the unified gas supply system of the country” 
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and Decree No. 539 from 01.06.1992 on the “measures necessary for the development of 
major new gas fields on the Yamal Peninsula in the Barents Sea and the Sakhalin shelf”. 
These decrees gave Gazprom an opportunity to control all the domestic gas market and 
licensed the company to develop gas fields in the richest regions. By 1995, Gazprom would 
have licenses for 81 gas fields, which is roughly equivalent to 68.5 per cent of all the gas 
reserves of Russia (Ivanova, 2001). 
At the end of 1990s, Gazprom obtained even more control over the gas sector in Russia. 
For instance, the Federal Law No. 69-FZ “On Gas Supply” is particularly interesting. Article 6 
of the law defines “a single system of gas supply”, which includes manufacturing complexes 
of extraction, transport, storage and supply objects of natural gas. Basically, a single system 
of gas supply includes all the property of Gazprom related to the production and supply of 
natural gas. Article 13 of the law regards the inadmissibility of the separation of the single 
system of gas supply. Article 14 says that the owner of the single system of gas supply can be 
shut down only by federal law. Moreover, this law limits the share of foreign investors to 20 
per cent of Gazprom’s stock (Federal Law No. 69, 31 March 1999). At the same time, the law 
does not mention anything about the importance of the development of competition in the 
natural gas sector, but states that Gazprom (or any other owner of transportation networks) 
has the right to refuse access to the pipeline network due to its limited capacity (Federal Law 
No. 69, 31 March 1999). 
After Putin came to power, changes were made in the top management of Gazprom. Rem 
Vyakherev was the president of Gazprom from March 1993 to May 2001. Before 1993, 
Vyakhirev had been working in the gas sector for 25 years. However, after Putin became the 
Prime Minister, he began to lobby for change in the management of Gazprom. After a series 
of raids by the tax police, Rem Vyakherev was replaced by Alexei Miller. Some Russian 
authors, such as Reznik, argue that these changes were made to give Putin an opportunity to 
influence decision-making in the gas monopolist (Reznik, 2009).  In sum, by the end of Putin’s 
second presidential term, the gas sector was dominated by Gazprom whose rights of 
ownership and control over the means of production and transportation are guaranteed by 
Russian legislation; while the oil sector was dominated by five major companies (see Table 
1). As a result of the securitisation process, the government achieved its goal of regaining 
control over the energy production. The success of the security speech act could be 
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explained by the manipulation of the historical political context in order to successfully 
“translate proposed meaning into a collectively held representation” (Spitzel, 2007: 369). The 
section above demonstrates that the government still controls a significant share of the 
Russian energy sector. At the moment, the government controls around 23 per cent of the 
oil-producing sector, mainly through shares in Rosneft and Gazprom Neft (Volosov, 2011). 
The rest of the oil-producing and processing companies are in private ownership. At the 
same time, the government controls around 48 per cent of the gas-producing sector, due to 
its ownership of 50 per cent of Gazprom’s shares (Volosov, 2011). 
Table 1 Major O il Producers  
Name Ownership Oil production 
(2010) 
Gas Production 
(2010) 
Rosneft  
 
State share: 75.16 
per cent 
Free-Float: around 
15 per cent 
(Rosneft website1) 
847 mln barrels of 
crude oil 
12.34 bcm   
 
 
(Rosneft website 2) 
LUKoil Private ownership: 
100 per cent 
 
(LUKoil website 1) 
708 mln barrels of 
crude oil 
 
(LUKoil website 2) 
2,471 bcm of 
stripped gas, 846,000 
tonnes of liquefied 
gas 
(LUKoil website 3) 
Surgutneftegas Private ownership: 
100 per cent 
59.55 mln tons  13.4 bcm  
(Surgutneftegas 
website) 
Gazprom Neft 
(Sibneft) 
Gazprom: 90.01 per 
cent 
Gazprom Finance BV: 
5.67 per cent 
Free Float: 4.32 per 
52.8 mln tons of oil 
equivalent 
4 bcm 
 
 
(Gazprom Neft 
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cent 
(Gazprom Neft 
website 1) 
website 2) 
TNK-BP Novyinvestment Ltd.: 
94.7 per cent 
Free-Float: 5.3 per 
cent 
Combined oil and gas production: 1,713 
thousand barrels per day (TNK-BP Annual 
Report, 2010: 12) 
Source: This table is based on data given on the websites of the energy companies listed 
To sum it up, Putin’s first two presidential terms resulted in the consolidation of energy 
sector under the governmental control. In case of the gas sector, the main aim of the Russian 
government was to keep the control, rather than to change the existing division of power 
between the state and the private sector. Taking into the consideration the developments in 
the oil sector described above, the securitisation of the gas sector went smoother. The 
securitisation is a process of “establishing lasting mechanisms of norm compliance” (Kurtz, 
2012: 671), or convincing the target audience to accept the securitising moves. In this sense, 
the securitisation process is closely related to the politicization. Buzan defines politicization 
as making “an issue to appear… as something that is decided upon and that therefore entails 
responsibility” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Therefore, securitising of the oil sector makes the gas 
sector a referent object of security as well. Since the audience accepted the securitisation of 
the oil sector, the securitisation of the gas sector has been accepted by the target audience 
as well.   
The security as a speech act has been used by the Russian government to consolidate the 
energy sector under the control of vertically-integrated companies and a higher level of 
governmental interference in the sector is criticized in the Western world. It is assumed in 
the West that Putin’s energy policy undermines the results of the privatization and 
liberalization reforms of the 1990s. In particular, Western commentators were disappointed 
by the Yukos affair, by the increase of the governmental share in Gazprom to 51 per cent and 
by the sale of Sibneft to Gazprom, which became Gazprom Neft (Terterov, 2006: 3). However, 
neither the Putin’s regime nor the majority of the Russian population consider the 
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privatization to have been so far beneficial for the development of the Russian Federation. 
According to an opinion poll conducted in 54 cities in the Russian Federation, the majority of 
population does not believe that the privatization process has reached its aims. 60 per cent 
of participants think that the privatization was conducted without respect to Russian 
legislation; 77 per cent think that the owners of large corporations do not have legal rights of 
ownership; 80 per cent of respondents mentioned the negative consequences of corruption, 
which resulted in the unfair distribution of strategic industries (Bor’yan, 2007: 14). This 
example demonstrates “the embedded-ness of security articulations in social relations” 
(Spitzel, 2007: 365). The security speech act could not be successful only due to the linguistic 
element of it. Both the securitising actors and the audience are embedded into the same 
social context.   
 The official position of Russian leader in the justification of the energy sector 
securitisation is based on the idea that through “the assertion of state authority in the 
energy sector” (Sakwa, 2009: 78), the government protects the interests of the Russian 
population. The government believes that oil and gas resources are important for Russian 
economic recovery. At the same time, the current regime is sceptical about the mechanisms 
of the world market. The government is concerned that global market forces would not be 
able “to provide the economic opportunities and social support necessary for the Russian 
people to make a successful transition to a modern European-style economy and political 
system” (Olcott, 2004: 16). In sum, Putin thinks that by acting as the ‘supreme regulator’ of 
the energy sector, the state protects the interests of the society (Balzer, 2005: 218). As a 
matter of fact, the Russian population seems to share this official position. For instance, the 
Yukos affair is presented in the West as an unlawful attempt to regain control over the energy 
sector from the private hands. However, the majority of the Russian population saw it as a 
reconstruction of order and rightful punishment of the billionaires, who gained their wealth 
at the expense of the Russian population (Olcott, 2004: 30).  
 Changes introduced to the structure and ownership of the energy sector were 
supposed to ensure domestic energy security and to boost the Russian economy. The Russian 
government has to control the energy sector to ensure the protection of domestic 
consumers. For example, the Gazprom representative emphasized the specific role of 
Gazprom in the domestic system of gas supply in an interview with the author. He said that, 
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“the supply of natural gas to the Russian population at a low price is the priority for 
Gazprom” (Interview with Gazprom representative, April 2010). However, as it was 
mentioned above due to the dual pricing policy Gazprom is in desperate need of investment. 
Considering, that the increasing of domestic prices to the European level is not possible at 
the moment, the only solution for Russia is to attract foreign investors to the development of 
the Russian energy sector. The situation around foreign investment is another stumbling 
block of Russian energy policy. On one hand, the Russian government is interested in 
attracting foreign investors, but at the same time it cannot give the rights demanded by 
foreign investors. According to Cameron, the Director of the EU-Russian Energy Centre, 
foreign investors have concerns about the ability of the Russian government to protect their 
rights (Cameron, 2011). Cameron says that the position of foreign investors in Russia has 
changed a number of times throughout the history, depending on the priorities and needs of 
the government (Cameron, 2011). The history of foreign investment into the oil and gas 
sector is indeed difficult. Below is a brief summary of the history of foreign investment in 
Russia. Similarly, regarding the discussion on the re-consolidation of the energy sector under 
governmental control, it is important to look at the history of the FDI in Russian energy 
sector.    
FDI in the oil and gas sectors  
The securitisation of the FDI legislation followed the similar logic as the consolidation of 
energy sector under governmental control described above. It was important for the 
government to justify the importance of bringing the issue of the FDI into the realm of the 
exceptional politics, to demonstrate that it is important to put it under the state control as a 
matter of security. The symbolic power has been used once again to justify the securitisation 
move. The state-sponsored media was framing the issue by referring to both traditional lack 
of trust to the foreign investors and to the deals and decisions made in the 1990s (the period 
of time, which is usually associated with political weakness). For instance, Rossijskaya gazeta 
quoted Valerij Zorkin, the former head of the Constitutional Court as follows: “It is important 
to reconstruct energy sovereignty, including revision of the PSA agreements with foreign 
investors. These agreements signed in 1990s provide favourable conditions to the large 
international companies, but Russian interests are overlooked” (Dobrjnina, 2006). To explain 
how the context has been manipulated by the government it is important to look at the 
context itself. And for the purposes of this section it is important to go as far back as the early 
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years of oil and gas production in Russia, to demonstrate the attitude of Russian population 
towards foreign investors. 
The history of oil production in Russia goes back to the nineteenth-century, when the 
first oil fields were discovered in Azerbaijan. Before the 1917 Revolution, private foreign 
investors had been actively involved in the development of the industry. Since 1898, foreign 
investors had almost absolute freedom in trade and industrial production in the Russian 
Empire; the only exemption was military production. Tsarist Russia was especially interested 
in attracting foreign investment to develop oil production in the Caucasian region. Since 
1875, the Russian oil industry has been consolidated in the hands of Noble and Rothschild. 
According to Marshall Goldman, Shell had been actively involved in the Russian petroleum 
sector since 1911 (Goldman, 2008: 21-24). In 1914, 300 oil companies existed and the 
majority of these were operating under foreign control. At this time, foreign investors were 
responsible for 54 per cent of oil extraction and 75 per cent of trade in oil. Since the 
nationalization process in 1918, all foreign companies were included in the Soviet planned 
economy. The Soviet leaders mainly had a negative attitude towards foreign investors 
(Goldman, 2008: 25). 
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 had a direct impact on foreign investment in the 
Russian economy, including in the energy sector. In June 1918, all the oil-fields were 
confiscated by the Bolshevik government. Soon after this, the new state leaders realized the 
necessity of foreign technical support in the operation of oil-fields. Moreover, the major 
Western companies decided to boycott Russian oil exports (Goldman, 2008: 25). Following 
the conclusion of the Civil War, Vladimir Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
which among other ideas, included the decision to invite foreign investment into Russian oil 
production. Among the companies which responded to this incentive were the Bransdall 
Corporation, British Petroleum and a Japanese group in Sakhalin (Goldman, 2008: 26). 
Goldman argues that it was the foreign technical support which allowed the new Communist 
government to increase oil production to 7 million tons in 1924,  compared to 3.781 million 
tons in 1921 (Goldman, 2008: 25–26). He points out the following elements of western 
assistance: “besides work at the wells, foreign help included American, German, and British 
assistance in the building of a second pipeline from Baku to Batumi, the French supply of a 
Schlumberger well-logging process, and American, German, and British support for refinery 
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construction” (Goldman, 2008: 26). For example, in 1927, there were 69 concessions in 
Russia: 53 of them were entirely created by foreign capital and 16 were joint enterprises. 
Among the biggest investors were Germany (16 concessions) and the United States of 
America (9 concessions). Other investors were Great Britain, Japan, Poland, Austria, Norway, 
France and Sweden. Foreign investors were mainly interested in the extraction and 
processing of natural reserves, agriculture and trade. However, alltogether the concessional 
production was around only 1 per cent of the total production in 1926 – 1927 (Goldman, 
2008: 26). 
However, Soviet cooperation with foreign investors did not last for a long time. in the 
Interwar period, the Soviet government started to expel Western investors from the Russian 
energy industry and, by the end of the Second World War, all the foreign companies were 
gone (Goldman, 2008: 26). These early years of Soviet rule resulted in continued uncertainty 
of foreign investment in the Russian economy, including the oil-and-gas industry. Up to the 
present day, there is no proper legislation which can guarantee the security of foreign 
investment in Russia. Since 1987, the leaders of first the Soviet Union and later the Russian 
Federation reformed the legislation related to foreign investment in Russia. The legislation 
adapted during the later years of the Soviet Union allowed joint companies as the only form 
of foreign investment. Moreover, in the first stages of the development of this legislation, 
only participation of investors from the Soviet bloc was allowed (Doronina et al., 1993: 72). 
The closeness of the Soviet economy to foreign investment shaped the specific public 
opinion towards the foreign investors. Even the radical political changes in the 1990s could 
not easily change the traditional scepticism towards the FDI. Moreover, the liberalisation 
reforms were ill-planned and implemented. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union did not improve the investment climate dramatically. 
The laws adopted between 1991 and 1999 expanded these boundaries and allowed different 
ways of foreign investment in Russia (Voznesenskaya, 2001: 29). However, the legislation on 
foreign investment, adopted by the Russian Federation in the early 1990s, was often 
developed in a rush and without significant attention to detail. As explained below, it was the 
weakness of this legislation, which is used now as a symbol in the securitisation of the FDI in 
Russia. The law on foreign investment in the Russian Federation from 4 July 1991 could be 
useful to demonstrate the problems of Russian legislation on foreign investment in the 
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1990s. The Law included generic provisions on the protection of foreign investment in Russia 
including the protection of the ownership rights of foreign investors, rights to use the profits 
from investment and dispute settlement provisions. However, most of these provisions were 
under-developed and, as a result, could not guarantee the rights of foreign investors in 
Russia. For instance, Article 8 of the Law states that in the case of the nationalization of 
property owned by a foreign investor, compensation should be paid to the owner of the 
nationalized enterprise. Compensation should be calculated according to the estimated value 
of the nationalized property, but it is unclear which institution should be responsible for such 
an evaluation and for the methods of the calculation of compensation (Doronina et al., 1993: 
87-88). 
On 14 July, 1999, a new Law on foreign investment in the Russian Federation came into 
force (consequently, the former Law of 1991 lost its power). According to Ninel 
Voznesenskaya, the Law of 1991 covered a broader variety of issues related to foreign 
investment. The Law of 1999 focused mainly on the governmental guarantees of the rights of 
foreign investors. The Law specified that banking, insurance, and non-commercial sectors are 
excluded from the provisions introduced by this law. According to Voznesenskaya, it 
contradicted the international norms with regards to foreign investment (Voznesenskaya, 
2001: 40). 
The most common type of foreign investment in the Russian energy sector is through 
Production Sharing Agreement (PSA). The PSA Law was developed and signed under Yeltsin’s 
administration in 1995. The PSA agreement is signed between the Investor, the State, and the 
local authorities in the region in which the Investor wishes to invest (Maican, 2009: 11). Such 
an agreement gives an investor the right for the exploration, development and production of 
energy resources for a certain period of time. Both Russian and foreign companies can sign 
the PSA agreement, but for foreign investors there is an established limit of 30 per cent of 
Russian oil and gas resources (Maican, 2009: 11). There are other requirements which an 
investor should consider. They include: Russian companies have the priority in signing such 
an agreement, 80 per cent of the personnel should be Russian, and the Investor pays the 
State, either in shares of the resources extracted or in shares of the product sales. An 
Investor has the right for reimbursement “for the costs of its investment out of an agreed 
portion of the oil that the Investor produces, before any profit oil is taken by the parties to 
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the agreement” (Maican, 2009: 11). To summarise, the legislation on foreign direct 
investment is historically weak in Russia. In the beginning of his first term, Putin promised to 
improve the situation for foreign investors. However, by the time of his re-election, it became 
obvious that an improvement of the FDI laws would clash with the new developments in the 
Russian energy policy.   
Coming back to the securitisation theory applied in this thesis, the audience should 
accept the securitisation of the particular issue for the speech act to be successful. 
Securitising actors may use national identity and collective memory as symbolic power to 
convince the audience in the necessity of the extraordinary measures. Balzacq writes the 
following about the national identity: “the social identity, which operates to both constrain 
and enable the behaviour of the securitising actor” (Balzacq, 2005: 178). In case of Russian 
energy policy, the current Russian political leaders use the references to Russian history and 
national identity to justify the limits imposed on the foreign investors. As it has been 
demonstrated above, historically, the Russian government and Russian population are 
sceptical about the participation of foreign investors in the development of the Russian 
energy industry. That is why, in the early 1990s, the question of FDI into strategic industries, 
including the oil and gas sectors, caused a heated debate among Russian politicians. More 
conservative parts of the Russian government called any concessions to foreign investors 
“selling country’s mineral endowment to foreigners at fire sale prices” (Timokhov, 2001-
2002: 367). This negative perspective towards foreign direct investment from some Russian 
politicians and Russian people almost undermined the PSA Law development in the middle 
of the 1990s (Timokhov, 2001-2002: 367). The negative attitude on FDI in the Russian energy 
sector is shared by the general public, as well as the politicians (Kusznir & Pleins, 2007:12). 
The Russian Public Opinion Research Centre conducted two opinion polls in 2006 and 2007 
about the necessity of foreign investment in strategic industries, including the oil and gas 
sector. In 2007, none of the respondents thought that all the restrictions on foreign 
investment should be lifted in both the oil and gas industry. At the same time, 51 per cent 
considered that any FDI is unacceptable in the oil sector and 17 per cent were against any 
foreign participation in the gas production industry. The majority of the respondents (39 per 
cent for the oil industry, and 63 per cent for the gas industry) thought that foreign 
investment into the energy sector should be limited to 25 per cent (WCIOM, 2008).  
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During the second presidential term, Putin’s government began to change its 
approach towards foreign investors as compared to the early 2000s. When Putin came to 
power, he claimed that Russia needed to become more attractive for FDI to support the 
Russian economy. Indeed, the inflow of FDI increased during his first presidential term. 
According to Kari Liuhto, in 1990–1995, the annual inflow of FDI into the Russian economy 
was around US$1 billion, ten years later (in 2005) the number was almost fifteen times 
higher (Liuhto, 2008: 2). Nevertheless, the situation changed again after his re-election for a 
second term. In 2004–2005, the additional limitations on investment into Russia’s strategic 
industries have been explained by security implications. Kari Liuhto quotes Putin’s address to 
the Federal Assembly in April 2005: 
“Investors sometimes face all kinds of limitations, including some that are 
explained by national security reasons, though these limitations are not 
legally formalized. This uncertainty creates problems for the state and 
investors. It is time we clearly determined the economic sectors where the 
interests of bolstering Russia’s independence and security call for 
predominant control by national, including state, capital. I mean some 
infrastructure facilities, enterprises that fulfill state defense orders, mineral 
deposits” (Liuhto, 2008: 3). 
 The sectors mentioned in this address are referred to as the strategic industries. 
Consequently, foreign-owned companies are not permitted to participate in the development 
of large oil and gas reserves (Liuhto, 2008: 3). In April 2007, Putin signed a new law on FDI in 
these strategic industries. The law states that any foreign company wishing to obtain a 
controlling stake in a company operating in a strategic sector, or to buy more than 10 per 
cent in larger oil and gas deposits, needs to obtain the approval of a governmental 
commission. Putin himself became the head of this commission after his second presidential 
term (Pleines, 2009: 74). Putin remained the Chairman of the Commission of the Foreign 
Investment Oversight until May 2012. On his resumption of the presidency, he was 
succeeded as Chairman by Dmitry Medvedev. 
In other words, foreign investors have different experiences in Russia, depending on 
the industry they invest in. For example, companies working in the retail sector feel more 
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secure, compared to investors interested in the natural resource sector. According to a 
representative of DG Energy in the European Commission, European investors are concerned 
with the limits imposed on foreign investors wishing to participate in strategic sectors 
(Interview with a representative of DG Energy, 2011). Moreover, there is no international 
legal framework which can guarantee the interests of investors: “there is no agreement on 
FDI since 2008, when Russia withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty” (Interview with 
representative of DG Energy, 2011). The European concerns, with regards to the protection 
of FDI, have also been expressed by Fraser Cameron, Director of the EU-Russia Centre. In 
Cameron’s opinion, it is worrying that, without a clear international framework, the Russian 
government has the chance to change legislation at any moment (as it used to do in the 
past). That is why small and medium-sized businesses avoid investing in the Russian energy 
sector (Cameron, 2011). However, even the larger investors (such as BP) are not protected 
from the controversies of Russian legislation on foreign investment. This chapter uses the 
examples of the Kovytka gas deposit license, and the Sakhalin–2 projects to demonstrate 
how the interests of the Russian government override the interests of foreign investors. 
The case of Kovytka gas deposit license 
Kovytka is situated in Irkutsk Oblast’. This gas field boasts 2.13 trillion cubic metres of 
gas and 108 million tons of condensate (Poussenkova, 2009: 139). It is one of the richest gas 
deposits, with a potential annual production of 40–45 billion cubic metres. According to 
Jeronim Perovic and Robert Orttung, “Kovytka could produce enough gas to satisfy 15–20 per 
cent of the non-contracted gas demand of China and South Korea by 2020” (Perovic et al., 
2007: 5). The original license holder for the development of this field used to be RUSSEA 
Petroleum, the company jointly owned by TNK-BP and Interros. TNK-BP owned a 62.4 per 
cent stake in RUSSEA Petroleum (Perovic et al., 2007: 5). Gazprom has been interested in 
participating in the development of Kovytka’s gas since the beginning of the 2000s. For TNK-
BP, it had been extremely difficult to avoid inclusion of Gazprom into the project, because 
“Gazprom is the official coordinator for the development of gas production in the Russian 
East, and… has the right to own and operate gas export pipelines” (Perovic, et al., 2007: 5). In 
June 2010, TNK-BP announced the bankruptcy of RUSSEA Petroleum. In March 2011, 
Gazprom bought assets of RUSSEA Petroleum in an auction (Vesti, March 2011). 
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The case of Sakhalin-2 project 
Some other foreign investors also came under pressure to sell part of their shares in 
major oil and gas operating companies to major Russian companies. Sakhalin-2 was 
established in 1994. The license for the development of oil and gas belongs to a company 
“Sakhalin Energy”, which used to be owned by three foreign companies: Royal Dutch/Shell 
(55 per cent), Mitsui (25 per cent), and Mitsubishi (20 per cent) (Jeffries, I. 2011: 322).  For a 
long time, Sakhalin-2 was the only project, which had no Russian participation (Perovic et al., 
2007: 5). However, in December 2006, Gazprom also received stakes in the Sakhalin–2 oil and 
gas project. Perovic and Orttung argue that the Russian government used accusations that 
the company had violated Russian environmental legislation, in order to press foreign 
partners into selling a share of Sakhalin Energy to Gazprom (Perovic, et al., 2007: 5). The 
state sponsored press provided supportive account of the case by linking violation of Russian 
environmental law with the references to the agreements signed in 1994, which supposedly 
overlook Russian interests. For instance, Rossijskaya Gazeta provides the following analysis of 
the case: “Russia could potentially gain up to US$ 300-400 million, but due to the 
unfavourable *to Russia+ PSA agreement is only getting US$ 20 million in royalties” 
(Vladimirov et al. 2006). The same article quotes the intention of Russian authorities to close 
the project if Russian environmental law is violated (Vladimirov et al. 2006). Presenting the 
activity of foreign investors as undermining to Russian economic interests, helps to shape 
public opinion and justify the state’s decisions as taking an issue under control for the benefit 
of the entire population. According to Buzan et al. (1998:29) and Kurtz (2012: 671) this is an 
example of security speech act. The use of specific socio-cultural context allowed Russian 
government to successfully regain control over the project. At the moment, Gazprom owns a 
51 per cent share of Sakhalin Energy, Royal Dutch/Shell owns 27.5 per cent, Mitsui 12.5 per 
cent and Mitsubishi 10 per cent (Sakhalin Energy website).  
To sum it up, the securitisation of the FDI legislation followed the similar logic as the 
consolidation of energy sector under governmental control described above. It was 
important for the government to justify the importance of bringing the issue of the FDI into 
the realm of the exceptional politics, to demonstrate that it is important to put it under the 
state control as a matter of security. The symbolic power has been used once again to justify 
the securitisation move. The state-sponsored media was framing the issue by referring to 
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both traditional lack of trust to the foreign investors and to the deals and decisions made in 
the 1990s (the period of time, which is traditionally associated with political weakness). For 
instance, Rossijskaya gazeta quoted Valerij Zorkin, the former head of the Constitutional 
Court as follows: “It is important to reconstruct energy sovereignty, including revision of the 
PSA agreements with foreign investors. These agreements signed in 1990s provide favourable 
conditions to the large international companies, but Russian interests are overlooked” 
(Dobrjnina, 2006).  
The clash between political and economic factors in Russian energy policy  
Russian regime considers the energy sector to be central to political and economic stability in 
the country, and in the last 14 years was increasing the governmental control over the energy 
industry. To justify the consolidation of the energy sector under the governmental control, 
the Russian government uses the elements of symbolic power, such as references to the 
national identity and collective memory, in particular the controversial liberalization and 
privatization reforms conducted in 1990s. According to the securitisation theory used in this 
thesis (Balzacq 2010, Buzan 1989), the important part of the securitisation as a speech act is 
the identity construction based on the ‘us against them’ dichotomy. In case of the 
securitisation of Russian energy industry ‘them’ could be both domestic and foreign actors. 
For instance, one of the purposes of the securitisation process is to limit an ability of both 
Russian and foreign investors to control the industry, especially in the gas sector. The 
outcomes of this policy are controversial. The government negotiates its policy to the 
population as an attempt to regain control over the sector for the benefit of the majority of 
Russians as opposed to the small number of big businesses in and outside of Russia.  
There are some positive results: the Russian economy demonstrated the sign of stable 
growth over the last ten years, the political situation within the country is finally perceived as 
a stronger player in the international arena. The Russian economy overcame the crisis of 
1998 and 1999. The growth and progress of the Russian economy was acknowledged by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2004. Before the economic recession, “Russian foreign 
reserves were more than US$185 billion, the fiscal budget was in surplus, debt was paid 
down” (Crandall, 2006: 125). A large proportion of revenues from oil and gas sales have been 
used to establish a stabilization fund. Some of this money was used to pay off Russian foreign 
debt, which went down to just 4 per cent of GDP in the middle of 2007 (Hanson, 2009: 26). 
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The inflation rate has been brought down as well (Hanson, 2009: 26). These achievements 
required significant changes in the Russian energy sector. First of all, the Russian government 
had to exercise a higher level of control over the energy production. The energy sector 
became the referent object of security and all the forces (domestic and foreign), which could 
undermine the government’s position in the energy sector, were presented as a threat (for 
example, Mikhail Khodorkovsky). The controversy of this policy could be illustrated by the 
effects of global financial crisis, which hit the world in 2008 – 2009 (as illustrated below). 
 The Russian domestic political situation has stabilised. However, the achievements of 
this policy have come with a price. The consolidation of the energy sector under 
governmental control, gaps in the legislation on foreign investment and the reliance on 
energy exports for reconstruction of the economy has created a risky situation for the energy 
sector and for the Russian economy in general. Many experts argue that Russia cannot be 
considered a rising economic power, as, for example, China or India. For instance, Youngs 
(2009: 80) writes the following: “Russia… is on a long term path of decline enjoying new 
influence thanks to a moment of rising energy prices” The potential fluctuations of the price 
of the oil are the main risk to Russian economy.  
The successes of Russian economic growth have been achieved by the exploitation of 
Russia’s natural resources base. Moreover, the growing revenues from the oil and gas sectors 
have been achieved not by the increase in production, but due to the increase in oil prices 
since the beginning of the 2000s. For example, the fall in the price of oil in 1998 resulted in a 
fall in the Russian revenue from oil sales, which in its turn contributed to the downfall of the 
country’s economy. Conversely, the rise in oil prices in 2000 resulted in an extra 70 per cent 
of revenue for Russian oil companies and accordingly an additional US$8.1 billion in tax for 
the Russian state (Jaffe & Manning, 2001: 134). Keeping in mind that the oil price level 
changes over time and that, following a period of price growth, there would most likely 
follow a period of price fall, the Russian economy is vulnerable to this fluctuation. Moreover, 
the income received from oil and gas sales was hardly invested into the development of the 
industry. On the contrary, outputs of natural gas are stagnant: three supergiant fields, which 
have been in operation since the Soviet times, are in decline. Oil production has also slowed 
down after the short period of growth in the early 2000s (Jaffe & Manning, 2001: 134). The 
2009 global financial crisis demonstrated the negative impact of the high level of 
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dependence of the Russian economy on energy sales. 
 Global recession has affected the Russian economy as well. In 2009, the Russian 
economy shrank by 7.9 per cent and the FDI decreased by 45 per cent. Among other reasons, 
one reason for the decline of Russian economy is its dependence on energy prices. During 
the second half of 2008, oil prices dropped from US$147/bbl to US$32/bbl (Mankoff, 2012: 
43). The Russian economy demonstrates rather slow recovery rates: real GDP grew 4 per cent 
in 2010 (IMF, 2011: 27). The IMF explains the slow recovery by the economic dependence on 
energy sales, the poor investment climate, as well as the imperfections of the banking system 
(IMF, 2011: 28). The interconnection between economic growth and energy prices is 
discussed by other scholars as well. For example, Guriev and Tsyvinski (2010) write that: 
“*the+ Russian recovery depends on high oil prices, and the evaluations of predicted 
economic recovery are directly related with the fluctuations of oil prices” (Guriev et al., 2010: 
29). Moreover, as it has been described above, Russian energy infrastructure is in desperate 
need of investment, especially the gas sector with Gazprom’s double-pricing policy.   It is 
important to ask the question why Russia creates such difficult conditions for foreign 
investors to energy sector, considering that Gazprom is in such desperate need of 
investment. The answer is related to the very nature of the securitisation process. Kurtz 
writes the following about it: 
“Once a securitising actor has employed a particular argument 
relating to a specific fact… to legitimize his proposition, he/she cannot 
fall behind that anymore without risking losing a considerable 
amount of credibility” (Kurtz, 2012: 671) 
In this case, the government cannot change its policy towards FDI without affecting 
other elements of its energy policy. This creates the clash between political and economic 
elements of Russian energy policy, and in the long term may result in both economic 
vulnerability and political instability. Considering that energy sales constitute 50 per cent of 
Russian exports, the only realistic way to increase the export, to match the import growth, is 
to increase the export volumes of hydrocarbons (Ahrend, 2006: 113). This is because, even if 
Russia increases “exports of more sophisticated manufactures, their contribution to total 
export growth would remain modest for some years to come, given their small share in 
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current exports” (Ahrend, 2006: 113).  Of course, Russia needs to diversify its exports to 
include a wider range of products, aside from natural resources. Nevertheless, at the 
moment, there is the question as to whether Russia can increase exports at all, including oil 
and gas sales. The topic of the much-needed investment into the energy sector was raised 
earlier in this chapter. Kjaestad and Johnsson write that large investments are needed in 
more or less all parts of the Russian energy sector, in order to guarantee future supplies 
(Kjaestad et. al, 2007: 887). Without investing in the development of the new fields and the 
upgrading of the existing infrastructure in a short period of time, Russia may lose its share of 
the European market (Kjaestad et al. 2007: 887) and, this, in its turn, will negatively affect the 
Russian economy.  
Moreover, the developments in Russian national energy policy are raising concerns in 
the EU. The bureaucratic and legislative barriers imposed on foreign investors, and the 
controversial approach to the consolidation of the energy sector under governmental control 
is sometimes interpreted as a way to use energy sales as a foreign policy tool (Smith, 2008; 
Baran, 2007; Cameron, 2011). There are different perspectives on the ultimate goals of 
Russian energy policy. One of the perspectives suggests that Russian government is trying to 
construct an ‘energy superpower’ (Rutland, 2008: 203). It is complicated by the fact that 
there is no single opinion on what the term ‘energy superpower might mean? Rutland 
considers the concept of ‘energy superpower’ to be contradictory, by combining military 
strength with the energy market. He also emphasizes that none of the major oil-producing 
countries, could be called a ‘superpower’ (Rutland, 2008: 206). Peter Rutland writes that 
Russia supplies only around 10 per cent of global oil and gas. Considering this, it is difficult to 
imagine that Russia would be able to use energy as a “political weapon” without the 
cooperation of other energy-producing states (Rutland, 2008: 207).  
To summarise, the context of securitisation and its interpretation and application by 
the securitising actors is different in Russia as compared to the EU. This thesis argues that the 
motives behind Putin’s changes to Russian energy policy are driven firstly by domestic 
factors. External actions, which are often interpreted as signs of attempts to use energy as a 
political weapon, are driven either by the consequences of the limitations of domestic energy 
policy or in response to policy changes in other states. For instance, Russian resistance to 
liberalize the access to the pipeline network connecting Central Asia and the EU, is not 
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caused by a Russian desire to increase political leverage on the EU, but to ensure future 
Russian supply volumes both internally and externally, in case of a drop of gas production 
domestically.  
134 
 
Chapter 4 
The level of act: Media Analysis 
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Introduction 
According to Balzacq securitisation happens on two levels: the level of agent and level of act. 
Two previous chapters were devoted to the level of agent and focused on actors and contexts 
of securitisation in Russia and in the European Union member states. This chapter looks at 
the level of act, consisting of the context of securitisation and the linguistic act of 
securitisation. Language is one of the most important tools used by the securitising actors 
“to prompt a target audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, 
sensations, thoughts and institutions)” (Balzacq, 2010) to justify the securitisation policy. The 
chapter is divided into two parts: an overview of the gas dispute will help to understand the 
context of securitisation process and the media analysis of Russian and European press is 
used as an example of linguistic act. 
The case study selected for analysis is 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute, which 
affected both energy security of Russia and the European Union. In the past a number of the 
European member states have experienced the interruptions of Russian energy supplies. The 
Central and Eastern European member states are more dependent on Russian supplies and 
therefore more vulnerable to gas stoppages. The significance of 2009 gas spat is very well 
summarized by Amelia Hadfield (2012: 457): “the 2009 gas crisis accelerated the view of 
energy by EU policy makers as a strategic commodity, and a subject of EU foreign policy. 
None of the previous disruptions of supplies from Russia had had such an impact on mutual 
relations”. Moreover, Ukraine is among the most important transit states for Russian exports, 
because around 80 per cent of Russia’s gas exports to the EU go through Ukrainian territory. 
This creates transit risks for both Russia and Europe (Spanjer, 2007: 2890). That is why the 
2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict has been selected for the analysis. 
This chapter presents detailed analysis of Russian and British printed media, 
supported by the analysis of media frame based on the overview of 8 European media 
sources as an example of the analysis of the linguistic element of securitisation process. The 
quantitative analysis of Russian and British media is aimed to answer the question if the 
securitisation process is increased in the context of Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute; and the 
qualitative analysis of Russian, British and European media examines how the gas dispute has 
been negotiated to the audience in Russia and the EU. 
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Energy conflicts with transit states and their implications for EU-Russia energy 
relations 
Historical reasons of transit rows between Russia and transit states 
The transit related problems as well as the difficulties of setting the energy prices for former 
Soviet republics experienced by Russia are rooted in the dissolution of the USSR. The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union into 15 independent states was accompanied by a break in 
economic relations with former Soviet states. First of all by transfer from set up prices of 
planned economic system to the world market ones. The creation of the CIS was essential for 
former soviet republics to adapt to the new conditions. This included energy trade as well. 
For many former Soviet states Russian energy exports constitute from 80 per cent to 100 per 
cent of energy resources consumption (Zhisnin, 2003: 212-213). But most of the former 
Soviet Union states fail to pay for the imported resources. In the early 1990s, straight after 
the USSR broke up, Russia agreed to set energy prices for former Soviet Republics lower than 
the world level (energy prices were about 10 per cent of world levels) (Gromulka, 1994: 93). 
Russia also accepted the principles of gradual lifting energy prices to world levels and gradual 
dismantling of direct subsidies (Gomulka, 1994: 95). Due to the economic difficulties 
experienced by the majority of the Soviet republics, the rise of energy prices by Russia could 
create the potential for conflict. 
The integration process in the former Soviet space has not been very strong 
(politically or economically) (Kubicek, 2009: 237). By the end of the 1990s the slow 
fragmentation of the CIS began, with some of the states facilitating cooperation within the 
CIS framework and others gradually moving away from it. For instance, Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan created the European Economic Community (EurAsEc). 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan established the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organization (CACO) in 2002. Russia joined this organization two years later. In October 1997, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova created another cooperation framework – GUAM. 
Uzbekistan was a member of this organization between 1999 and 2005. For this period of 
time the organization was called the GUUAM. After leaving the GUUAM, Uzbekistan joined 
EurAsEc in 2006 (Papava, 2008: 49).  According to Papava the reason for this disintegration 
process is “the continued restriction of the integration process to the framework of CIS along 
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the same lines as the closed nature of production cooperation that characterized the Soviet 
Economic System” (Papava, 2008: 48). 
The process of disintegration was also accompanied by the intention of some of the 
former Soviet republics to reduce dependence on Russian energy. For example, the GUAM 
member states were interested in the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. 
This pipeline was supposed to reduce dependence of some of the GUAM members on 
Russian oil supplies. For instance, Ukraine would get an opportunity to import oil shipped 
straight from Turkey (Mankoff, 2012: 247). Soon the process of disintegration became even 
more intensified by the chain of colored revolutions in a number of the CIS member states. 
First a “rose revolution” happened in Georgia in 2003, the next year was an “orange 
revolution” in Ukraine, and in 2005 Kyrgyzstan experienced a “tulip revolution” (Hale, 2005: 
134). All these coloured revolutions had the same pattern, which Beachain defined as “a civic 
campaign to guarantee free and fair elections” (Beachain, 2010: 7). Usually as a result of such 
a campaign it was a pro-Russian candidate who was overthrown. Beachain explains this by 
the inability of Russian leaders to consider the specifics of the electorate in these countries. 
On the example of Ukraine, he argues that Russian advisers suggested Yanukovich follow the 
electoral campaign, which works in Russia: the specific use of media and encouraging 
maximum “voter turnout” in especially supportive regions, as well as pressure to people 
dependent on the state to vote for Yanukovich (Beachain, 2010: 36-37).  
The Russian government did not expect ‘to lose’ the CIS, because in some sense 
Russia never thought about the former Soviet Republics as ‘foreign states’. Sergey Morozov 
argues that Russia did not use any elements of the soft power on the post-Soviet space to try 
to shape positive attitude towards Russia. However, a number of American and European 
NGOs were actively operating in Ukraine and in some other states, including Georgia 
(Morozov, 2008: 20-21). However, for the aim of this research the reasons of the colored 
revolutions are not as important as the outcomes. In 2004–2005 the Russian government 
became aware of the loss of its political influence in the CIS. This led to new directions in 
relations with these states, including in energy policy. Russia decided to concentrate on its 
own interests and started to lift energy prices for its neighboring states in 2005. 
Unfortunately this process was not very smooth and resulted in the appearance of new 
phenomenon: ‘energy wars’ with transit states which caused supply interruptions to the EU 
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and damaged the Russian reputation of a reliable energy producer. Among the most 
significant energy rows were the 2006 and 2009 energy crises with Ukraine. 
Russian energy supplies pass through the territory of at least one state before 
reaching the European market. This fact creates transit-related risks due to the lack of control 
over the gas or oil flow in the territory of the transit state which also creates opportunities 
for cost distortions. The European states became aware of the outcomes of these risks after 
the two major transit rows between Russia and Ukraine. Even though the first crisis 
happened in January 2006, the tension between the sides existed for several years before it 
happened. According to Mankoff the argument between Kiev and Moscow over the status of 
gas transportation network in the Ukrainian territory existed ever since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Ukrainian leaders always demanded high tariff prices for the transit of Russian 
supplies and resisted persistent attempts of Russia to “secure an ownership stake in its 
pipeline infrastructure as a means of paying off the country’s debt to Russia” (Mankoff, 2012: 
252). The disagreement over energy trade reached its culmination point in the middle of 
2005.  
In spring 2005 the former president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, suggested moving 
transit tariffs to the European levels and make them payable in cash. A couple of months 
later the Russian Duma voted for Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania to pay 
European prices for gas (Stern, 2006). At the end of the year Gazprom requested a price 
between US$ 160–230 by mcm (considering the rise of world gas prices), unless it would give 
Gazprom “an equate stake in the transit pipeline network” (Stern, 2006). Ukraine did not 
agree to either of these variants and as a result by the end of December 2005 Russia and 
Ukraine failed to reach an agreement and sign a new contract for the next year. On 1st of 
January 2006 Gazprom reduced the volumes of gas piped through the Ukrainian territory and 
as a result in the period of time from 1st to 3rd of January 2006, “Gazprom’s gas supply to 
France decreased by 25–30 per cent; supply to Austria decreased by 33 per cent; and Italy 
received approximately 25 per cent less than normal” (Spanjer, 2006: 2889). The conflict 
ended in January 2006 when Russia and Ukraine agreed, that Gazprom would sell gas to 
intermediate company RosUkrEnergo, which is based in Switzerland and co-owned by 
Gazprom, for US$ 230 per mcm. RosUkrEnergo would resell gas to Ukraine for US$ 95. At the 
same time, Kiev increased transit rates by 50 per cent (Nyrgren, 2008: 61–62). For two years 
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there were no major problems related to the transit of Russian gas through Ukrainian 
territory. 
At the end of the year 2008 the energy relations between Kiev and Moscow reached 
a new point of disagreement over gas and transit prices for 2009. On the 31st of December 
2008 Russia and Ukraine failed to sign the new energy supply contract for 2009 because of 
disagreement between the two countries on gas prices and debts. On 1st of January 2009 
when Gazprom’s contract to supply gas to Ukraine ended, the taps were turned off at 0700 
GMT. Even though both countries guaranteed that gas supplies transported via Ukraine to 
the EU states would continue as normal (BBC (1), 2009) , but on the 7th of January gas 
supplies stopped after Russia accused Ukraine of stealing gas meant for European countries 
(BBC (2), 2009). After continuous mutual accusations, negotiations and the pressure from the 
EU, Russia and Ukraine managed to reach an agreement (BBC (3), 2009). The gas supplies 
resumed fully only by the 20th of January 2009.  Almost 20 countries in Europe were affected 
by the gas row between Russia and Ukraine (BBC (4), 2009). The long–term consequences of 
the ‘gas war’ are negative for Russia. The EU placed an emphasis on the importance of the 
development of the internal energy market and the development of alternative energy 
sources, which may potentially reduce the Russian share at the European energy market, or 
in other words it threatens Russian energy security. At this stage it is very important to 
answer the question, why would Russia risk its reputation of reliable energy supplier by these 
incidents? 
In Western literature, Russia’s behaviour towards Ukraine is explained by political 
reasons. For instance, Baran argues that Russian energy policy is aimed not at achieving 
economic benefits, but to increase the dependence of the European countries on Russian 
energy supplies. This would allow Russia to use its position as an energy producer as a 
political tool (Baran, 2007). Some authors explain Russia’s behaviour as an attempt to 
influence internal the political situation within the transit states. For instance, Pavel Baev 
writes that “Russian economy and Gazprom in particular have gained practically nothing; the 
achievements are entirely political… Gazprom’s straightforward pressure made very little 
sense and was certain to yield fewer rewards than firm but flexible demands for step-by-step 
increases” (Baev, 2008: 151). He argues that the 2006 transit row was one of the steps taken 
by the Russian government to weaken the anti-Russian government in Ukraine (Baev, 2008). 
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However, it is not entirely fair to explain this transit row only as Russia’s foreign policy 
strategy, because the debt problem discussed earlier is a real factor.  
 The main argument of the majority of critics was that there are double standards in 
relations with former Soviet states: only states which “either left the Soviet Union (the Baltic 
countries) or those which had elected pro-European (rather than pro-Russian governments” 
(Stern, 2006). In 2006 Russia increased energy prices for Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova and Ukraine. Only Ukraine and Moldova refused to pay the demanded price, which 
resulted in a halt to supplies to both states in January 2006 (Stern, 2006).  At the same time 
the relatively loyal Belarus has been enjoying the same subsidized price as before. However, 
this argument might have been valid only in January 2006. In 2007 Russia did raise the issue 
of price increases with Belarus as well. Soon after the transit row with Ukraine was over 
Gazprom began negotiations with Minsk over new price levels for 2007. However, Belarus 
also did not want to pay the market price and the heated negotiations lasted until 31st of 
December 2006. On that day an agreement was reached, the price was increased and Russia 
managed to buy some shares of Beltransgas. However, seven months later the tension 
escalated again, Minsk owed Gazprom US$ 450 million and insisted on a price reduction. 
Moscow requested the debt to be paid otherwise the gas supply volumes to Belarus would 
have been reduced. In the end Minsk agreed to Moscow’s conditions (Morozov, 2008: 146–
156). To conclude, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century Russia increased 
prices for the CIS without consideration of the political loyalty of their governments. 
 It would be wrong to say that the energy conflict resulted from the Kremlin’s attempt 
to control the internal political situation in Ukraine. On the contrary, the policy of price 
increase demonstrates that Russia gave up its imperial ambitions. It would be too naïve from 
the Russian side to expect to force the governments of the CIS countries to follow the 
Russian direction only by energy blackmail. Russia should be too short-sighted not to 
understand the long-term negative implications of the transit rows for the Russian energy 
sector to risk its reputation as a reliable energy supplier to Europe by the vague and unlikely 
possibility of re-establishment of its political influence on the post-soviet states. The coloured 
revolutions made it obvious for Russian leaders that the era of Russian political dominance in 
the region is over and it is time to give up old the Soviet policy of subsidizing the allied states. 
Simonov, the director of the Fund for National Energy Security, argues that Russian energy 
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policy is orientated towards economic interests rather than political ones. The Gazprom 
representative confirmed this opinion by saying: “Gazprom’s obligation and priority is to 
provide Russian domestic customers with energy on fair price. To do so Gazprom needed to 
accumulate enough of income from gas exports” (Gazprom representative, 2010), including 
exports to the CIS as well. Some of authors find this position rational as well. For instance, 
Stacy Closson says that “the new prices imposed have been related to sales prices in the 
West, and the transition from subsidies to market prices may simply represent a passing 
phase as countries adjust their relationships and adapt to market realities” (Closson, 2010: 
97). Moreover, the long-lasting negotiations on Russia’s WTO accession also require the 
liberalization of energy sector, including the domestic market. According to the Gazprom 
representative, Russia agreed to a gradual increase of energy prices for domestic customers 
until 2015 (The EC representative, 2011). Consequently, prices for the CIS countries should go 
up as well. 
Whatever the reasons were, the crises damaged Russia’s position on the European 
energy market. Until 2006 Russia had a reputation as a reliable energy producer and the 
energy cutoffs due to transit rows with Ukraine damaged this reputation. It demonstrated 
the importance of supply diversification of energy supplies for Europe and facilitated the 
negotiations on the development of Common European Energy Policy. According to the 
interview with the representative of DG Energy in Brussels, it was the experience of the 
Russian energy supplies cutoffs, which facilitated the negotiations on the potential for 
development of more coherent approach towards non-EU energy producers (DG Energy 
representative, 2011). To sum up, the energy rows provoked a new wave of securitisation in 
EU-Russia energy relations, because it threatened both the security of demand for Russia 
(potential of losing its position on the European energy market) and the security of supply 
(European access to energy supplies).  
Since this research is aimed at the analysis of the securitisation process of energy trade 
between Russia and the EU, it would be useful to see how these threats have been 
negotiated to the audience. The second part of this chapter is devoted to the media analysis 
of the Russian printed press in order to answer the question how the energy row of January 
2009 has been presented to the Russian and British audiences. 
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Media analysis of the January 2009 energy conflict  
Gamson writes that “media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct 
meaning” (Gamson, et al. 1989: 2). Media as power to put an emphasis on some issues as 
compared to others and to formulate and shape public discourse (Splichal, 1999: 272). This 
section studies how energy policy is presented in Russian and European media using the 
example of the energy transit row with Ukraine in January 2009. Structurally this section 
begins by an explanation of how media analysis is grounded in the theoretical framework of 
the research, then it goes on to describe the specifics of the Russian media context; and the 
second half is devoted to the qualitative and quantitative analysis of four Russian 
newspapers: Kommersant, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, and Komsomolskaya 
Pravda, followed by the analysis of the European media, which is divided into two sub-
sections: the first one presents a broad European media frame based on the analysis of 
media sources of member states affected by the gas dispute, and the second one is devoted 
to the more detailed analysis of British newspapers: The Independent, The Guardian, The 
Daily Telegraph, The Observer. The conclusion compares the media frames10 created in 
Russian and in European media. For the first part of the European media analysis a variety of 
English-language online media sources from eight member states are selected. British 
newspapers are selected more detailed analysis of the media in the EU. Despite the fact that 
the UK wasn’t directly affected by the gas dispute, the analysis conducted in this chapter 
demonstrated that the media frame created by British media presents the situation in the 
same way as a broader cross-national European media frame.  
Theoretical grounds of media analysis 
The Frankfurt School argues that a government may use media to justify domestic and 
foreign policy (Kellner, 1995: 29). The majority of the population, weather politically active or 
not does not have open access to information about what happens in the outside world. The 
general audience could be compared to the people in Plato’s cave, who can only see the wall 
in front of them and the shadows of the objects which are passing in front of the fire behind 
and above of them. These shadows and the meaning which they are given are the only 
knowledge about the world they have. The prisoners are enlightened by the philosopher, 
                                                 
10 Media frame is a term used in media studies. Media frame promotes a particular interpretation of events. 
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whose aim is to open their eyes to the real meaning of these shadows. Using this allegory to 
explain the process of transition of the information from mass media to the audience, it is 
possible to argue that “news as security is a social construction” (Vultee, 2011: 82). The 
media in this allegory may play the role of puppeteer who creates shadows on the wall 
(Newman, 1989: 85), some kind of buffer between people and the real world. The 
presentation of these real life events “are not necessarily fabrications, but representations 
that are in greater or lesser degree made by man himself” (Vultee, 2011: 82). The use of 
media analysis is compatible with critical social research. The securitisation theory used in 
this dissertation acknowledges the importance of language for security construction 
(Balzacq, 2002; Balzacq, 2010, McDonald, 2008, Buzan et al. 1998). The mass media uses 
language to present and explain events to its target audiences that is why the analysis of the 
media frames created by the newspapers can help to analyze how energy security is 
negotiated to the audience. Balzacq (2010) writes the following: 
“In the context of securitisation, the aim of interactions, as constituted or 
mediated by language, is to convince or persuade an audience to see the world 
in a specific way”  
In his earlier work Balzacq also writes about the symbolic component of the security 
negotiation process. He writes that symbolic practices (use of metaphors, stereotypes, 
images, emotions) could be used to create the desirable image (by the securitising actor) 
(Balzacq, 2002: 491). In some sense he builds on Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic power, which is 
also connected to the ability to shape one’s perception of self and of the other (Bourdieu, 
1991: 181). The literature on media studies explains how these symbolic techniques could be 
applied by the modern media. Neumann provides a list of some of them: agenda-setting, 
salience cuing, priming effects, issue framing, mainstreaming, and ideological cultivation 
(Neuman, et al. 1992: 9). Agenda–setting evaluates the connection between the most 
presented issues in media and the perception of importance of these issues as compared to 
others by the audience (Neuman, et al. 1992: 10). Another approach, ideological cultivation, 
argues that the more people watch television the more stereotypical their opinion is about 
the outside world (Neuman, et al. 1992: 9). Media dependency hypothesis talks about the 
reliance of the population on media to get news about public policy, because they have no 
other source of information (Neuman, et al. 1992: 11). For the purpose of this research, the 
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media dependency theory is the most relevant: the majority of the population can only make 
sense of EU-Russia energy relations from mass media. For these reasons, this dissertation 
uses media analysis to illustrate how symbolic practices are used to shape the public’s 
understanding of energy security. In other words, the media frames created by Russian and 
British newspapers are used as an example of the speech act. Before moving to the analysis 
itself, it is important to explain why the comparison of the media frame with the speech act 
is valid. The Copenhagen School defines securitisation as a speech act: a securitising actor 
presents an issue as a threat which requires certain measures to defend the security (Buzan 
et al. 1998: 40). The problematic issue is to define ‘the speaker’, Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde 
suggest that ‘the speaker’ might be represented by the authoritative collectivities (including 
the state, pressure groups) (Buzan et al., 1998: 41). The media could be considered to be a 
‘voice’ of these collectivities.  
For example, the Russian media is (historically) closely connected with the state. 
Smaele points out that for a long time the media in Russia was dominated by Marxist 
ideology and fulfilled a special role in forming public opinion (Smaele, 1999: 175). For 
seventy years journalists were concerned not with providing independent outlook on 
domestic and foreign policy, but guarding and promoting the official position of the 
government. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation formally adopted 
Western principles with regards to the press, including freedom of speech, expression, and 
the independence of the mass media. However, it is difficult to call Russian media completely 
independent. It was the early 1990s when the state began sponsoring the mass media. These 
governmental subsidies helped many influential newspapers to cope with financial 
difficulties. On the biggest part of Russian territory the advertising market was not yet 
developed enough to provide sufficient income to support the press, “which made the media 
even more dependent on local or regional political bosses, who rewarded political loyalty 
with financial support” (Belin, 2002: 141).  
The European media system is different from the Russian one. For example, the mass 
media is a well-established industry in the UK, and “journalism is strongly professionalized in 
the sense that journalists have their own set of criteria for the selection and presentation of 
news” (Hallin, et al. 2004: 222). Traditionally the major newspapers have an affiliation with 
one of the political parties, but this became weaker after the Second World War (Hallin, et al. 
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2004: 210).  Nevertheless, the major newspapers still have certain political orientation. 
According to Hallin et al. the majority of the readers of the Daily Telegraph and Times 
support the conservatives, as compared to the Guardian and the Independent whose target 
audience is more politically diverse (Hallin, et al. 2004: 212). Despite the differences in the 
mass media of Russia and the UK, media analysis is important, because the media plays a key 
role in forming the public opinion and informing the public about the major issues in 
domestic and foreign politics (Wright, 2000: 161). It is important to emphasize here, that this 
thesis doesn’t aim to compare Russian and European/British media system, but the media 
frames created by media sources in Russia and the EU to examine the differences in 
presenting the information to Russian and European audiences. 
The analysis of the printed press is useful to provide an understanding of what kind of 
message is transferred to the general audience by people in power and near them. According 
to the data of Russian Public Opinion Research Centre, 36 per cent of the Russian population 
read newspapers daily, 43 per cent regularly, and only 21 per cent do not read newspapers at 
all (WCIROM, Press-release No 1248). Even considering the rapid development of the 
technology and wide-spread use of online media, 55 per cent of Russian people believe that 
online resources cannot compete with the printed press (WCIROM, Press-release No 1407). It 
is also important to note that a public opinion survey demonstrated that 53 per cent of the 
population in Russia tends to believe the information provided by mass media (WCIROM, 
Press-release No 1673) and only 8 per cent believe that the government is censoring this 
information (WCIROM, 2010). To sum this up, the majorities of Russians read newspapers 
regularly and tend to believe in the accuracy of the presented information.  
A similar public opinion survey conducted in Britain by UK Public Opinion Monitor, 
demonstrated that around 50 per cent of respondents read daily newspapers regularly, and 
35 per cent read local newspapers on a regular basis (at least 3 times a week). Around 88 per 
cent of British people use media to understand what is happening in the world (UK Public 
Opinion Monitor, 2011). However, the level of trust towards the reliability of the information 
presented in newspapers is lower in the UK when compared to Russia. The survey conducted 
by the Public Broadcasting Service in November 2011 demonstrates that only 38 per cent of 
British populations trust the information presented in the newspapers (Thompson, 2011). 
The same survey indicates that the recent phone-hacking scandal has reduced the level of 
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trust in the press (Thompson, 2011). To conclude, the assumption can be made that the 
content analysis of Russian and British newspapers will help to compare the message 
received by general public about EU-Russia energy relations in both Russia and the UK. 
Methodology of Media Analysis 
Because the media analysis is not the key method of this research project and due to the 
word limit, the decision was made to focus on the analysis of printed press only for Russian 
and British media, supported by the analysis of the European online media sources. The aim 
here is therefore not to undertake an exhaustive study of media images, but to make 
sufficient analysis to support the specific claims which are made about securitisation and 
media discourse in public space (such as the use of media as a securitisation tool). 
Methodologically, media analysis can be approached by using both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. The purpose of quantitative analysis is to collect the countable data, 
which can be analyzed statistically. The qualitative approach, on the contrary, focuses on the 
narrative aspects of a text (Altheida, 1996: 23–36). Both approaches have strengths and 
weaknesses. For instance, the advocates of quantitative media analysis have been criticized 
for “restricting content analysis to numerical counting exercises” (Krippendorf, 2004: 87). At 
the same time the proponents of the qualitative research of mass media have been criticized 
for “being too impressionistic” (Krippendorf, 2004: 87). To maximize the accuracy of the 
investigation, the analysis of selected Russian and British newspapers would be conducted by 
using both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The chapter uses only qualitative 
analysis of European media, because of a slightly different aim for this part of analysis.  
Quantitative analysis allows for determining if the coverage of energy security issues 
intensified in January 2009, and therefore if the specific context contributed to the increased 
securitisation. This could be achieved by comparing the number of articles and their position 
within the newspaper (how many are printed on the front page) devoted to energy trade 
with Ukraine in December 2008 and January 2009. Moreover, quantitative analysis will help 
to evaluate if energy security is covered by the press regularly, or only in response to 
breaking news. This could be achieved by comparing how many articles are printed on 
energy security in general, and EU-Russia relations in particular, were printed in December 
2008 and how this changed in January 2009. In this case the increased number of articles on 
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EU-Russia energy relations could be considered to be an evidence of increased securitisation 
process – the actors are negotiating an issue to the audience in a specific way. Qualitative 
analysis will help to analyze the message passed to the audience through these media 
sources. It is important to note the compatibility of quantitative analysis with the post-
positivist methodology applied in this research. McGuirk and O’Neill argue that quantitative 
methods can be used in post-positivist research, if the results of quantitative analysis 
demonstrate the influence of the social, cultural, and political context on the subject of the 
study (McGuirk et al. 2012: 12). In the case of the media analyses presented in this chapter, 
the quantitative data (the number of articles on energy security) allows to evaluate the 
correlation in coverage of energy related issues by newspapers with different political 
orientation. For example, Rossiiskaya Gazeta is considered to be a voice of the state, and the 
monitoring of the changes in coverage of EU-Russia relations (before and after the January 
energy conflict), in combination with the analysis of the media frame created by Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta, could help to evaluate if the state uses the press to shape the public opinion on 
Russian energy policy.    
Russian newspapers: 
1. Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Russian Newspaper) is a daily Russian government newspaper, 
established in 1990. Legislative acts come into effect after publication in the 
newspaper. The content includes the news, interviews with government officials and 
expert commentaries on official documents. According to the website, Rossiiskaya 
gazeta is orientated towards the general audience. Circulation is 179,550 (web-site of 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta). 
2. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The Independent Newspaper) is a daily newspaper, appeared in 
1990. The newspaper positions itself as an edition publishing independent points of 
view on political, economic and social life in Russia and abroad. The perspective 
presented in the newspaper is often in opposition with the official line. In the late 
1990s it was part of the media group of Boris Berezovsky (Zassoursky, 2004: 37). The 
circulation is 56,094 (web-site of Nezavisimaya Gazeta). 
3. Kommersant is a daily newspaper established in 1990. The content includes financial 
and business news, world politics, and the coverage of cultural and sport events in 
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Russia and abroad. The circulation is 125,000 to 130,000 copies (web-site of 
Kommersant newspaper). 
4. Komsomolskaya Pravda is one of the oldest daily newspapers in Russia. The first issue 
was published in 1925. The content includes everything from political and economic 
news to interviews and stories about celebrities. The target audience is the general 
public. The circulation of daily newspaper is 0.7 million copies. The newspaper has 
been criticized for publishing tabloid kind of content and for the lack of criticism of 
the existing government. However, the newspaper is very popular among Russian 
population (web-site of Komsomolskaya Pravda). 
British newspapers: 
1. The Daily Telegraph – daily newspaper with circulation of 580,000 copies in April 
2012. The newspaper is owned by Hollinger. In terms of political affiliation, the Daily 
Telegraph is associated with Conservative party (britishpapers.co.uk (1)). 
2. The Guardian – daily newspaper with circulation of 302,636 copies. The newspaper is 
owned by Guardian Media Group. Traditionally the Guardian is associated with pro-
Labour views (britishpapers.co.uk (2)). 
3. The Independent – daily newspaper with circulation of 176,785 copies (data of 2008). 
The newspaper is owned by Independent Group. Officially the Independent is not 
associated with any political party and stays in the centre of political spectrum.  
4. The Observer – Sunday newspaper with circulation of 386,140 copies (data of 2008). 
The owned is Guardian Media Group and consequently, has similar political 
affiliations with the Guardian. 
Table 2 European newspapers  
 
Country Media name Brief overview 
Austria Austria Today Daily online newspaper 
aimed at covering Austrian 
news for International 
community 
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Bulgaria Bulgaria Gazette Bulgaria`s online English-
language newspaper 
covering Bulgaria business, 
politics, society, lifestyle, 
sports and tourism news. 
The Czech Republic The Prague Post Weekly publication featuring 
current affairs, business, 
sports, and financial news, 
plus cultural reviews and 
opinion. 
France Le Monde Diplomatique LMD in English is a concise 
version of the Paris-based 
parent edition, publishing all 
the major stories each 
month, expertly translated 
Germany The Deutsche Welle Online broadcaster aimed at 
representing Germany in 
international media 
landscape 
Hungary Budapest Business Journal Hungary's largest and oldest 
source of business and 
financial news about 
Hungary in English. 
Slovakia The Slovak Spectator Slovakia's only English-
language newspaper. It is 
published weekly and covers 
local news, culture and 
business. 
Poland Gazeta Wyborcza Presents some of the 
translated articles published 
by daily Gazeta Wyborcza, 
which has been established 
by the journalists from 
former democratic 
opposition in 1989 
 
The media analysis is divided sub-sections. First one is devoted to the quantitative media 
analysis, and aims to monitor the changes in coverage of the issues related to energy security 
before and after the energy conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The second part, is devoted 
to the qualitative media analysis, and analyses the media frame created in both British and 
150 
 
Russian media in regards to Russia-Ukraine energy crisis, the analysis of British media is 
supported by the qualitative analysis of the media frame created by the European media.  
Quantitative analysis of Russian media 
This section aims to determine if the number of articles devoted to energy issues in general 
and transit problems with Ukraine in particular have increased after the energy supplies 
interruption at the beginning of January 2009. The following aspects have been measured: 
the total number of issues published by a newspaper in December and January, how many 
issues were devoted to energy related topics each month, how many articles were about the 
gas row with Ukraine and how many energy related articles have been printed on the front 
page. These indicators allow us to calculate the percentage of issues which included 
information about energy trade each month and how it changed before and after the crisis. 
Table 3 Kommersant  
Month, Year December 2008 January 2009 
Total NN of issues published this month 24 17 
Total NN of issues, which included 
articles on energy related issues 
13 12 
Total NN of articles about energy related 
issues published this month 
23 26 
Total NN of articles about gas row with 
Ukraine 
2 17 
Total NN of articles about energy 
published on the front page this month 
6 11 
 
In December 2008 more than half of the issues (54 per cent) published included articles 
about energy trade or energy policy development. In total 23 articles were devoted to energy 
related issues and only 2 (8 per cent) of them were about gas crisis. Only 6 (26 per cent) were 
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front page articles. In January 2009, 70 per cent of the issues included information on energy. 
17 articles (65 per cent) were devoted to the gas row with Ukraine with 11 (42 per cent) of 
them been the front page article. 
 
Table 4 Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent Newspaper)  
Month, Year December 2008 January 2009 
Total NN of issues published this month 21 15 
Total NN of issues, which included 
articles on energy related issues 
5 15 
Total NN of articles about energy related 
issues published this month 
15 65 
Total NN of articles about gas row with 
Ukraine 
3 41 
Total NN of articles about energy 
published on the front page this month 
1 13 
 
In December 2008 only in 23 per cent of the issues could find articles on energy related 
problems. Overall, 15 articles were published in December on energy related issues, 11 of 
them constituted a special section on energy. Only 3 (20 per cent) articles were about energy 
conflict with Ukraine.  Only one article (6 per cent) was published on the front page. In 
January 2009 we can see a significant increase in coverage of energy related issues. Overall, 
15 issues of the newspaper were in print in January 2009 and each of them (100 per cent) 
included some articles on energy trade or energy security. Throughout the month 65 articles 
were released on energy related issues, including one special section (15 articles). 41 articles 
(61 per cent) were about the gas row with Ukraine and 13 of them (20 per cent) were printed 
on the front page.  
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Table 5 Komsomolskaya Pravda  
Month, Year December 2008 January 2009 
Total NN of issues published this month 27 26 
Total NN of issues, which included 
articles on energy related issues 
3 22 
Total NN of articles about energy related 
issues published this month 
3 50 
Total NN of articles about gas row with 
Ukraine 
1 50 
Total NN of articles about energy 
published on the front page this month 
0 17 
 
Out of 27 issues of Komsomolskaya Pravda printed in December 2008 only 3 (11 per cent) 
included the articles on energy related issues and only one of them (33 per cent) was about 
transit price disagreement with Ukraine. None of the energy related articles were published 
on the front page. At the same time in January, 22 (84 per cent) issues out of 26 covered the 
news in the energy sector. Overall, 50 articles were about energy trade in January and all 50 
(100 per cent) of them were devoted to transit row with Ukraine. 17 (34 per cent) articles 
were published on the front page.  
Table 6 Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Russian Newspaper)  
Month, Year December 2008 January 2009 
Total NN of issues published this month 23 15 
Total NN of issues, which included 
articles on energy related issues 
15 13 
Total NN of articles about energy related 22 37 
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issues published this month 
Total NN of articles about gas row with 
Ukraine 
4 28 
Total NN of articles about energy 
published on the front page this month 
5 8 
 
In December 2008 65 per cent of the issues had some articles on energy related subjects. In 
total 22 articles covered news in energy sphere with 5 (22 per cent) of them been a front 
page story. However, only 4 (18 per cent) articles were about the tension in energy relations 
with Ukraine. After the gas row with Ukraine the amount of articles devoted to energy crises 
increased significantly. In January 2009, 13 (86 per cent) issues out of 15 followed the 
development of energy trade in general and the situation around Ukraine in particular. 
Overall 37 articles were devoted to the fossil fuel industry and 28 (75 per cent) followed the 
transit row with Ukraine. However, the number of articles published on the front page did 
not increase dramatically – only 8 (21 per cent) energy related articles were printed on the 
first page.  
Result of the quantitative analysis of Russian press:  
The above analysis proved that Russian printed media indeed paid a lot of attention to the 
news coverage in the energy sphere. All four of the selected newspapers printed articles on 
energy related topics in the majority of January issues in 2009: from 70 per cent 
(Kommersant) of issues to 100 per cent of issues (Nezavisimaya Gazeta). Moreover, the 
majority of energy related articles were devoted to the gas crisis: from 61 per cent 
(Nezavisimaya Gazeta) to 100 per cent (Komsomolskaya Pravda). If in January all four 
newspapers focused a lot on the transit row in particular and the energy sector in general, 
the amount of information on energy published in December vary from one to another. The 
lowest percentage of energy related topics were in Nezavisimaya Gazeta (only 15 articles 
with 11 of them being part of a monthly supplement) and Komsomolskaya Pravda (only 3 
articles). Kommersant and Rossiiskaya Gazeta both included energy related articles into more 
than half of their issues in December: 54 and 65 per cent respectively. At the same time both 
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of these newspapers provided a significant number of publications on issues not related to 
transit tensions between Moscow and Kiev in January 2009: 35 (Kommersant) and 25 
(Rossiiskaya Gazeta) per cent.  
For the analysis of media as tools of public opinion construction, the examples of two 
newspapers are especially interesting: Rossiiskaya Gazeta and Komsomolskaya Pravda. The 
former one is “the voice of official government” and a large amount of articles on energy 
related issues in both December 2008 and January 2009 demonstrates the high interest of 
the Russian government in the development of the energy sector in Russia. At the same time 
Komsomolskaya Pravda is the most popular newspaper among the general public as 
compared to the other three newspapers. Komsomolskaya Pravda is also famous for its pro-
government orientation (with low level of governmental criticism). In this case a large 
number of articles on the transit row in January may indicate on attempt to justify Russian 
policy to the general population. Content analysis of sample articles provided below may 
help to see how the information is framed by the policy makers and mass media to shape 
public opinion. 
Quantitative analysis of British media: 
This section, similarly to the quantitative analysis of Russian printed media, intends to 
determine the number of articles related to energy trade in general and on gas conflict with 
Ukraine in particular.  
Table 7 The Daily Telegraph (London)  
Month, Year December 2008 January 2009 
Total NN of issues published this month 27 27 
Total NN of issues, which included 
articles on energy related issues 
26 25 
Total NN of articles about energy related 
issues published this month 
76 115 
Total NN of articles about gas row with 5 30 
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Ukraine 
Total NN of articles about energy 
published on the front page this month 
1 3 
In December 2008, 96 per cent of issues included articles about energy related issues. Out of 
76 energy related articles only 5 (6.5 per cent) were about the gas crisis. Only one out of 
these five articles was published on the front page. In January 2009, around 93 per cent of 
the Daily Telegraph issues included articles about energy (115 in total). 26 per cent of these 
articles were about energy conflict between Russia and Ukraine, 10 per cent of these articles 
(3 out of 30) were published on the front page. 
 
Table 8 the Independent (London)  
Month, Year December 2008 January 2009 
Total NN of issues published this month 27 27 
Total NN of issues, which included 
articles on energy related issues 
25 26 
Total NN of articles about energy related 
issues published this month 
98 89 
Total NN of articles about gas row with 
Ukraine 
4 23 
Total NN of articles about energy 
published on the front page this month 
0 0 
The Independent also mentions energy related topics in the majority of the issues published 
both in December 2008 (93 per cent) and January 2009 (96 per cent). In December just 4 out 
of 98 articles (4 per cent) were about tensions between Russia and Ukraine. In January 2009, 
the coverage of Russo-Ukrainian crisis and its consequences on the EU has been more 
significant (25 per cent). However, none of these stories was published on the front page.  
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Table 9 the Guardian  
Month, Year December 2008 January 2009 
Total NN of issues published this month 27 27 
Total NN of issues, which included 
articles on energy related issues 
21 22 
Total NN of articles about energy related 
issues published this month 
99 90 
Total NN of articles about gas row with 
Ukraine 
6 23 
Total NN of articles about energy 
published on the front page this month 
0 1 
Around 28 per cent of the Guardian’s issues published in December 2008 included 
information about energy policy or energy markets, with 6 articles out of 99 (6 per cent) 
devoted to the escalation of Russo-Ukrainian crisis. In January 2009, 81 per cent of issue 
included articles on energy related subjects. 23 articles (25 per cent) were about the 
development of the energy crisis, and only one article was published on the front page. 
Table 10 the Observer  
Month, Year December 2008 January 2009 
Total NN of issues published this month 4 4 
Total NN of issues, which included 
articles on energy related issues 
4 4 
Total NN of articles about energy related 
issues published this month 
14 24 
Total NN of articles about gas row with 
Ukraine 
0 2 
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Total NN of articles about energy 
published on the front page this month 
0 0 
One hundred per cent of the Observer’s issues published in both December 2008 and January 
2009 contained the information about energy related subjects. In December none of the 14 
articles was about Russo-Ukrainian gas price dispute. In January only 2 out of 24 articles 
about energy trade were about the gas crisis.  
Result of quantitative analysis of British media:  
All four newspapers cover a variety of issues related to the oil and gas industry and trade, as 
well as energy policy development when compared to the Russian newspapers the number 
of articles on energy related issues did not change significantly in January 2009 as compared 
to December 2008. However, as in the case with Russian media the attention to Russian 
energy policy increased in January 2009 with the development of the energy conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine. The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian and the Independent printed 
approximately the same amount of articles on the gas dispute between Kiev and Moscow: 
from 25 to 26 per cent out of total number of articles on energy related issues. The Observer 
had the lowest number of articles on the gas conflict (just 2 articles).  
Vultee defines media frames as the lens through which the public sees security 
related issues (Vultee, 2009: 33). In securitisation theory media is one of the tools used by 
the securitising actors to negotiate an issue to the audience (Balzacq, 2010). The media 
analysis allows to answer two important questions for an understanding of the securitisation 
process: which issues are covered more as compared to others, and which linguistic 
mechanisms are used to convince the audience in the importance of the extraordinary 
measures (Vultee, 2009: 34) The quantitative analysis is devoted to the first question, 
evaluating how the coverage of energy related issues changed after the transit conflict in 
Russia and the UK. As was demonstrated above, in Russian newspapers published in January 
2009 from 61 to 100 per cent of articles on energy related topics were about the transit 
crisis. Moreover, the amount of articles on the gas dispute published on the front page is 
different as well. In British newspapers selected for this analysis only five articles (on Russo-
Ukrainian dispute) all together were published on the front page as compared to 61 front 
page stories in case of the Russian newspapers. The quantitative analysis demonstrated that 
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the securitisation process is more prominent in Russian newspapers as compared to British 
ones. However, it is still important to analyze the media frames created in Russia and the UK, 
and how the printed media present the transit conflict to the audience.  
Qualitative analysis of printed media in December 2008–January 2009 
The process of information exchange between journalists and the audience goes through the 
so-called media frames. Vultee defines media frame as “as an element of media discourse 
that provides a central organizing idea for making sense of events” (Vultee, 2011: 79). To put 
it simply, it answers the set of questions: what happened, whose fault is it and what should 
be done to solve the problem. The frame would usually include the range of the positions 
(Gamson, et al. 1989: 3). In this sense the process of securitisation is placing the particular 
issue into the specific frame, which would not only attract the attention of the audience to it, 
but also provide the interpretation of this event (Vultee, 2011: 79). It is also important to 
remember that mass media does not exist in isolation from society. Journalists and editors 
share the same cultural context with the audience and “frames organize the world in a way 
that makes sense to the people who produce the news as well as those who read it” (Vultee, 
2011: 83). 
Research Questions: 
1. Who is presented as responsible for the transit row? 
2. How Russian actions are described (effective, non–effective)? 
3. How would it influence the further development of EU-Russia energy dialogue? 
Qualitative analysis of Russian newspapers11: 
Kommersant  
December 2008 
In December 2008 Kommersant published just two articles about potential rows with Ukraine 
                                                 
11 Four articles are selected from each of the eight newspapers: two from December 2008 and two from 
January 2009 (one from the beginning and the end of each month). The media analysis is limited to four articles 
per a newspaper due to the word limit.  
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over gas prices. Both are written by Natalya Grib and Oleg Gavrish, correspondents covering 
energy policy issues:  
1. Grib, N., Gavrish, O. (2008), Ukraine left Gazprom with a debt: the country can survive 
a winter without Russian gas, Kommersant, Issue N 222, p. 9 
2. Grib, N., Gavrish, O. (2008), New Old Year: Gazprom wages a war on Ukraine again, 
Kommersant, Issue N 232, p. 1 
Both articles talk about the difficult situation around Ukrainian debt to Gazprom at the end 
of 2008. By the end of December Ukrainian Energy Company Naftogas owed two billion US 
dollars to Gazprom for gas supplies. Both articles emphasize that Ukraine simply did not have 
money to pay off the debt, at the same time by the end of the year 2008 Ukraine had enough 
gas in its underground gas storage for three months. The first article published in the 
beginning of December (5th of December) predicted that the negotiations would not lead to 
any positive outcome, because the Ukrainian side was just trying to postpone the obvious 
escalation of the conflict. The second article, published two weeks later (19th of December) 
re-evaluated the situation according to possible gas price fluctuations in 2009. If in the 
beginning of December Gazprom could argue about raising prices up to US$ 400 in case if 
Naftogas had not paid its debt, but in the end of December it became obvious that the price 
could go up to a maximum of US$ 230. The authors argued that in this case the only reason 
for the escalation of the conflict by the Russian side was political: at that time Ukraine raised 
the issue of joining NATO and Russia did not like it, according to Grib and Gavrish. 
January 2009 
Articles for analysis: 
1.  Sjsoev, G. (2009), Europe used a gas mask: Energy shortfalls united Europe, 
Kommersant, Issue N 1, p. 2, 
2.  Grib, N., Gavrish, O. (2009), Long Gas-goodbye: Russia is inviting Europe to join 
negotiations with Ukraine, Kommersant, Issue N 5, p. 1-2, 
Both articles developed the topic of political roots of energy crises. For instance, Grib and 
Gavrish wrote about the Brussels’ accusations of Russia using oil and gas as a political tool. 
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Both articles mentioned that the critical position towards Russia could be influenced by the 
new EU member states. Gennadij Sjsoev wrote that Poland took the Ukrainian side and 
considered Gazprom to be responsible for energy shortfalls. Grib and Garvish argued that 
among other reasons for the especially critical position of the EU towards the transit conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine was the fact that the energy row coincided with the change of 
presidency in the EU. From January 2009 the Czech Republic took the presidency and 
influenced the development of the tough response of the EU on the Ukrainian–Russian 
transit disagreement. Both articles concluded that this conflict resulted in negative 
consequences for all: EU member states, Russia and Ukraine. Grib and Garvish suggested 
that the danger of future supply interruptions by Russia and/or Ukraine would facilitate the 
development of a Common EU Foreign Policy, which would limit Russian ability to promote 
its interests in energy trade at the bilateral level. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
December 2008 
1.  Ivzhenko, T. (2008), Timoshenko burns bridges: New Political Scandal in Ukraine 
involves gas interests, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Issue N 278, p. 5 
2.  Ivzhenko, T. (2008), Cheap politics of expensive gas: Viktor Yushchenko insists on his 
conditions of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Issue N 280, p. 7 
In both pieces the author writes about the role of gas supplies negotiations with Russia in 
Ukrainian political speculation at the end of December 2008. Both articles discuss the 
disagreement over the gas price between Russia and Ukraine for 2009 and the position of 
the former Ukrainian president towards them. According to data provided by Tatiana 
Ivzhenko, Yushchenko argued that he would manage to convince Russia to reduce the price 
for Ukraine to US$ 100 per one thousand cubic meters. The first article talks about the 
accusations which Yulia Timoshenko has thrown at the former president of Ukraine with 
regards to his special relations with Dmitry Firtash, co-owner of RosUkrEnergo,12 and acting 
in their mutual interests to make money on questionable financial operations. At the same 
time both articles concluded that the intention of Viktor Yushchenko to be involved 
                                                 
12RosUkrEnergo is a intermediate company dealing with energy trade between Russia and Ukraine 
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personally in negotiations on price level would sabotage the provisional compromise with 
agreed price of US$ 230 per one thousand cubic meters. The overall conclusion of both 
articles is that internal political competition in Ukraine may influence badly energy security 
for both Russia as energy producer and Europe as energy consumer. 
January 2009 
Articles for analysis: 
1.  Ivzhenko, T. (2009), Senseless gas war: Upcoming agreements between Gazprom 
and Naftogas may lead to new conflicts, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Issue N 001, p. 1 
This article gives a broad description of the consequences of energy crises for all sides 
involved, including Ukraine, Russia and the EU. This article concludes that the EU won in the 
Russo-Ukrainian gas conflict. It was the first energy related disagreement in which the EU got 
involved that much and (according to Tatiana Ivzhenko) it is likely that the EU would try to 
expand its control over energy transit issues via Ukraine, possibly by provoking new conflict 
between Moscow and Kiev. The article underlines that Russia warned Brussels about 
potential supply interruptions due to unauthorized Ukrainian actions in December 2008. In 
conclusion the article puts responsibility for the crisis on Ukrainian internal political conflict. 
 
 
2. Ivzhenko, T.  (2009), One way ticket to Ukrainian president: gas problems heated 
public opinion to the boiling point, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Issue N010, p. 7 
The second article emphasizes mainly internal political tension within Ukraine, which gets 
only worse due to the transit conflict with Russia and its potential consequences. According 
to the article there were a number of protests in Ukraine to express the negative attitude of a 
population towards potential tax raise and increase in energy price for a population to pay 
for expensive energy supplies from Russia.  
Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Russian Newspaper) 
December 2008 
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Articles for analysis:  
3. Zjkov, S. (19.12.2008), Inextinguishable debt: Gas supplies to Ukraine may be 
stopped, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Issue N 4817, 
The article briefly summarizes the problem of Ukrainian debt and concludes that 2 billion US 
dollars are not going to be paid to Gazprom; Russia would stop supplies to Ukraine. The 
article also explains that according to current legislation there are different contracts on gas 
supplies and gas transit and even if the gas supplies to Ukrainian needs stop, Naftogas still 
needs to carry on transit to the EU as normal. However, Russia plans to inform European 
consumers about possible supply interruptions by Ukraine. 
4. Sadovnikov, N. (29.12.2008), Gas-reboot: Gazprom hopes to reach an agreement 
about Ukrainian gas in this year, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Issue N 4822, 
This article talks about the attempts of finding compromise in negotiations about the debt, 
including the possibility of advance payment for transit to Ukraine. The article also talks 
about the price fluctuations for 2009. For Ukraine the price was expected to rise above US$ 
200 per one thousand cubic meters, but for some other Russian consumers the gas price was 
reduced as compared to earlier estimations. These countries included Belarus, Moldova and 
some Baltic States. The reason for lowering the price is connected to the reduced world 
market price. However, even considering the changes in world price level the proposed price 
(by Ukraine) of US$ 100 per one thousand cubic meters was unrealistic. 
January 2009 
Articles for analysis: 
1. Zjkov, S. (12.01.2009), Abduction of Europe: Ukraine left Europeans without Russian 
gas during winter holidays, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Issue N. 4825,  
The article gives a brief overview of the development of gas crisis day by day starting from 
the 1st of January 2009. This summary aimed to demonstrate the unlawful actions of Ukraine 
which resulted in supply interruptions in some of the European states. At the same time the 
article focuses on the Russian conditions of transit resumption. To do this Ukraine needs to 
confirm its agreement to let international observers to monitor the transit situation on the 
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Ukrainian territory. 
2. Yurgens, I. (23.01.2009), Inhale gas, Exhale oil, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Issue N. 4834, 
This article, written by Igor Yurgens the chairmen of board of Institute of Modern 
Development, analyzed the consequences of the gas row at different levels, including the 
international and political levels. He began by saying that Russia won the transit row and 
proved the actions of Ukraine to be illegal. However, the long-term consequences may be 
negative: including the possible growing control from European states over Ukraine, which 
may begin by gas transit regulations and develop further into the possible membership of 
NATO and the EU. He also emphasized the importance of development of international 
agreement which may regulate the energy trade instead of the ECT, which was violated by 
Ukraine. At the same time he warned that some of the external powers may use this 
situation to try to conserve oil prices at the level of US$ 30–35 per barrel, which would mean 
financial loss for Russia. As a result this may lead to worsening consequences of financial 
crisis in Russia and level of societal satisfaction with government. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda 
December 2008 
Only one article was devoted to Ukraine debt to Russia in December: 
1. Kaftan, L. (30.12.2008), Ukraine steals Russian money by not paying for gas” by Larisa 
Kaftan, Komsomolskaya Pravda 
This article is written in very emotional and simple language, using some slang phrases. The 
author uses a personal story – talks about her elderly mother, who is living in Ukraine and 
afraid not to have heating in her flat due to gas supply interruptions from Russia. The article 
goes on to explain that Ukrainian political leaders jeopardize Russo–Ukrainian relations and 
present it to the public as a Russian threat to Ukrainian security. The author describes the 
negative consequences of Ukrainian debt on the Russian economy: this money could be used 
to invest in the Russian economy and increase Russian GDP. At the same time, Kiev benefits 
from this situation by decreasing production cost and selling its goods successfully on the 
Russian market. The article goes on by suggesting that Kiev may steal Russian gas devoted to 
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European customers. The author concludes that the Ukrainian government focused only on 
internal political argument creates security threats not only Russian economic and energy 
security, but also for energy security of the EU and the human security of its own citizens. 
January 2009 
1. Grachev, I. (07.01.2009), ‘Gas war’ between Moscow and Kiev is the last defeat of 
George Bush: Timoshenko had to agree to allow international monitoring of pipeline, 
Komsomolskaya Pravda,  
The author begins by announcing the total halt of transit through Ukrainian territory due to 
the fact that Kiev blocks the gas on its territory. The article states that Ukraine is responsible 
for energy supply interruptions to the EU and emphasizes that the Russian side is prepared 
any minute to resume the negotiations on new contract with Naftogas. The author also 
express optimism about the decision to let international observers monitor the volumes of 
transit on both Russian and Ukrainian territory. He reminds that for a long time Yulia 
Timoshenko resisted this decision which proves that it is Ukraine that has something to hide. 
The article concludes that the transit row was initiated by America, but the author did not 
explain in which way. 
2. Viktorova, L. (22.09.2009), Yushchenko suspects Timoshenko in betrayal: gas 
agreements would be analyzed by General Prosecution Office and National Security 
Service, Komsomolskaya Pravda,  
This articles talks about internal political competition between the president of Ukraine 
Yushchenko and Prime Minister Timoshenko. The author implies that the former president of 
Ukraine feared the political competition from potentially more successful candidate at future 
presidential elections, because Yulia Timoshenko managed to find a compromise in the price 
disagreement with the former Russian Prime Minister Putin. Timoshenko was accused in 
providing Russian energy companies with beneficial conditions and potential opportunity to 
overtake the Ukrainian gas transportation network, and in political conspiracy with Moscow 
against president Yushchenko. 
Answers to research questions: 
165 
 
Who is responsible for the gas row?  
All four newspapers directly or indirectly blamed the escalation of conflict on Ukraine. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda and Nezavisimaya Gazeta promoted the idea of negative influence of 
internal political argument within Ukrainian government. Rossiiskaya Gazeta and 
Komsomolskaya Pravda mentioned that the resistance of the Ukrainian side to allow 
international observers to monitor gas volumes in pipelines proves that Kiev had something 
to hide. Words and phrases such as “stealing” and “illegal actions” were used in the majority 
of articles, when authors talked about use of transit gas for Ukrainian needs. Komsomolskaya 
Pravda went as far as blaming the crisis on conspiracy between the Ukrainian government 
and the administration of former US president George Bush. 
How Russian actions are described? 
The majority of articles agree that Russian actions were legitimate. Most of the sample 
articles emphasized that Ukraine pays less for gas than Gazprom’s customers in the EU. All 
selected articles mentioned that Russia did its best to inform Brussels about potential supply 
interruptions. Moreover, Komsomolskaya Pravda emphasized that Gazprom was ready to 
resume negotiations on a new contract at any time and Ukraine was slowing the process 
down. Only Kommersant briefly mentions that the reason for Russian intention to increase 
price to Ukraine up to European level is Ukrainian aspiration to join NATO. 
How it would influence further development of EU-Russia energy dialogue? 
The answer is mainly negative. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Kommersant and Rossiiskaya Gazeta all 
mentioned that the gas row benefited the EU by providing a new level of control over transit 
through Ukrainian territory, which the EU would probably like to keep. Furthermore, the 
potential development of a Common European Energy Policy, which would complicate the 
promotion of Russian interests on the European market. Kommersant also mentioned that 
the support of the EU towards Kiev might be explained by the influence of new EU member 
states which traditionally have negative perspective towards Russia. 
Media frame created by Russian printed press in December 2008 – January 2009 
Qualitative analysis did not demonstrate a big difference between pro-governmental 
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newspapers and ones with a more neutral position: all of them shared the same perspective 
on the energy crisis. However, quantitative research demonstrated the difference between 
the so-called elite newspapers (Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Kommersant) and newspapers 
which are mainly orientated towards the general audience (Komsomolskaya Pravda). Even 
though all the selected newspapers reacted to the 2009 energy row by paying more attention 
to news in energy trade than before, it was Komsomolskaya Pravda which almost did not 
cover energy trade in December and published articles on the energy row in 84 per cent of 
its January issues. The other three newspapers did not demonstrate such a big gap between 
December 2008 and January 2009 in the percentage of issues with energy related articles. 
This may mean that the untypically high attention to energy sector in January in 
Komsomolskaya Pravda was aimed at shaping public opinion in a specific way.   
As a result of qualitative media analysis the following frame of explanation of the transit 
row was created: Ukraine absorbed into internal political competition between former 
president Yushchenko and ex-prime minister Timoshenko first has sabotaged the 
negotiations on a new contract by demanding an unrealistic price. After failing to secure the 
price they wanted and loosing Russian energy supplies, Kiev began to steal gas devoted to 
European customers. Russian actions are explained as legitimate. Ukraine’s irresponsible 
behaviour affected the development of the Russian economy: not only did Ukraine enjoy 
subsidized gas prices, but it was reluctant to pay even this small price. In this sense it is not 
only legitimate to cut off supplies which resulted in loss for the Russian economy. Moreover, 
the behaviour of the Ukrainian government led to negative consequences in the EU-Russian 
energy dialogue. As a result, the EU did get control over energy transit through Ukrainian 
territory and most likely would try to keep it. Moreover, the conflict facilitates the 
negotiations on a Common European Energy Policy, which would make it more difficult for 
Russia to achieve agreements with the EU member states on the bilateral level.  
Qualitative Analysis of European media  
The media-analysis of the European media is conducted in two stages.  First cross-national 
analysis of European media sources has been conducted in order to construct the media 
frame created in the EU member states affected by Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute, the 
second stage presents more detailed media analysis of British newspapers in order to 
investigate how the gas dispute has been negotiated to the audience in a specific member 
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states. 
Cross-national analysis of European media frame  
Methodologically, this section of analysis is based on hermeneutic and inductive framing. 
Hermeneutic approach provides an interpretive account to media framing. This approach 
allows linking media analysis with broader cultural discourse (Matthes, J. et al. 2008: 259). 
Inductive approach could be defined as follows: “inductive approach involves analyzing a 
news story with an open view to attempt to reveal the array of possible frames, beginning 
with… loosely defined preconceptions of these frames” (Semetko, H. et al. 2006: 94). A 
responsibility frame is used as defined preconception of the media frame. The responsibility 
frame presents a certain actor as responsible for an issue analyzed. In case of the case study 
selected for this analysis the main question which actor is presented responsible for the gas 
dispute?  
 The media sources selected are major English-language sources in the EU member 
states affected by the Russian-Ukrainian crisis: Austria, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, France, and Hungary. Two articles are selected from each of the news 
sources via LexisNexis search for the analysis. The media sources analysed present a variety 
of online sources (including quality, daily, monthly, and weekly news sources). The brief 
description of the newspapers used was presented above (p. 136). 
Brief Summary of articles selected: 
Austria Today: 
1. Russia cuts gas supply completely, Austria Today, 07.01.2009 
Summary: This article describes an immediate impact of the gas dispute on Austria as 
well as potential measures to be taken to minimize negative consequences of the gas 
supply interruption. The article does not put direct blame on either Russia, or Ukraine, 
but talks about the necessity to support NABUCCO pipeline to resolve the European 
security supply problem. 
2. No Austrian needs to freeze in gas crisis, prime minister says, Austria Today, 
08.01.2009 
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Summary: The article summarises the attempts of Austrian Energy Company and Austrian 
government in resolving the negative consequences of Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute. 
Among other things the importance of supply diversification is emphasized. The article 
talks mainly about Russian responsibility for supply stoppage, Ukraine is presented as 
another country suffering from supply interruption.  
Bulgaria Gazette: 
1. The import of Russian gas will be decreased, 05.01.2009 
Summary: The article talks about first consequences of the Ukraine-Russian gas conflict, 
as well as potential risks of interruption of Russian supply to Bulgaria. 
2. The EU gives money for gas ‘interconnection’ with Greece and Romania, 08.01.2009 
Summary: The article talks about the measures planned by the European Union to 
minimize the negative consequences of the supply interruption in future and to assist 
Russia and Ukraine in restoring natural gas shipments to Bulgaria and other countries of 
the European community. 
The Prague Post 
1. Hulpachová, M., Russia gas flow remains spotty: Czech-brokered agreement fails to renew 
deliveries to EU, 15.01.2009 
Summary: This article presents Russia as the responsible side in the Ukraine-Russian gas 
crisis. An author makes the connection between the gas supply interruption to Ukraine 
and Russian attempts to prevent integration of Ukraine with the Western Europe. The 
article also makes connection between Russian energy policy and the Cold War rhetoric. 
Moreover, the article concludes that despite the vulnerability of the Central and Eastern 
European member states to Russian gas supply interruption, and the negative impact of 
the gas dispute on businesses and household, the EU will not change its relations with 
Russia. 
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2. Cunningham, B., Gas crisis fuels energy talks: Russian gas crisis sends Central Europe 
scrambling for future alternatives, 22.01.2009, 
Summary:  The article reflects on the weaknesses of the European energy security based 
on the implication of the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict. An author emphasises the 
importance of supply diversification for the European Union both by constructing new 
pipelines and bringing new energy producers on the European market, and by increasing 
the share of nuclear power (in particular, in the Czech Republic itself). Both Russia and 
Ukraine are presented as unreliable suppliers of energy to the EU. 
Le Monde Diplomatique 
1. Kandiyoti, R., Russia, Ukraine and the complex politics of natural gas pipelines: an OPEC for 
gas?, 23.01.2009 
Summary: The article makes assumptions about the political nature of the gas dispute, and 
expresses concern that Ukraine can potentially “disappear into Putin’s new ‘liberal empire’”. The 
article goes on to emphasize the EU’s growing dependence on external energy supplies in 
general, and Russian supplies in particular. An author claims that in future Russia may use the 
limited ways of gas transportation systems as a political tool and a way to raise natural gas price. 
The article also talks about the complications and problems faced by foreign companies wishing 
to invest to Russian energy industry, and about the tensions around Russian participation in the 
Energy Charter Treaty.  
The Deutsche Welle 
1. Russia warns deliveries to Europe could be hit, 27.12.2008 
Summary: This article talks about an escalating tension between Russia and Ukraine about a new 
contract. The article also mentions that there is a possibility of supply interruption to Europe. In 
conclusion, the article is talking about ‘Russian threats’ to Ukraine, in case if Kiev fails to pay for 
Russian gas. An author indicated that Ukraine is not going to be able to pay this money and had 
to ‘beg the International Monetary Fund’ for financial support. 
2. EU warns Rowing Gas Powers of Long Term Consequences, 07.01.2009, 
Summary: The article summarizes the negative impacts of the Ukraine-Russian gas conflict on the 
European member states. The article also states the necessity of the supply diversification to 
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minimize the consequences of potential supply interruptions in future. The article also states that 
the gas dispute puts the reputations of both Russia and Ukraine in question. 
Budapest Business Journal 
1. EU premiers plead with Ukraine and Russia for gas, 15.01.2009, 
Summary: The article provides an overview of the Ukraine-Russian gas dispute and its impact on 
the EU member states. The article also explains that the resolution of the conflict is delayed, 
because both Russia and Ukraine refuse to cooperate and blame each other for this dispute. The 
article connects Russian actions with Russian attempts to influence domestic politics in Ukraine.  
2. Russia and Ukraine aim to sigh gas deal on Sunday, 19.01.2009, 
Summary: The article summarises the progress in negotiations between Russia and Kiev on new 
contract and expresses hope that the gas supplies will resume soon. 
The Slovak Spectator 
1. Balogova, B., Russia turns off gas for Slovakia: the biggest fall in gas supplies, 07.01.2009, 
Summary: The articles talks about the biggest drop in natural gas supplies, which affects both 
industrial consumers and the households. This article condemns the actions of Russia and 
Ukraine and claims that it may affect their reputation negatively.  
2. Balogova, B., Lesna, L., Energy crisis looms as all gas imports cease, 12.01.2009, 
Summary: The article outlines the impact of the gas dispute on Slovakia: the exhaustion of 
Slovakian reserves of natural gas in severe winter conditions. The article also emphases the 
importance of energy supply diversifications to minimize Slovakian vulnerability to repetitive 
supply interruptions by Russia. 
Gazeta Wyborcza 
1. Kublik, A. (07.01.2009), Putin’s gas mace, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
Summary: The article describes the development of the gas dispute between Russia 
and Ukraine. Indirectly Russia is presented as a responsible side in the gas dispute. 
Russian accusation that Ukraine is stealing Russian gas supplies to Europe is explained 
by the fact that Ukraine uses these supplies to keep pressure in the pipelines. The 
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supply interruptions to Ukraine and the Baltic states (in the past) are explained by 
Russian attempts to promote alternative gas pipelines Nord Stream and South Stream 
as opposed to EU-supported pipeline NABUCCO. 
2. Wojciechowski, M. (14.01.2009), Europe has to be firm towards Russia, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
Summary: The article reflects on the difficulties in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. 
The article explains the gas dispute by Russian ‘big politics’ and claims that the EU needs to 
play more active and firm role with Russia to prevent it from interfering with domestic 
politics of Ukraine, and to avoid a possibility of supply interruption in future.   
Media frame created by European newspapers:  
All European newspapers state that 2009 gas dispute affected the energy security of the 
European Union and demonstrated vulnerability of European states to external energy 
supplies. European press suggests that the EU needs to diversify energy supplies to reduce 
dependence on Russian energy resources and minimise the consequences of potential future 
supply interruptions. The articles argue that gas conflict damaged Russian reputation as a 
reliable energy supplier. The Ukrainian reputation is also mentioned, but despite of it gas 
dispute is often explained as Russian attempt to influence Ukrainian politics. Ukrainian 
actions are explained either by the financial difficulties or by the necessity to keep the 
pressure in the pipelines.  
Qualitative analysis of British newspapers 
The Daily Telegraph: 
December 2008 
1. Blomfield, A. (05.12.2008), Putin threatens to cut off the gas for Christmas, The Daily 
Telegraph, p. 20, 
As the title suggests the article discusses the possibility of energy supply interruptions 
caused by Russia because of the inability of Ukraine to pay the increased price for natural 
gas. The article discusses both Ukrainian and Russian reputations as an energy producer and 
a transit state. Blomfield presents Russian energy policy as a foreign policy tool. The article 
suggests that the Kremlin uses energy supply interruptions as a weapon, which was used 
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against a number of the neighbouring states from Ukraine to the Czech Republic (Blomfield, 
2008:20).  Furthermore, the article also connects the potential energy crisis with Russian 
military power. Blomfield refers to the military conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 
2008, and the possibility of the use of power by Russia against other former Soviet States.  
2. White, G., Mason, R. (31.12.2008), Fears for UK gas as Gazprom-Ukraine row 
continues, The Daily Telegraph, p. 27, 
The article describes the latest (at that moment) development of the negotiations between 
Russia and Ukraine over the natural gas price for 2009. The article also writes about the 
mixed statements made by Gazprom and Naftogas on whether Russia did or did not receive 
debt repayment of $1.5 billion. The article also talks about Russian energy subsidies to the 
CIS states, which gave the post-communist states an opportunity to buy hydrocarbons on 
discounted prices. Russia began to raise prices in the mid-2000s to a number of states, 
including Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia. 
January 2009 
3. Elder, M. (02.01.2009), Europe shivers as Russia shuts gas taps, The Daily Telegraph, p. 
18 
The article talks about Russian decision to cut energy supplies to Ukraine, which threatens 
the European energy security in a similar way to the 2006 energy crisis. The article also talks 
about the political element of the conflict, including the reference to Russian decision to 
raise prices to Ukraine due to the pro-Western shift in Ukraine. Elder claims that the EU is 
better prepared for potential supply interruptions as compared to the similar crisis of 2006. 
The article concludes by saying that both Russia and Ukraine are hit by the economic 
recession, which has affected the development of 2009 price dispute.  
4. Waterfield, B. (20.01.2009), When will we get gas: EU asks, The Daily Telegraph, p. 16, 
The article talks about the post-crisis negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and the place 
of the EU in these negotiations. Waterfield focuses on the schedule of the resumption of gas 
supply to Europe after the agreement was reached between Russia and Ukraine over the gas 
supplies for 2009. The article also puts the Russo-Ukrainian energy crisis into perspective of 
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the EU’s energy supply diversification strategy and introduces the importance of bringing 
alternative supplies and construction of the new pipelines bypassing Russian territory.  
The Guardian (London) 
December 2008 
1. Macalister, T., Gow, D. (23.12.2008), Britain warned of danger to gas supplies as Russia 
steps up dispute with Ukraine: Gazprom alert revives fears of energy ‘cold war’: 
Moscow seeks to create Opec-style cartel, The Guardian, p. 21, 
The article focuses on two issues: potential energy supply interruptions due to the Russian-
Ukrainian gas dispute and the Russian initiative to establish an OPEC-style cartel of gas 
producing states. According to the article, this raises the concerns over Russian ambitions to 
use energy sales as a political tool. The article says that the establishment of the OPEC-style 
gas cartel could raise the natural gas price, and therefore, threatens energy security of Britain 
and other consumers. Macalister et al. argue that Russian energy policy “triggers fears of an 
energy ‘cold war’” (Macalister et al. 2008:21). 
2. Macalister, T. (30.12.2008), Putin fails to break deadlock as gas row with Ukraine 
threatens wider market, The Guardian, p. 24, 
The article summarizes the development of the negotiations on gas prices for Ukraine for 
2009. Macalister tries to present the situation from different perspectives: Russian, 
Ukrainian, and the EU’s. The article focuses on the negotiations between Gazprom and 
Naftogas on resolution of price dispute, and on Russian attempts to prevent the price dispute 
with Ukraine to affect its reputation as a reliable supplier to Europe. The article also 
mentions the internal political conflict in Ukraine between Timoshenko and Yushchenko and 
its impact on the gas relations with Russia. 
January 2009 
3. Leading Article: Russia and gas: heat and light, (02.01.2009), The Guardian, p. 32, 
The article looks at the consequences of the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute for both Kiev and 
Moscow. The article looks at the political dispute within Ukraine and the economic 
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difficulties of Gazprom caused by the high level of governmental interference in the 
commercial interests of the company. The article implies the political context of the transit 
row; it describes Russian actions as “cutting supplies to pro-Western, free-market Ukraine” 
(The Guardian 3, 2009: 32). The article concludes that Russia and Ukraine are interdependent 
economically and the transit row affects both countries negatively. 
4. Traynor, I. (21.01.2009), Russian gas begins to flow into wary Europe, The Guardian, p. 
26, 
The article looks at the consequences of the January 2009 gas dispute for the EU-Ukraine-
Russia energy trade. The article argues that the reputation of both Russia and Ukraine have 
been affected negatively by the crisis. The article argues that Ukraine was affected by the 
transit row the most, because of the negative consequences of the new gas deal for 
Ukrainian economy. Finally, the article emphasizes that the supply interruption demonstrated 
the importance of supply diversification, in particular via the NABUCCO route. 
The Independent (London) 
December 2008 
1. Dawber, A. (24.12.2008), Russian-led gas producers’ group raises fears of cartel, the 
Independent, p. 34, 
This article is about the meeting of the 12 biggest natural gas exporters in Moscow to discuss 
the creation of a Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). The article describes briefly the idea 
of GECF and also touches on the problem of Ukrainian energy debt and argues that this cartel 
can give an opportunity to raise prices for energy consumers (including the EU) The article 
also discusses the potential for the new energy row in January 2009, which can result in 
supply disruptions for the EU, since 80 per cent of Russian gas exports go through the 
Ukrainian territory. 
2. Arnott, S. (31.12.2008), Paying the piper; As Russia again threatens to cut Ukraine’s 
gas supply, Sarah Arnott surveys a battleground of economics and power politics, The 
Independent, p. 36, 
In apprehension of new transit row between Russia and Ukraine, the article focuses on the 
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politics of pipelines and talks about the existing pipeline projects (Nord Stream, South 
Stream, NABUCCO), which may help the transit problem. The article summarizes the progress 
(or lack of such) in Russo-Ukrainian negotiations on gas prices for 2009. The article claims 
that Russian energy policy towards Ukraine is not entirely economic; the Kremlin uses energy 
supplies as a political weapon. 
January 2009 
3. Leading article: The blunted claws of the Russian bear, (02.01.2009), the Independent, 
34, 
The article speculates on the concepts of power, which Russia has due to its position as an 
energy producer and how this power can be used against its neighbours. The article also 
looks at the question of price formation for energy for the former Soviet republics. The 
article presents Ukraine as vulnerable and dependable on Russian supplies state. At the same 
time, the EU is in different position as compared to Ukraine, and can and should look for 
alternative energy suppliers to monimise risks related to energy dependence on Russia. 
4. Arnott, S. (07.01.2009), Gazprom and the struggle for power; Gazprom is now so 
powerful that it is capable of freezing much of Europe. Sarah Arnott reports,  the 
Independent, p. 40, 
The article discusses the interconnection between Russian government, Gazprom and 
Russian energy policy. Arnott states that “Gazprom is simply not a normal commercial entity. 
Nor is it as non-political as it claims” (Arnott, 2009: 40). The article claims that Russia uses 
energy as a political tool to punish neighbouring states for adopting anti-Russian policy. To 
support this claim, Arnott reminds that the first transit row followed the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine. The Czech Republic also experienced supply disruptions after Prague has agreed 
to host a US radar station. The article also describes how both Ukraine and Russia blame 
each other for the conflict.   
The Observer13 
January 2009 
                                                 
13
 There are no articles published on this subject in December 
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1. Harding, L. (11.01.2009), Deal to resume Russian gas eludes EU as 11 people die in big 
freeze-up, The Observer, p. 32, 
The article is about the reluctance of both Russia and Ukraine to overcome the crisis caused 
by the price disagreement, and, about the severe consequences of this conflict for the 
countries the most affected by the supply interruptions (the Balkans). The article quotes the 
people from the affected states to emphasise the impact of Russo-Ukrainian conflict on 
European consumers. For example, Harding refers to Vlasta Stankovic from Serbia: “in some 
ways its worse than during the 1999 NATO bombing in the Kosovo crisis – at least it was 
springtime then and not so cold” (Harding, 2009: 32). The article concludes that the crisis 
caused not only by commercial interests, but also by political problems which go back to the 
2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. 
2. Medvedev’s gas pledge, (18.01.2009), The Observer, p. 47,  
The article is about the promise of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to do everything 
possible to restore gas supplies to Europe as soon as possible. The article concludes that 
despite the promises and speeches of the officials, both Russia and Ukraine failed to prevent 
the conflict, which affected people not only in Ukraine, but also in the member states in the 
EU. 
Answers to research questions: 
Who is responsible for the gas row? 
All four newspapers put greater responsibility on Russia for the energy crisis. All three daily 
newspapers implied that Russia uses or tries to use energy supplies as a political tool. For 
example, The Daily Telegraph writes that “Russia began sharply raising prices to Ukraine in 
2006, after a pro-Western government took control in Kiev” and “some Western diplomats 
fear that Russia, emboldened by its victory over Georgia in August, could yet turn its military 
ambitions on Ukraine”. The internal political competition in Ukraine, on which the escalation 
of the conflict is blamed in Russian media has been mentioned briefly, but not as the most 
significant factor.  
How Russian actions are described? 
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The Russian response to the Ukrainian refusal to pay the higher price for energy resources is 
presented negatively. The Independent writes that “Russia wants to gain control of EU 
pipelines”. The Guardian also blames Russia for abusing its position as an energy supplier. 
The articles selected for analysis include the following phrases: “Russia was using energy as 
political weapon”, “fears of energy ‘cold war’”. The Daily Telegraph shares a similar position: 
“Russian energy, an asset that the Kremlin has used to punish its political foes”.  
How it would influence further development of the EU-Russia energy dialogue? 
The newspapers selected for the analysis concluded that the energy row damaged the 
reputation of Russia as a reliable energy supplier and demonstrated the weaknesses of the 
European dependence on Russian supplies. The Independent and The Guardian talk about 
the importance of supply diversification in general and the southern corridor (NABUCCO) in 
particular.  
Media frame created by British newspapers in December 2008–January 2009 
All four newspapers selected for the analysis presented the energy conflict and its 
implications on EU-Russia energy relations in a similar way, despite different political 
affiliations. As a result of the qualitative analysis of British newspapers the following frame is 
created: Russia abuses its position as an energy supplier to punish some of its neighbours 
(Ukraine in particular) for choosing pro-Western political orientations. Such phrases are used 
in the majority of articles selected for analysis: “gas war”, “political club to beat opponents 
down”. The newspapers talk about the negative consequences of the gas conflict on the 
Russian reputation as a reliable energy supplier. Only one article in the Guardian mentions 
that the Ukrainian reputation suffered as well. Ukrainian internal political conflicts were 
mentioned, but had not been described as a major factor contributing to the development of 
the conflict. The dependence on Russian supplies is presented as a threat to European 
energy security. The importance of supply diversification is mentioned as well. For example, 
the Independent writes about the importance of getting oil and gas from alternative sources. 
Also, The Observer puts emphasis on the human victims of the conflict and all four 
newspapers suggested the importance of supply diversification. Especially important, is 
bringing new suppliers to the European energy market by supporting the construction of the 
NABUCCO pipeline.  
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Conclusions  
The aim of this chapter is to look at the negotiation of security to the audience. The 
Copenhagen School (Buzan, et al. 1998), as well as other critical theorists (Balzacq, 2002) 
argue that for the issue to be put on the security agenda, the securitising actor should 
present the issue as a threat to the audience, and the audience need to accept this threat.  
Not all the claims made by the securitising actors are socially effective (Williams, 2003: 514). 
For the claims to be effective the actor should connect the claim with the socio-cultural 
context and shared knowledge (Williams, 2007: 2). Balzacq claims language to be an 
important tool of the securitisation process. Language allows the securitising actor to use 
stereotypes, metaphors and emotions to shape the public opinion (Balzacq, 2008). Buzan et 
al. write that it is often difficult to distinguish one particular ‘speaker’, who is communicating 
security to the audience, and the ‘speaker’ could be traced back to the collectivities which 
have authority and ability to shape public opinion. This dissertation chose the media as an 
example of a ‘speaker’, because the majority of people get information about EU-Russia 
energy relations from the media. This chapter presented the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis of 4 Russian newspapers (Komsomolskaya Pravda, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, Kommersant, and Rossiiskaya Gazeta) and 4 British newspapers (The Daily Telegraph, 
The Guardian (London), The Independent (London), and the Observer), and a broader sample 
of European media (Austria Today, Bulgaria Gazette, The Prague Post, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, The Deutsche Welle, Budapest Business Journal, The Slovak Spectator, Gazeta 
Wyborcza). Both Russian and European media have different political affiliations (European 
media are orientated towards different political parties or independent; Russian newspapers 
have either pro-governmental or more neutral position), however it doesn’t affect validity of 
the media analysis, since its purpose is not to compare different media systems, but the 
media frames constructed in Russia and in the EU to negotiate energy security to the 
audience.  
Specialists of media analysis often use a term ‘frame’ (Vultee, 2011). Frame is a way 
of channeling the information about the outside world for a general audience. Coming back 
to the cave allegory, used at the beginning of this chapter, ‘framing’ is a way of giving 
meaning to the shadows on the wall. According to Vultee, “securitisation is a form of framing 
that highlights the existential threat of an issue – whether it arises at the interstate level or at 
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the cultural level of state’s legitimacy” (Vultee, 2011: 79). The media analysis focused on the 
coverage of the January 2009 Russian-Ukrainian energy conflict, because of its implications 
for the development of EU-Russia energy relations. After the energy interruptions in January 
2009 when almost twenty countries in Europe experienced shortage of Russian supplies, the 
member–states of the EU realized the urgency of the development of the Common European 
Energy Policy and supply diversification (see Chapter 5 for more details on diversification). 
The representation of this energy conflict in both Russian and European media is a good 
example of the use of symbolic properties in shaping public opinion. Bourdieu writes about 
this process the following: “symbolic properties, even the most negative, can be used 
strategically according to the material and symbolic interests” (Bourdieu, 1991: 221). The 
qualitative media analysis demonstrated that both British and Russian newspapers used the 
symbolic attributes to support their interpretation of the problem. British newspapers laid an 
emphasis on the effect of the energy conflict on the daily life of the European countries, 
which experienced the supply interruptions. The frame created by British newspapers 
blamed Russia for using energy power as a foreign policy tool, presented the dependence on 
Russian energy supplies as damaging for the EU energy security, and promoted the 
importance of supply diversification. Despite the fact that the UK wasn’t really affected by 
the energy crisis, the analysis of cross-national European media demonstrated that the 
media frame created in the UK projects the same message as a broader European cross-
national media frame. At the same time, Russian newspapers focused on the internal 
political conflict in Ukraine and the unreasonable expectations of the CIS states in regards to 
energy prices. Overall, media analysis demonstrated that the energy security is presented 
differently to Russian and European audiences.   
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Chapter 5 
De-Securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations: reasons 
and strategies 
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Introduction14 
Balzacq writes that an analysis of securitisation should also evaluate potential conditions for 
de-securitisation (Balzacq, 2010). Chapters 2 to 4 are devoted to the reasons and contexts of 
securitisation from both the Russian and the EU perspectives. Building on the conclusions 
and findings made in the previous chapters, this chapter moves on to the consequences of 
securitisation and the possible approaches to de-securitisation. It is important to look at the 
consequences of securitisation to answer the question: if de-securitisation is necessary or if 
EU-Russia relations should remain on the security agenda. Waever argues that de-
securitisation is not always a good thing. He writes: “De-securitisation is preferable in the 
abstract, but concrete situations might call for securitisation… securitisation might help 
society to deal with important challenges through focusing and mobilizing attention and 
resources” (Waever, 2011: 469). Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated that both Russia and the EU 
see each other’s energy policies as a potential threat to their own energy security. Russia and 
the EU try to develop diversification strategies to ensure energy security. This chapter 
evaluates the existing plans for diversification and the potential impact of these plans on 
both European and Russian energy security and EU-Russia energy relations. The examples to 
be discussed are: diversification of Russian gas supplies (entering the Chinese market, LNG 
and energy trade with Turkey, and EU-Russia competition over access to Central Asian and 
Caspian hydrocarbons).  
The second part of the chapter introduces the concept of de-securitisation and 
suggests a possible de-securitisation strategy. As was discussed in Chapter 1, there are 
different approaches towards de-securitisation. The Copenhagen School suggests that 
securitisation should be avoided (Roi, 2004: 284). If the issue has been securitised there are 
two possible ways: “to keep the responses in forms that do not generate security dilemmas 
and other vicious spirals” (Roi, 2004: 284) and to remove the issue from the security agenda 
(Roi, 2004: 284). According to Roi, de-securitisation could be achieved either by management 
of threats or their transformation (Roi, 2004: 285). He writes: “the management of 
                                                 
14
 Some of the material presented in this chapter contributed to the following publication: 
Khrushcheva, O. (2011), The creation of an Energy Security Society as the way to decrease 
securitization levels between the EU and Russia in energy trade, Journal of Contemporary European 
Research, 7 (2), p. 216-230, 
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securitised issues may well bring with it some notion of ‘normalizing’ the situation, the 
language of security will nevertheless also be present… the transformation of securitised 
issues is shifting of an issue from something that is ‘security’ to… ‘asecurity’” (Roi, 2004: 
285). Practically it could be achieved by following one of these strategies: objectivist strategy 
or the constructivist strategy (Roi, 2004: 285–286). The first is concerned with the 
differentiation between real and constructed elements of security, in other words “where 
security has an objective content against which subjective notions of threat will be either real 
or illusory” (Roi, 2004: 285). The second one, the approach adopted by this thesis, is 
concerned with the deconstruction of the reasons for securitisation. Krause, et al. write 
about the importance of securitisation theory for achieving de-securitisation, which could 
result only from a “profound understanding of the forces that create political loyalties, give 
rise to threats, and designate appropriate collective responses” (Krause, 1996: 249). As long 
as one understands why an issue has been securitised it is easier to handle the problem (Roi, 
2004: 285–286).  That is why it is important to connect the discussion on de-securitisation 
with the problems raised in the previous chapters. In relation to EU-Russia energy relations 
this thesis understands de-securitisation as ‘management of threats’ by deconstructing the 
reasons for securitisation. 
Diversification of Russian gas supplies   
Russo-Chinese negotiations 
Table 11 below demonstrates Russian vulnerability to any diversification of European energy 
supplies. As one can see from the table all Russian pipelines apart from the Blue Stream are 
destined to the EU. For this reason the potential construction of a pipeline to China is 
important for diversification of demand. However, the negotiations about gas contracts with 
China are complicated, because of price disagreement. This section provides an overview of 
Russo-Chinese negotiations on gas supplies, including the potential consequences of this deal 
for EU-Russia energy trade. 
Table 11 
 Russian Pipelines for natural gas supplies 
Pipeline Date Route Capacity 
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Bratstvo/Soyuz Soviet Network Russia–Ukraine–
Central Europe 
130 bcm 
Polar Lights Soviet Network Russia–Belorussia–
Ukraine–Central 
Europe 
25 bcm 
Transbalkan Soviet Network Russia–Ukraine–
Moldova–Belorussia–
Turkey–Greece 
20 bcm 
Finland Connecter Soviet Network/ 
expanded in 1999 
Russia–Finland 20 bcm 
Yamal Since 1999 Russia–Belorussia–
Poland–Germany–
Western Europe 
28 bcm 
Blue Stream Since 2002 Russia–Black Sea–
Turkey 
16 bcm 
Nord Stream Estimated 2011/2012 Russia–Baltic Sea–
Germany–Western 
Europe 
28/55 bcm 
South Stream Estimated 2014/2015 Russia–Black sea–
Balkans–
Central/Southern 
Europe 
31/63 bcm 
Source: Boehme, D. (2010), EU-Russia Energy Relations: What Chance for Solutions? A focus 
on the Natural Gas Sector, p. 64. 
 Even though the discussion on the possibility of Russian gas supplies to China has 
existed since 2004, the Russo-Chinese negotiations intensified again after the Third Energy 
Package came into force at the beginning of 2011. Nevertheless, up to the current moment 
the agreement has not been signed yet. The main stumbling block in negotiations is 
184 
 
disagreement on prices. In 2006 Russia signed an agreement to provide gas to China from 
Siberia. According to the original plan two new pipelines were supposed to be constructed by 
2011. However, up to the current moment this project still exists only on paper. The official 
reason for the delay in the realization of the project is the price disagreement between 
Beijing and Moscow (Guangjing, 2010). At the moment, the level of gas consumption in 
China is rather low. Only 4 per cent of Chinese energy comes from gas, the country still 
depends a lot on coal (Economidies, 2010). Even though Chinese leaders admit that they 
need more gas, they cannot offer a price which can compete with the one on the European 
market. One Gazprom representative commented on this situation as follows:  
“The Chinese market will never bring as much income as the European market 
does. At the same time the construction of necessary infrastructure is quite an 
expensive enterprise. It is uncertain yet who will pay for the construction of this 
pipeline. Possibly the Chinese side will participate in funding the project on 
account of future gas supplies” (Altaigazprom representative, 2011).  
 A Gazprom representative said in the interview to the author of this thesis that “in 
the condition of the economic recession it is not profitable project. That is why for the next 
couple of years this plan is not going to be fulfilled” (Gazprom representative, 2010). 
Simonov, the Director General of the National Energy Security Fund agreed that any project 
for demand diversification by Russia is not economically viable. However, the EU “keeps 
pushing Russia away by the lack of coherence in Common European Energy Policy and 
constant paranoia regarding Russian ambitions to use energy as a political tool” (Simonov, 
2010). 
 The progress in negotiations is slow. In April 2010 Gazprom as well as the energy 
security experts in Russia saw the price disagreement as the major problem, which would set 
back the realization of the project for at least a couple of years (Simonov, 2010; Gazprom 
representative, 2010). In April 2011 the negotiations between Russia and China intensified, 
local authorities of the Altai Territory, Gazprom, and the research institutions involved in the 
project development expressed enthusiasm about the future of the pipeline. In spring 2011 
the General Manager of “Altaigazprom”15 expected the agreement to be reached by the 
                                                 
15
 Altaigazprom is the regional branch of Gazprom situated in the Altai Territory 
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middle of June 2011. According to Dr. Vinokurov, “Gazprom should be pretty confident in the 
success of the negotiations, otherwise they would not initiate the geotechnical, engineering 
and environmental works in the Ukok Plateau” (Vinokurov, 2011). Moreover the first deputy 
chairman of the government of the Republic of Altai, Sergej Tevonyan, said that the 
construction of the pipeline may begin in 2011, since according to the provisional plan the 
pipeline should be ready and operating in 2015. The pipeline is going to be 2600 kilometers 
long from the place of extraction to the borders with China on the Altai territory (Tevonyan,  
2011). The pipeline should go through the territory of six subjects of the federation: the 
Republic of Altai, Altai Territory, Novosibirsk Region, Tomsk Region, Yamalo-Nenetsk 
Autonomous Region, and Khanti-Mansiysk Autonomous Region (Gazprom’s web-site1). 
According to the preliminary arrangements the contract between Russia and China would be 
at least for 30 years, and Russia would supply 30 bcm per year (Gazprom’s web-site). It is not 
confirmed yet, but possibly the construction would be sponsored by the Chinese as well and 
Russian side would return the money invested in the future supplies. Nevertheless, in the 
beginning of 2013 the agreement between Russia and China has not been reached yet. 
 The pipeline construction caused a lot of disagreement within Russia as well. The 
attitude of some non-governmental organizations towards the proposed route is very 
negative (Engoyan, 2011). Originally, there were three possible routes: through Mongolia, 
through Kazakhstan, through the Altai Territory and the Republic of Altai. Gazprom decided 
to select the third route, which causes a lot of opposition within Russia. The proposed 
pipeline route is supposed to go through the Ukok Plateau. Among the arguments against 
this route: ecological consideration, difficult climatic conditions, and economic 
considerations, which are discussed below in more detail.  
Ecological considerations 
The Ukok Plateau is situated in the south east of the Republic of Altai on a high mountain 
plateau. This is a large natural reserve and home to a number of animal species. The Ukok 
Plateau is recognized by UNESCO as Quiet Zone (UNESCO web-site). Some Russian ecologists 
consider the construction of the pipeline and road to China through this territory to be a 
tremendous mistake, which would destroy the unique ecosystem (Engoyan, 2011). Moreover, 
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some Russian scientists argue that by constructing the pipeline through the Ukok Plateau, 
Russia would contradict international conventions, since the Ukok is included by UNESCO in 
the World’s Heritage List (Engoyan, 2011). 
However, not all members of the Russian scientific community share this negative 
attitude towards the route of the pipeline “Altai”. For instance, Yuri Vinokurov, Director of the 
Institute for Water and Environmental Problems, says that the threat to the Ukok Plateau is 
overestimated. The Ukok Plateau is divided into several zones and in some of them Russian 
legislation allows the conducting of economic activities. The pipeline would not go through 
the conservation areas and the natural reserve would be preserved (Vinokurov, April 2011). 
According to Vinokurov, the main difficulty for Russian engineers is going to be the 
development of the project, considering the difficult climatic and geographic conditions. In 
this sense, the two alternative routes (through Mongolia or Kazakhstan) would be easier to 
conduct construction works there.      
Gazprom faces a lot of opposition within and outside Russia over the proposed route of 
the pipeline, including the ecological consideration. In 2012 UNESCO experts advised the 
Russia to re-consider the proposed route, because the construction of the pipeline threatens 
the ecological as well as cultural value of the plateau (Bankfax, 2012). Despite all the 
criticism, it is unlikely that Gazprom would reconsider the route (Kozlova, 2012). According to 
Demchik (2011), the choice of the route is explained by the aim to avoid the possibility of 
transit-related problems, which may arise if the pipeline goes through the territory of either 
Mongolia or Kazakhstan. For this reason, the Ukok Plateau, through which 54 killometers of 
the Russo-Chinese border lies, is the only possible option.  
Socio - economic considerations 
The pipeline is controversial also because not everyone in Russia considers it to be 
economically viable. Engoyan (2011) says that the pipeline would negatively influence the 
economy of the Republic of Altai. The region’s economy depends on tourism, agriculture and 
animal breeding. The Ukok Plateau is a natural reserve which can potentially attract a lot of 
tourists, but the construction of the pipeline would definitely reduce the attractiveness of 
the area for tourists. From the other side, the local population uses some parts of the Ukok 
Plateau as pasture for their stock and construction work would withdraw some of these 
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pastures from use (Engoyan, 2011). At the same time, the pipeline would not bring any 
benefits to the regional economy. According to Engoyan, the pipeline project would hardly 
create a lot of working places in the Republic of Altai, because there are not many people 
there who have the required qualifications for this project. Furthermore, the pipeline is 
aimed solely at the Chinese market and would not contribute at all to the gasification of the 
Altai Territory and the Republic of Altai (Engoyan, 2011). Finally, some of the analysts are 
concerned that China may not be that interested in the pipeline as it is interested in the road, 
which is going to be built for pipeline maintenance. It means that there would be a risk of an 
increase in migration of Chinese citizens into Russian territory (Engoyan, 2011). 
According to an opinion poll conducted in the Republic of Altai, the majority of the 
population also opposes the idea of the construction of the pipeline through the Ukok 
Plateau, because of the sacred importance of this territory for the local population. The 
pipeline project is supported only by that part of the population which thinks that this 
project would contribute to the gasification of the territory and can create some new jobs in 
the region. The results of the opinion poll are as follows: 16.7 per cent of the population is in 
favour of the pipeline project, 30 per cent think that there is no need for it, 3.79 per cent 
think that the project is untimely, and 44.8 per cent think that the project is dangerous. 
Among the negative consequences of the pipeline are the negative impacts on the 
environment and the danger to the integrity of the sacred territories (Engoyan, 2009). 
Moreover, it is important to mention that not everyone in Russia shares the negative 
perception of the pipeline project. The scientific institutions involved in the engineering, 
research and development of the project promise that all the ecological considerations 
would be accounted for and the eco-balance would not be endangered. At the same time, 
the accusations that Gazprom is following its commercial interests and the project would not 
contribute to the gasification of the region are not completely fair. Gazprom has different 
branches, which deal with the different directions of the company’s business agenda. The 
pipeline project ‘Altai’ is concerned with the diversification of external energy trade. 
However, at the same time the other direction of Gazprom’s activities is the gasification of 
the subjects of the Russian Federation, including the Altai Territory and the Republic of Altai. 
Starting from 2007, Gazprom has been investing in the gasification of the Republic of Altai. At 
the moment the process is completed in the two largest populated localities: Gorno-Altaysk 
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and Mayma (Gazprom’s web-site 1). In 2011 Gazprom plans to invest a further 500 million 
rubles in the further gasification of the region (Gazprom web-site 3). 
The potential consequences of this deal on the development of the EU–Russia energy trade 
It is also important to consider how the construction of the new pipeline would affect energy 
trade with Europe. According to the provisional agreements with China, Gazprom would sell 
around 30 bcm of gas to Beijing annually. This may create the risk of Russia’s inability to carry 
on the current contract obligations to Europe. These concerns are related to the decline of 
the output on the existing oil-and-gas fields in Russia (Mankoff, 2009: 8). According to some 
sources, Gazprom’s production will slide from 545.1 bcm in 2004 to only 340 bcm in 2020 
(Mankoff, 2009: 10). Already in 2003 it was known that some of the major gas fields are in 
decline. For instance, Stern provides us with the following numbers: 75.8 per cent of reserves 
of Medvezhe gas field have been used, 65.4 per cent in case of Urengoy, and 54.1 per cent of 
Yamburg gas field have been exhausted (Stern, 2005: 8). To keep up with the current supply 
volumes Gazprom needs to invest a lot into the development of the new oil-and-gas fields. A 
lot of these fields are situated in the “inhospitable areas, especially the Yamal Peninsula, as 
well as eastern Siberia and the Barents Sea” (Mankoff, 2009: 8). Moreover, big pipeline 
construction projects (Nord Stream, South Stream) also require large investment and put 
additional limits to Gazprom’s investment budget. According to the rough estimations 
Russian production has declined at the approximate rate of 18–25 bcm/year in the 2000s 
(Stern, 2009: 2). 
Considering these numbers, Gazprom needs to invest US$4-5 billion per year in the 
development of the new fields in order to keep the current supply rates (Hanson, 2009: 43). 
At the moment, Russia is spending only around US$1 billion per year (Hanson, 2009: 43). In 
the last few years, not only did Gazprom not increase its investment budget, but on the 
contrary reduced it. In 2009, Gazprom announced that the development of the new 
Bovanenko field on the Yamal Peninsula would be postponed and the production would 
begin in the third quarter of 2012 instead of 2011 as it was planned before (Stern, 2009: 2). 
According to Stern, the economic recession of 2008 took off some of the pressure from the 
Russian gas industry to develop new fields due to the fall in demand (gas demand fell by 6 
per cent in 2009) (Stern, 2009: 10). In 2010, the EU’s natural gas market demonstrated a 
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slight increase in gas consumption (by 12%) and this rate will continue to raise pretty quickly 
(Lewiner, 2010). For these reasons, the pipeline project to China makes the problem of 
potential supply shortages even more complicated, since Gazprom would have to invest 
additional money into construction of the pipeline to China and, moreover, at least 30 bcm 
would be diverted to the Chinese energy market instead of the European one. 
Even considering that both sides are highly interested in the project and keep their hopes 
high on signing the agreement in the nearest future, Moscow and Beijing are still failing to 
overcome the price disagreement. It was expected that the agreement would be signed in St 
Petersburg during the International Economic Forum, which took place from 16th to 18th of 
June 2011. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Chinese colleague Hu Jintao had a 
meeting to discuss energy cooperation. Both sides agreed that this cooperation is one of the 
top priorities in the Chinese-Russian relations. However, Russian and Chinese leaders failed 
to reach a price agreement in June 2011. Russia suggested to link gas price with oil prices the 
same way it is done with the EU, but China cannot afford the EU price level (Washington 
Post, 20.06.2011). 
Gazprom asks for the European price for gas – US$300 per one thousand cubic meters 
(Izvestia, 16.06.2011) and according to the current predictions the price of Russian supplies 
will continue to grow and may even reach US$500 per one thousand cubic meters by the end 
of 2011 (Washington Post, 20.06.2011). This price level is too high for China due to 
governmental control over the energy prices within China. China is prepared to pay US$100 
per one thousand cubic meters (Bankfax, 2012). China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) cannot agree on the European price level: high import prices would lead to losses for 
the company (RBC Daily, 20.06.2011). Furthermore, it is unlikely for Beijing to accept the 
European price level because of internal expenditures related to the transition of energy 
generating industry in China. At the moment the Chinese domestic market is still highly 
dependent on coal and this transition also is going to cost a lot of money (Gazprom 
Representative, April 2010). Moreover, at the moment China buys cheap gas from 
Turkmenistan and other Central Asian states (Izvestia, 16.06.2011). For example, 
Turkmenistan supplies 13 bcm per year (Peyrouse, 2011: 183).  
At the moment, it is difficult to say when the price agreement will be reached. However, 
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even considering the difficult negotiations, Moscow expresses hope to reach an agreement 
by the end of this year, because of mutual interest in the project and the growing demand for 
gas in China (Washington Post, 20.06.2011). Nevertheless, in case of the agreement with 
China being reached and the contract is signed, this would put additional pressure on the 
Russian ability to keep this contract obligations as well as contract obligations to Europe. The 
question of urgent need of investment into production and infrastructure of the oil and gas 
sector in Russia was discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. The fears of the Russian inability to 
meet the export requirements put additional pressure on diversifying the energy supplies by 
the EU, and on ensuring access to oil and gas reserves for domestic consumption and exports 
by Russia. That is why access to the Central Asian and Caspian energy resources is of key 
importance for both Russia and the EU. Before this chapter moves on to a more detailed 
discussion of EU-Russia competition over the Caspian and Central Asian states, other Russian 
demand diversification projects will be mentioned. 
 Other projects of demand diversification by Russia include the Blue Stream pipeline 
project and the LNG projects. Russia plans to expand its market for natural gas by developing 
technology and infrastructure for LNG. Originally the key projects for production and 
transportation of the LNG were the Sakhalin-II project (operated together with Shell) and the 
Shtokman field in the Barents Sea (Bochkarev, 2006: 31). However, after the decision was 
made to postpone the development of the Shtokman field, appeared the Yamal LNG project. 
The Yamal LNG project is still in the early stages of development and will require at least ten 
years to complete (Stern, 2009: 9). Potential and actual consumers of Russian LNG are: the 
USA, Great Britain, Japan and South Korea (Bochkarev, 2006: 31-32).  At the moment, the 
USA is the key consumer for Russian LNG supplies. It is predicted that the demand for natural 
gas in the USA will continue to grow by around 1.5 per cent annually up to 2025 (Sheffield, 
2007: 5). To meet its domestic demand the USA will need to import LNG from oversees, 
including from Russia. The first tankers with LNG were destined to the USA in 2005 under 
medium-term contracts with American companies (Sheffield, 2007: 5). In total, Russia 
delivered around 60.000 tons of LNG to the United States in September 2005 (Bochkarev, 
2006: 31). In 2006, Russian LNG was delivered to Great Britain (Sheffield, 2007: 5).   
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Blue Stream pipeline 
Between 2001 and 2002 Russia completed the construction of the Blue Stream pipeline to 
Turkey. The Blue Stream pipeline goes from the Russian city of Tuapse under the Black sea to 
Samsun in Turkey and continues overland to Ankara (Boehme, 2010: 118). The pipeline is a 
joint venture between Gazprom, Italian ENI and Turkish Botas (Boehme, 2010: 118). The 
deliveries to Turkey began in 2003. In the beginning the annual volume of supplies was below 
the pipeline’s capacity: 9.5 bcm of gas in 2007 out of a planned 16 bcm per year (Boehme, 
2010: 118). By 2011 the pipeline still did not reach full capacity (ICIS, 2011). Nevertheless, 
the pipeline is important for the study of Russian external energy policy. The Blue Stream is 
the first Russian off-shore pipeline. Moreover, it was the world’s first deep-sea pipeline 
(around 2,800 meters cross-sea depth) (Barysh, 2007: 3). The pipeline allowed Russia to get 
an important place on the Turkish energy market, in spite of the fact that from 2006 Turkey 
also gets natural gas through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline from Azerbaijan (Barysch, 
2007: 3).  
In summary, Russian attempts for demand diversification are in the early stages and are 
not able to provide the same level of income as the European energy market. The most 
significant project is the potential gas deal with China. However, at the moment it is difficult 
to say if this project will succeed or not. In other words, these diversification plans are 
unlikely to reduce Russian dependence on the European gas market. For this reason, Moscow 
would be vulnerable to any supply diversification project launched by the EU. At the same 
time, the EU member states are concerned with Russia’s energy policy and the high levels of 
dependence on Russia and are trying to ensure its energy security by diversification of supply 
as well as the development of a unified energy policy. The section below looks at the 
European strategies of supply diversification. 
The EU strategy for supply diversification  
The EU is concerned with the reduction of its dependence on fossil fuels supplies for both 
security of supplies and environmental considerations. Chapter 2 already introduced the 
Second Strategic Energy Review of January 2008, which committed all 27 member-states to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent, to increase the share of renewable energy 
sources in energy consumption by 20 per cent, and to increase energy efficiency by 20 per 
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cent (Faas, et al. 2011: 12). Umbach et al. write that “if the EU is able to implement these 
strategies, it may drastically decrease its gas import demand by 2020 at the current levels or 
even lower (around 300 bcm) in contrast to previous forecasts (490 bcm)” (Umbach, et al. 
2011: 300). The European Commission is positive about the possibility of achieving these 
targets. The Communication of the European Commission from May 2010 summarises the 
following progress with regards to 20-20-20 strategy (COM (2010) 265 final):  
4. The EU emissions reduced to 10 per cent below 1990 level in 2008, 
5. Due to the economic recession verified emissions in the EU Emissions Trading 
Systems in 2009 were 11.6 per cent below 2008 emissions, 
6. Renewable energy sources accounted for 61 per cent of new electricity generating 
capacity in the EU in 2009.   
The progress might be respectable, but it was partly achieved due to the economic 
recession, which caused the decrease of demand on the fossil fuels and the energy prices as 
well. However, one needs to remember that “as production recovers in energy-intensive 
industries like steel, this rate of reduction cannot be simply extrapolated in the future” 
(Umbach, et al. 2011: 300). Even though the development of the renewable energy and 
transition to low-carbon energy is a long-term process, the EU considers this process to be 
very important for energy and environmental security. Umbach et al. write that natural gas 
supply interruptions after the gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine demonstrated the 
importance of changes to the European energy policy. In particular, the European 
Commission determined to ensure energy security by “proposing concrete energy 
infrastructure projects with a total turn of 3.5 billion Euros for 2009 and 2010 as part of the 
EU’s overall economic stimulus programme in coping with the global economic-financial 
crisis” (Umbach, et al. 2011: 301). The priority projects are: 
3. A Baltic Interconnection Plan to connect energy markets of the Baltic states, 
4. NABUCCO pipeline project, 
5. Development of the LNG projects and gas storage facilities, 
6. A Mediterranean Energy Ring to connect hydrocarbon and renewable supplies, 
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7. North-South Gas and electricity interconnections in countries of Central and Southern 
Europe, 
8. A North Sea Offshore Grid, which could connect national electricity grids and planned 
offshore wind turbine projects. (Umbach, et al. 2011: 301).  
These plans, as well as 20-20-20 targets, are the response to the risks connected to 
the high dependence on external energy supplies. In particular, the transit conflicts between 
Russia and Ukraine mentioned in the previous chapter. At the moment, Russia does not 
express any concerns about the potential loss of the European energy market share. In an 
interview conducted in April 2010, the representative of Gazprom said that in the nearest 
future it is highly unlikely for the EU to be able to develop the renewable energy and energy 
efficiency to significantly reduce the dependence on hydrocarbons (Gazprom representative, 
2010). This point of view was confirmed by Simonov, the director of the National Energy 
Security Centre, who also said that in the near future the EU will be dependent on Russian 
energy supplies (Simonov, 2010). In the short term, Russia might be safe, but in the long term 
the EU has the potential to decrease dependence on Russian supplies due to both energy 
supply diversification and the increased share of renewable sources in European energy 
consumption.  
At the current moment, both the EU member states and Russia are competing over 
access and control over the energy production and transportation networks in the other 
regions. In particular, Central Asian and the Caspian Basin resources are important to both 
Russia and the EU. The section below looks at the competition over the access to the energy 
recourses of these regions between Russia and the EU.    
Competition over Central Asian Gas 
The collapse of the USSR resulted in the appearance of new energy producing states in the 
Caspian Sea region and Central Asia. The major energy producing countries that appeared 
out of the remains of the USSR are: the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Luong, et al. 2001: 367). These five states, along with Iran, 
control the energy resources of the Caspian Basin (one of the largest oil and gas reserves in 
the world) (Luong, et al. 2001: 367). After the collapse of the USSR all of these states selected 
different approaches to the governance of their energy sectors. Luong et al. describe these 
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decisions as follows (Luong, et al. 2001: 369): 
1. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – chose to keep energy production under governmental 
control. 
2. Kazakhstan – the majority of the formerly state-owned companies have been sold to 
foreign investors. 
3. Azerbaijan – a combination of full state control and the participation of foreign capital 
in the development of the energy reserves. 
At the same time for two out of four states (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) energy resources 
are the main source of export revenue. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are also cotton 
producers (Luong, et al. 2001: 380). The access and control of the oil and gas reserves of the 
Caspian Basin is of key importance for countries both inside and outside the region.  
 Central Asian energy reserves play an important role in the energy policy of both Russia 
and the EU. For the EU, access to Central Asian gas can help to diversify supplies and reduce 
dependence on Russia. For Russia, at the same time, it is important to keep control over 
Central Asian gas to ensure domestic supplies and/or have an option for export contracts in 
case the development of the new major gas fields in Russia would be postponed any longer. 
It is also stated in the Russian Energy Strategy up to 2020: “In case of the absence of 
compensation of investment, deficit in the coming period increases risk of insufficient 
development of the industry, it could require an increase of gas imports from Central Asian 
States or to reduce export volumes” (Energy Strategy for Russian Federation up to 2020). In 
the first half of the 2000s, Gazprom bought 12.5 per cent of the Central Asian gas output 
(approximately 8 tcm of natural gas). Due to the limits of the existing gas transportation 
networks (most of which were constructed during the Soviet times), Russia has an 
opportunity to prevent European consumers from buying gas from the Central Asian states 
and the Caspian Sea region (Bochkarev, 2006: 31). Moscow is particularly interested in 
control over the energy supplies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Apart from this, Russia is 
actively involved in the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which remains 
subject to dispute (Bochkarev, 2006: 31). 
 The Central Asian states which potentially could export natural gas to either Russia or 
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the EU are: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. With Azerbaijani and 
Turkmen gas being the centre of competition. Kazakh gas production increased significantly 
only during the previous decade. Kazakhstan became a net exporter to Russia in 2004 
(Boehme, 2010: 123). The biggest export supplies go from the gas field in the West of 
Kazakhstan to the Orenburg region of Russia (Remme, et al. 2008: 1626). Uzbekistan is 
currently producing around 65 bcm per year, with 50 bcm being consumed domestically. This 
means that export potential at the moment is limited to the Central Asian CIS republics 
(Boehme, 2010: 124). Turkmenistan has good potential for the export of natural gas. It is 
estimated that Turkmenistan has about 2.1 tcm in reserves. Considering that domestic 
consumption is relatively small, it leaves the biggest share of gas produced for export. For 
example, in 2002 out of 71 bcm of natural gas produced only 21 per cent was consumed 
domestically (Hancock, 2006: 70).  
For a long time, Turkmen natural gas supplies have been mainly directed to Russia. 
This is mainly explained by the lack of pipeline routes, which were available for the majority 
of the Central Asian states.  Turkmenistan, as well as other countries in the region has to rely 
on Gazprom-owned pipelines to export its gas supplies (Hancock, 2006: 70-71). For a long 
time, Russia managed to secure cheap deals with Turkmenistan. In 2003, Russia, Ukraine and 
Turkmenistan agreed on the gas prices for the next 25 years (until at least 2028). This deal 
has been confirmed afterwards by the next Turkmen President Gurbanguly 
Berdymukhamedov. That year, the decision was made that the price would only be US$44 
per one thousand cubic meters (as compared to European gas price exceeding US$200 per 
one thousand cubic meters). Moreover, agreement has been reached that the Russian side 
would pay cash for only half of the gas supplies purchased and barter for the rest with goods 
(Hancock, 2006: 72–73). According to data provided by Remme, Blesl, and Fahl, in 2004, 39 
bcm of Turkmen gas have been exported to Russia and Ukraine through Central Asia–Centre 
(CAC) pipeline (Remme, et al. 2008: 1626). In the following years the volumes of Turkmen 
energy sales to Russia have been growing and have reached around 50 bcm per year by 2008 
(Boehme, 2010: 123). However, with the growing importance of the imports from the Central 
Asian states and competition from other countries like China for energy supplies from this 
region left Russia no choice, but to agree with the price increase. By 2007 price of Turkmen 
gas increased from US$44 per thousand cubic meters to US$100 (Perovic, et al. 2007: 5). 
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China started negotiations with Turkmenistan in 2006, during the visit of the Turkmen 
president Niyazov to China. During this meeting, Niyazov and the Chinese president Hu Jintao 
agreed to the construction of a pipeline going from the Turkmen gas fields to China. It has 
been decided that China would sponsor the construction of the pipeline, and Turkmenistan 
committed to supply 30 bcm annually for at least 30 years (Hancock, 2006: 77). In 2009 
Turkmenistan started to export gas to China. 
Another key region for the competition over access to energy resources is the Caspian 
Basin. The EU is interested in Caspian oil and gas supplies as a potential way of diversification 
of energy imports. Considering, the risks connected with the production levels in Russia, the 
control over Caspian energy resources is of key importance for Russia as well. In the early 
2000s, Putin set “a new agenda for setting the terms of access to Caspian hydrocarbons” 
(Stulberg, 2011: 2). During the first decade after the collapse of the USSR, Russian success in 
influencing the politics of the Caspian energy was rather inconsistent (Stulberg, 2011: 2). 
Adam Stulberg explains the main strength of the Russian position in the region as follows: 
“Because of Russia’s regional preponderance, continued dominance of bilateral trade 
flows across the NIS, and near-monopoly over the existing Caspian pipeline 
infrastructure, Moscow is presumed to be intent on and well positioned to impose 
near-colonial solutions to regional energy security. Strategically situated to reclaim 
proprietorship over the region’s asset-specific energy infrastructure and to forge a 
“rejectionist front” with Iran, Russia purportedly stands poised to direct decisions for 
Caspian energy and pipelines as critical steps towards boosting Russia’s economic 
dynamism and global competitiveness” (Stulberg, 2011: 2). 
In other words, Russia’s control over the existing pipeline network and strategic 
geographical location between the region and the potential consumers in Western Europe 
makes it very difficult for the EU to diversify the energy supplies with both Caspian and 
Central Asian oil and gas exports. The example of the two competing pipeline projects the 
South Stream and NABUCCO illustrate the EU struggle for direct access to Central Asian and 
Caspian energy. 
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Competition between NABUCCO and South Stream 
The competition of two pipeline projects, the South Stream and NABUCCO, can demonstrate 
the negative consequences of the securitisation of energy trade. Due to the high levels of 
securitisation it seems to be difficult for the EU to prioritize these projects in terms of their 
potential contribution to supply diversification. By concentrating on the threat of a further 
increase of the Russian share in the European energy market, some of the critics of the South 
Stream project overlook the benefits of the project for European energy security. Before 
moving on to the analysis of the competition of these two pipelines it is important to 
describe both projects briefly.  
NABUCCO project 
The idea of a 3300 km long pipeline construction which would connect European 
customers with gas fields in Iran was first proposed by the Austrian company OMV in the late 
1990s. NABUCCO would transport gas from the Caspian region via Turkey to Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary and Austria. The construction should begin in 2013 and finish in 2017 
(NABUCCO web-site). NABUCCO will cost around 5 billion Euros and have a capacity of 31 
bcm per year (Nanay, 2010: 126). The main problem with this project is the uncertainty 
about the possible suppliers. Azerbaijan is able to provide only 10–12 bcm per year, which is 
not enough (Nanay, 2010: 126). According to the original plan, the rest of the gas was 
supposed to come from Iran, but considering the current intense situation with Iran this is 
not likely. At the moment investors consider Central Asian states to be potential suppliers 
(Simonov, 2007: 203). This may also include Iraq or Egypt (Socor, 2008:1). This uncertainty 
creates the risk that there could be insufficient gas to pump through the pipeline. Moreover, 
the recent announcement made by Baku that Azerbaijan has delayed the beginning of the 
Shah-Deniz gas field development at the Caspian Sea until 2016 instead of 2014 creates 
additional concerns about the gas supplies for the NABUCCO project (New Europe, 2010).  
The South Stream Project 
At the moment, Russia in cooperation with a number of European gas companies is working 
on the construction of two new pipeline projects: the Nord Stream16 and the South Stream. 
                                                 
16
 The Nord Stream project is the pipeline (1220 kilometers long) which will connect the Russian Baltic coast 
near the city of Vyborg with the German Baltic coast near Griefswald (The official web-site of the Nord Stream 
198 
 
The South Stream pipeline is planned to go under the Black Sea to supply Russian gas to 
Bulgaria and further to Italy and Austria. At the moment, seven states apart from Russia are 
involved in the South Stream pipeline project: Croatia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Greece, 
Slovenia and Austria. In the next couple of months Gazprom is planning to finish negotiations 
with France about the French power group EDF’s participation in the project (Filatova, 2010). 
The South Stream is more expensive than NABUCCO, with an estimated cost of around 10 
billion Euros. However, it is important to mention that the total cost of NABUCCO depends on 
the potential suppliers. At the moment it is difficult to say who will provide the rest of the 
gas apart from Azerbaijan, but the construction of one or several additional pipelines to 
connect new suppliers with Europe would definitely increase the cost of NABUCCO.  
The competition between the two projects is a complex game. Russia is being blamed for 
high-levels of governmental interference in the South Stream project. The pipeline is often 
represented by Vladimir Putin, who is using the lack of solidarity to sign bilateral agreements 
with countries along the planned NABUCCO route (Socor, 2008:1). In 2010 Putin visited 
several EU member states, including Italy and Austria. The majority of his visits are related to 
discussions about the South Stream project. In this sense the level of governmental 
interference is higher than compared to NABUCCO. In official interviews Vladimir Putin 
emphasises that Russia is not threatened by NABUCCO and is not going to sabotage the 
competing project. However, this is not totally true. The pipeline from Azerbaijan to Europe, 
bypassing Russian territory, does indeed interfere with Russian interests because it would 
reduce its share of the European energy market. But it is important not to exaggerate the 
potential threat to Russia from NABUCCO. At the moment it is still not clear who will produce 
the rest of the gas required. To start construction without signing any contracts with energy 
producers is a risky and expensive enterprise (Simonov, 2007: 203). 
Moreover, it is important to answer the question of whether the competition between 
South Stream and NABUCCO actually threatens European Energy Security. Austria, Bulgaria 
and Hungary (the states involved in both projects) argue that there is no conflict between 
                                                                                                                                                        
project). From there Russia gas supplies would be distributed further in Germany, and in other European 
Countries, including Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and the Czech Republic. 
Two parallel pipelines would be constructed: the first line with a transmission capacity of around 27,5 bcm per 
year is completed in 2011. The second line is to be completed in 2012, doubling annual capacity to around 55 
bcm 
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these projects: both pipelines will contribute to supply diversification. It is argued that these 
two projects have two different aims. NABUCCO is aimed to connect Azerbaijan and Central 
Asian gas with Europe, bypassing Russia. At the same time, the South Stream and Nord 
Stream are aimed to reduce dependence on the transit states. A total of 95 per cent of 
Russian gas supplies transit through the territory of at least one country before reaching 
consumers in Europe. This creates transit risks for both Russia and Europe (Spanjer 2006: 
2891). The transit rows with Ukraine in 2006, 2008 and 2009 resulted in gas cut-offs to EU 
customers. The South Stream would help to avoid such disruptions of supplies in the future. 
The overview of the potential diversification strategies demonstrate that neither the EU 
nor Russia are capable of successfully decreasing dependence on one another in the nearest 
future. Proedrou writes the following: “the EU’s import portfolio is likely to be more 
diversified in two decades than it is today” (Proedrou, 2012: 122). At the same time, Russia 
and China struggle to overcome the price disagreement, preventing them from signing the 
contract. Therefore, both Russia and the EU would benefit from improving the relationship, 
rather than securitising their energy relations. The second part of this chapter evaluates the 
potential de-securitisation strategies, building on the analysis of the securitisation process 
presented in Chapters 2 to 4. 
Approaches towards the de-securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations 
The first section of this chapter demonstrates that the different understandings of energy 
security, together with such factors as national identity, domestic politics, and a clash 
between the supranational and national levels resulted in the situation, where both the EU 
and Russia try to protect their national energy security from one another. As a result of the 
securitisation process both sides perceive each other’s energy policy as threatening to energy 
security. For example, for the EU the consolidation of the Russian energy sector under 
governmental control, the clashes with the transit states over energy-related issues, and 
Russian withdrawal from such international frameworks as the ECT resulted in the perception 
of Russian ambition to use energy sales as a political weapon (Chapter 2). The lack of a 
Common European Energy Policy gives the individual member states a lot of freedom in 
controlling their national energy policies. In order to protect themselves from the potential 
risks related to the high levels of dependence on Russia, the EU member states sometimes 
pursue policies which contradict one another. Many promote the diversification of energy 
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supplies, which as in the case of NABUCCO is not necessarily beneficial. At the same time, 
Moscow is driven mainly by clash of the domestic political and economic aims. The Russian 
government sees the energy resources as the driving force of Russian re-construction. This 
creates a vicious circle, starting with the consolidation of the energy sector under 
governmental control to ensure the preferable pricing for domestic consumers (in the case of 
natural gas), and guaranteed revenues from the energy sales to the state budget (Chapter 3). 
As a result the input of private investors (especially foreign ones) is very limited. This policy 
placed a lot of pressure on the energy sector, and to ensure the future volumes of supplies 
and its position on the European energy market, Russia has to engage in competition over 
the control of the Caspian and Central Asian supplies (through control of pipelines) as well as 
in the bilateral relations with the individual member states to keep its share of the European 
market (often despite the criticism of the EU). Overall, despite the high levels of 
interdependence, which could be a basis for productive cooperation, both the EU and Russia 
perceive each other’s energy policies as a danger to energy security. To normalize the 
relations, both sides should perceive each other as partners rather than competitors (Aalto, 
2009:178). This could be achieved through de-securitisation. The definition of de-
securitisation was presented in the beginning of this chapter and in Chapter 1 (p. 49-50). This 
section will look at the ways the de-securitisation process could be shaped in EU-Russia 
relations. 
The Copenhagen School defines de-securitisation as the process of removal of the issue 
from exceptional politics to the realm of normal politics (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). Aradau argues 
that in the Copenhagen School’s understanding of the central question of de-securitisation is 
“what kind of politics we want: the politics of exceptional measures or democratic politics” 
(Aradau, 2004: 393). Therefore, for the Copenhagen School securitised politics is abnormal, 
and de-securitisation is necessary to return to the rhetoric of normal politics. However, due 
to the importance of energy relations for the quality of life for citizens of Russia and the EU 
states, the complete removal of EU-Russia relations from the security agenda is not 
necessarily the best option. Building on the introduction to this chapter, this thesis suggests 
using the managed approach towards securitisation, instead of transforming EU-Russia 
energy relations “from security to ‘asecurity’” (Roi, 2004: 285).  
In order to achieve this, it is important to answer the question who should drive the de-
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securitisation process. Some authors suggest, that de-securitisation means politicization, the 
others, such as Vibeke Schou Tjalve, suggest that de-securitisation could and should happen 
“at the level of polity, rather than policy” (Waever, 2011: 472). Her idea is that ‘de-
securitisation’ could be driven by the audience, rather than the policy-makers (Waever, 2011: 
472). Krause et al. suggest that de-securitisation could be achieved by changing from power 
politics to cooperation via international institutions and diplomatic practices (Krause, et al. 
1996: 249). As well as the securitisation process depending on the context, the de-
securitisation process also should be designed depending on the particular situation. Due to 
the sensitive nature of energy security for the economy and the quality of life of the 
population (both in Russia and in the EU), energy security could not be 100 per cent de-
securitised. At the same time and for similar reasons, de-securitisation should be driven by 
the policy and decision-makers. However, the potential pressure from the different groups 
within society should be considered. For example, in the case of unexpectedly high rises in 
domestic electricity prices, the Russian government will have to deal with the protests of the 
population. Thus, the interests of the social groups should be considered in the development 
of the de-securitisation strategy. 
Another important question asked in regards to de-securitisation is how the issue could 
be removed from the security agenda? Some authors (for example, Aradau) argue that it is 
much more difficult to de-securitise an issue, than to securitise it. Aradau writes that 
securitisation through the speech act could be successful only if the audience could relate to 
the justification of the securitisation process through their day to day experiences (Aradau, 
2004: 400). In other words, the securitising actors use the symbolic attributes (collective 
memory, national identity) to support the speech act. In this case, de-securitisation is 
another form of the speech act, aimed to “create a different reaction from one of enmity” 
(Aradau, 2004: 400). Behnke suggests an alternative approach, when “an issue becomes de-
securitised through a lack of speech, not through speech acts affirming its new status” 
(Behnke, 2006: 65). This thesis shares Vuori’s perspective on de-securitisation. He agrees 
with Behnke’s idea, but argues, that successful de-securitisation “may depend on a withering 
away, but this withering may begin with active moves” (Vuori, 2011:190).  Moreover, the de-
securitisation process as well as the securitising one should rely on symbolic properties and 
be embedded in a specific context for the audiences to relate to the de-securitisation aims. 
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Balzacq (2010) considers media, political elites and think tanks to be powerful agents of 
securitisation; however, the same agents could be used for successful de-securitisation.   
The de-securitisation strategy could be adapted to the different levels of EU-Russia 
energy trade according to the reasons for the securitisation of energy relations on these 
levels. In particular, three levels could be outlined: 1) The Russian domestic level; 2) The 
internal EU level, including the division of competences between the EU institutions and the 
national governments of the member states, and 3) The level of relations between the EU 
and Russia. All the actors involved in the securitisation of the energy trade, should be 
involved in the de-securitisation forces. The approaches towards de-securitisation would 
depend on the construction of energy security on each level. 
De-securitisation of energy trade by Russia  
Chapter 3 argued that for Russia the main driving force behind the securitisation of the 
energy trade, is the ambition of the Russian government to use the energy sector to stabilize 
both the domestic political and economic situations. However, the current policy could help 
to achieve these aims only in the short term. Indeed, during the first two terms of Putin’s 
presidency Russian GDP increased “by 60 per cent, and incomes almost doubled with wages 
growing by an average annual 13 per cent in real terms from 2002” (Sakwa, 2008: 313). 
However, it all came at a cost; the energy sector is in urgent need of investment to keep up 
with the current volumes of supply and/or to increase it in the future. Moreover, the use of 
energy for internal political and economic reasons became possible because of the 
historically high energy prices.  
The fluctuation of energy prices influences the energy relations between Russia, the EU 
and transit states. According to Hunt et al. “the energy prices doubled during the second half 
of the 1990s, and tripled during 1999–2000” (Hunt et al. 2002: 87). The increase in energy 
prices in the late 1990s–early 2000s made Putin’s energy policy possible: the high energy 
prices allowed the Russian government to create the stabilization fund and to pay off the 
foreign debt. The price formation for natural gas has its specifics. As compared to oil, there is 
no world market for natural gas. Trade is conducted on the regional markets. Boehme 
distinguishes three main markets: North America, Europe and East Asia (Boehme, 2010: 76). 
He writes the following about the process of price formation: “Price formation varies 
203 
 
according to the degree of liberalization the respective markets find themselves in and more 
specifically according to factors such as regulation, contracting habits, share of imports, 
liquidity or spot market size” (Boehme, 2010: 76). The regional particularities of the natural 
gas price on the European market allowed Russia to begin the process of the energy price 
increase for the CIS: high prices on the European market were used as an argument in favour 
of increase in natural gas prices for the CIS states. In case of energy price drop in the near 
future the Russian economy would be affected considerably.  
Moreover, due to the transit conflicts with Ukraine and Belarus, and the bilateral deals 
with the individual member states (undermining the overall European attempts to develop 
the Common European energy policy), Russia damaged its image as a reliable energy 
supplier. These domestic and international factors suggest that the securitisation of the 
energy production and trade put Russia in a vulnerable position to any changes on the 
European energy market (especially a price drop). At the moment, the Russian government 
does not have any solution to the potential problems of the domestic energy sector. To sum 
up, for Russia the main motive for de-securitisation should be the same as for securitisation: 
the role of the energy sector for the reconstruction of Russian economy and further 
stabilization of the Russian domestic political situation. However, to achieve this in the long-
term, Russia needs to change its policy towards the gradual liberalization of the energy 
sector (in particular, by improving its foreign investment climate).  
It would allow Russia to solve some of the problems both internally and in the energy 
trade. First of all, to keep the high volumes of exports Russia needs to invest a lot in the 
development of new oil and gas fields and the construction of new pipelines. It is almost 
impossible to support such a demanding sector without private investors. If Russia would let 
foreign investors participate in some of the projects it would be able to get essential money 
to increase the productivity of the energy sector and improve its image in the EU. If European 
customers could be involved in the development of new energy fields in Russia or pipeline 
projects it would help to rebuild trust between Russia and the EU. Recently, Russian experts 
have begun to realise this. For instance, Simonov said that Russia would invite more foreign 
investors in the future (Simonov, 2010). Vitaly Pogoretsky writes the following: “in order to 
support the financial viability of Gazprom, the Russian government had to reassess its energy 
pricing policy, and currently plans to converge export and domestic gas prices by 2014” 
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(Pogoretsky, 2011: 189). However, as explained in this section and in the Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, it is important to understand that these changes cannot be rushed. Due to domestic 
socio-economic considerations, Russia needs to implement these measures gradually to 
ensure the ability of the population to cope with these changes (for example, the rapid 
increase of domestic energy prices would negatively affect Russian households).  
The de-securitisation on the European level  
The de-securitisation on the EU level needs to be concerned with the further development of 
a Common European Energy Policy. The main problems and successes of the European 
energy policy have been discussed in detail in Chapter 2, which concluded that the EU 
institutions have only limited competence to control external energy relations of the 
member states. The bilateral agreements between the individual member states and Russia 
may clash with one another and undermine the common European attempt to unify energy 
relations with Russia. Moreover, the lack of a coherent Common European Energy Policy 
allows Russia to secure its interests on bilateral level. The new developments mentioned 
here were introduced in 2009 and came into force in 2011. The new energy policy is also 
known as the Third Energy Package. These developments are supposed to unify the internal 
energy market of the EU, but provide only limited competence for the EU’s institutions to 
regulate energy relations with external suppliers; and mainly aimed at development of 
internal market.  
This chapter argues that a coherent energy policy is essential for the de-securitisation of 
energy relations with Russia. And this policy should be considered as “the only real solution 
to a host of externally-derived issues” (Hadfield, et al. 2008). For this policy to be, the 
European Commission should be able to vet the bilateral agreements of the individual 
member states with external energy producers, as well as negotiate and conduct agreements 
about energy infrastructure with external suppliers (Buchan, 2011: 39). Starting from January 
2012, member states are offered to submit their bilateral agreements with foreign producers 
for the Commission to vet. In case it is decided that the agreement contradicts EU legislation, 
the Commission would have an opportunity to press for changes in the agreement (Pflüger, 
2011). However the implementation of these provisions is still in the early stages. Even 
though, at the moment this proposal received controversial feedback from the member 
states: the smaller states expressed their willingness to follow these rules, while the bigger 
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states “are only prepared to submit their foreign energy agreements to the Commission for 
vetting after they have been signed” (Buchan, 2011: 43).  
To encourage Russia to follow the rules of the internal energy market in Europe, and the 
new external energy policy in general, the policy should consider the interests of the energy 
producers as well. The current developments are orientated mainly on the protection of the 
security of supplies. However, to ensure the willingness of the energy producers to follow the 
rules of the Common European Energy Policy, the security demand should be considered, 
and “the multi-lateral producer-consumer cooperation should be developed further” 
(Correlje, et al. 2006: 541). To complete the de-securitisation process the EU and Russia 
should also work on strengthening intergovernmental ties through international institutions 
and agreements (Khrushcheva, 2010).  
De-securitisation on the international level  
One of the weaknesses of the current situation in energy relations between Russia and the 
EU is in the weaknesses of the international energy governance system. At the moment, 
there is no comprehensive legal framework, which would regulate energy relations. And the 
existing institutions are rather weak in ensuring secure and transparent energy trade. This 
thesis argues the importance of the institutionalization of energy trade for de-securitisation 
process. This chapter looks at two particular examples: the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and 
the negotiations on the international treaty on energy trade (The ECT and Russian suggestion 
of the new framework).  
As was described in the previous chapters the securitisation of energy trade with Russia 
is increased because of the lack of a coherent Common European Energy Policy because 
member states have a lot of freedom to ensure its interests on the bilateral level. The 
example of the competition of NABUCCO and South Stream pipeline projects demonstrates 
that it has negative effect on both Russia and the EU. Ideally, it would benefit the relationship 
if the negotiation on the key issues is conducted on the European level. At the moment, the 
progress is rather slow, the European Commission has a limited ability to influence national 
energy policies of the member states (mainly in the areas related to the internal market and 
competition. For example, the European Commission can control the bilateral deals if they 
contradict the EU competition law (DG Energy Representative, 2011). However, unless the EU 
206 
 
institutions will increase competence over the decision making in future, it is likely that 
Russia will prefer to continue securing bilateral dreals. To improve the situation Russia and 
the EU should continue the institutionalization of energy relations. The EU-Russia energy 
dialogue is one of the forums established for these purposes. 
The EU–Russia energy dialogue was launched in 2000 to provide “a forum to discuss 
questions of common interest in the energy sector and to bind Russia and the EU into a 
closer relationship *…+ and to contribute to security of energy supply and energy demand” 
(Monaghan, et al. 2006: 9). At the moment the dialogue consists of the representatives of 
both Russian and EU politicians and businessmen. After the first Permanent Partnership 
Council took place in October 2005, within the EU–Russia energy dialogue four bilateral 
thematic groups were established: investment, infrastructure, trade and energy efficiency 
(Youngs, 2009: 81). In November 2006 four working groups were reduced to three: energy 
efficiency, market developments and energy strategies (Youngs, 2009:  85).  
The European bureaucrats, working on EU-Russia energy dialogue believe that 
cooperation based on the equal partnership would encourage Russia to facilitate the 
transition to energy market liberalization (Closson, 2009: 100). The EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue is criticized for concentrating only on the technical and practical aspects of energy 
relations, being almost non-effective in regulating policy issues (Youngs, 2009: 85). Richard 
Young writes about the two levels of energy relations: the high politics level and the practical 
level. The high politics level is influenced negatively by the disagreements within the EU. The 
progress of the cooperation on the practical level is significantly higher (Youngs, 2009: 85). 
The difficulties on the high-politics level caused by the disagreements within the EU on the 
priorities of the EU policy towards Russia and by the lack of trust caused by the recent 
developments of Russian energy policy. At the same time, the positive development on the 
practical level could be explained by the mutual interests of both Russia and the EU in the 
development of energy sector in Russia. James Watson writes the following: “when the 
Western side makes finance or technology available to the Russian party without seeking to 
obtain an equity stake in the project, it is normally welcomed with open arms” (Watson, 
1996: 448). The cooperation on development of energy efficiency and technology transfer is 
one of the strong points of the EU-Russia dialogue (German Ministry of Economics 
Representative, 2011).  
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The cooperation in energy efficiency may become the bridge between Russia and EU 
countries which could help to overcome their contradictions in energy relations. According to 
the interview evidence with the representative of the DG Energy in the European 
Commission, the EU is concerned with the Russian ability to increase the volumes of oil and 
gas supplies or even to keep up with the current ones (The EU Commission representative, 
2011). International Finance Cooperation argues that Russia loses annually the amount of 
energy equitable to the annual primary consumption of France due to its inefficient use of 
energy (Energy Efficiency in Russia: Untapped Reserves: 1). By increasing its energy efficiency 
Russia could save 240 bcm of natural gas and 43 million tons of crude oil and equivalents. 
The saved energy could secure oil and gas supplies to the EU and bring environmental 
benefits as well. Russia has a potential for green energy (Pichkov, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the EU-Russia energy dialogue is not enough for successful de-
securitisation of the energy trade between Russia and the EU. For the cooperation to 
become successful the energy relations should be regulated by a comprehensive legally 
binding agreement. At the moment, there is no coherent international agreement to regulate 
EU-Russia energy trade. The section below looks at the state of negotiation on the 
amendments to the ECT (mentioned in Chapter 3) for a new framework suggested by former 
President Dmitry Medvedev.  
International Agreement 
Since 2009, when Russia announced its withdrawal from the ECT, there is no international 
legally binding agreement which could regulate the relationship between Russia and the EU. 
The ECT is described in more detail in Chapter 2. This section will focus on Russian reasons 
for withdrawal from the ECT and the current state of the EU–Russia negotiations on the 
international agreement on energy trade. The Russian government claims the ECT to be 
focused exclusively on the security of supplies. Another opinion about the real reasons 
behind the Russian decision suggests that Russia wanted to leave the ECT were not only 
based on the weaknesses of the Treaty, but also because Russian authorities believed that 
the ECT “limits the freedom of maneuver for the authorities in certain cases” (Milov, 2008: 
14). 
 After 2009 the Russian side proposed to develop a new international agreement, 
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which would consider the interests of energy producers, consumers and the transit states, 
without the discrimination in favour of any of them. The Russian suggestion on the new form 
of the international energy governance is summarized in the proposal on a “conceptual 
approach to the new legal framework for energy cooperation”, which was presented by 
Dmitry Medvedev during his visit to Finland in spring 2009 (Selivanova, 2011: 396). In many 
aspects the proposed system of the energy governance resembles the main provisions of the 
ECT: state sovereignty over national energy reserves, open competitive markets, non-
discriminatory investment promotion and protection. (Selivanova, 2011: 397). That is why, 
the EU is skeptical about the necessity of the development of the new energy treaty. The 
representative of the European Commission said that: “48 states signed and ratified the ECT, 
and only Russia wants to develop a new treaty. A more rational solution would be to 
continue negotiations on the development of the ECT” (the EU Commission representative, 
2011). Moreover, the representative of the European Commission said that 2010 
demonstrated some progress in negotiation on the ECT as well as Russian admission to the 
WTO (the EU Commission representative, 2011). If these negotiations are successful and all 
the actors (state and non-state) involved in the EU-Russia energy relations are willing to 
cooperate, the EU and Russia have a chance to gradually remove the barriers imposed by the 
excessive securitisation on the energy trade. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter as well as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrates that the securitisation of 
the energy trade between the EU and Russia complicates the energy relations between the 
two sides. While this seems unavoidable in the context, it is not necessarily inevitable. The 
EU member states and Russia depend on each other in energy trade. The European market is 
of key importance for Russia, because of the high price for energy supplies as compared to 
domestic market and sales to the CIS. For the EU, Russia is one of the main energy suppliers 
providing around 40 per cent of its overall energy requirements. Because both sides focus on 
different understandings of energy security (for the EU it is security of supplies, and for 
Russia it is security of demand), Russia and the EU develop their own energy policy without 
considering the other side’s security concerns. As a result, both the EU and Russia are trying 
to diversify its supply and demand, instead of strengthening relations and attempting to 
minimize risk through institutions and international agreements. This chapter suggests a 
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strategy to de-securitisation as a way to overcome the problems caused by the extreme 
securitisation.  
 This chapter suggests three levels of de-securitisation: Russian, European and 
international. On the Russian level, de-securitisation should be concerned with opening the 
Russian energy market to European investors more. According to the interview evidence with 
the representative of the European Commission, Russian legislation in regards to foreign 
investment (law on strategic industries) is one of the points of concern (the EU Commission 
representative, 2011). The greater involvement of the European energy companies to 
Russian energy market may improve the European perspective on Russian energy policy. If 
Europe perceives Russia as trustworthy energy partner rather than the potential threat, it 
might bring certain economic benefits for the Russian energy sector. For instance, Aalto 
writes that unless Russia provides more open access to its market, “representatives of the EU 
have indicated their willingness to consider imposing restrictions on the activities 
of…Gazprom in the EU market” (Aalto, 2009: 165). At the European level some changes are 
also required. The Common European Energy Policy is indeed important to manage the 
disagreements on domestic level. Aalto argues that: “relaxing the market and competition 
principle may be a way ahead in order to deal with Russia more effectively… This would also 
mean accepting Gazprom’s gas export monopoly in Russia” (Aalto, 2009: 177).  
 Finally, to complete the de-securitisation cycle, the changes on the international level 
are important. Russia and the EU need to continue negotiations on updating the ECT, so it 
will lead to its ratification by Russia. The coherent international legal agreement is needed to 
regulate the energy trade and minimize the risks to energy security (including the shortcuts 
of energy supplies). Moreover, Russia and the EU should strengthen the EU-Russia energy 
dialogue through the cooperation on mutually beneficial issues. The representatives of the 
European Commission and German Ministry of Economics named the energy efficiency and 
modernization of infrastructure among the key strong points of EU-Russia cooperation (The 
EU Commission representative, 2011; the German Ministry of Economics representative, 
2011). The combination of these three levels would result in the gradual de-securitisation of 
energy trade. 
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The main purpose of the concluding chapter is to reflect on the research question and 
research aims posed in the introduction. The summary of the findings related to the research 
question is the core of this chapter, but it also includes reflection on the research process.  
Despite the fact that the EU and Russia are highly dependent on each other, EU-
Russia relations are challenging to say the least. Rahr describes energy resources as the 
nuclear weapon of the modern times (Rahr, 2008: 8).  Proedrou writes that “the EU-Russia 
energy relations are characterized by an energy security dilemma. The fear of both entities 
that one might diversify its imports/markets pushes the other to follow the same logic” 
(Proedrou, 2012: 78). The main research question of this project is: how is it that energy 
trade between Russia and the EU reaches a high level of political securitisation? The existing 
literature often presents EU-Russia relations in a particular biased way (either energy-
consumer or energy-producer orientated). It is often assumed in the literature, that the 
uneven distribution of hydrocarbons between the states would give an advantage to energy 
producing states. Some authors (Baran, 2007; Smith, 2007) argue that Russia as one of the 
major energy exporters uses the ‘energy weapon’ as a foreign policy tool in relations with the 
EU. To answer the research question it is important to look at the problem in a more 
balanced way, by taking into consideration the context of securitisation processes and its 
interpretation by the securitising actors, including use of symbolic attributes. This thesis is 
grounded in the assumptions of CSS to provide an in-depth overview of the problem.   
The Copenhagen School explains security as a speech act: an issue becomes a threat 
then it is presented as such. Buzan et al. (1998: 28) argue that in principle any actor has an 
ability ‘to talk’ security. This understanding of security has been developed further by other 
theorists, including Balzacq (2005; 2011), and McDonald (2008). Balzacq (2011) argues that 
the securitisation process consists of two levels: level of agent and level of act. Balzacq 
(2005: 178) argues that for the speech act to be successful, it should include a securitising 
actor, whose authority is recognized by the audience; the audience; and the speech act itself. 
The success of the act depends both on the language and the context, and cannot be 
reduced to the purely linguistic act. The securitising actor often applies political and symbolic 
tools. These symbolic attributes could be defined as “built-in policy instruments that tell the 
population what the securitising actor is thinking and what collective perception of the 
problems is” (Balzacq, 2011: 17). Williams writes that “the ability to ‘speak security’ 
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effectively involves the ability to mobilize specific forms of symbolic power within the 
specific institutional fields in which it operates” (Williams, 2007: 66). Symbolic power may 
imply either the use of widely accepted knowledge or “the occupation of a socially 
recognized position of symbolic power from which it can be spoken” (Williams, 2007: 66). In 
other words symbolic power often is based or grounded in identities of the securitising 
actors and the audience. The detailed description of theoretical grounds of this dissertation 
is presented in Chapter 1. Chapters 2 to 5 aimed to de-construct the securitisation process by 
analyzing the level of agent in Russia and the EU, the level of act, the consequences of 
securitisation and potential for de-securitisation. Below are the main findings made in this 
dissertation.  
F indings  
The current state of EU-Russia relations is described by Simonov: “there is no EU-Russia 
energy dialogue, there are two monologues. And neither side is listening to another” 
(Simonov, 2010). Of course, in reality there are both dialogues and monologues at the same 
time. Both the EU and Russia define energy security differently, and construct their energy 
policies according to their priorities in energy sphere. However, the difference in energy 
security of supply and demand is not the only reason of challenging relations. Both Russia 
and the EU are responsible for the securitisation of energy relations for a number of reasons 
(political and economic interest of states, international institutions, and energy companies) 
(see Chapters 2 and 3). Moreover, the symbolic attributes (national identity, collective 
memory) and mutual misperception contributes to the securitisation process.   
There are problems, which lie on the surface:  
The major energy companies, individual member states, and supranational institutions have 
different and often contradictory priorities in developing energy relations with Russia. Not all 
EU member states are equally dependent on Russian energy supply; consequently, individual 
member states have a different vision of policy developments towards Russia. Even states 
which are highly dependent on Russian energy supplies have different approaches towards 
Russia. For example, Germany prefers to deal with Russia on bilateral level. At the same time 
the Baltic States and Poland are rather skeptical of Russian intentions and promote a more 
coherent common European approach towards Russia (among other things because of the 
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energy supply interruptions as a result of price disagreement with Ukraine). Considering the 
limited competence of the EU institutions in energy policy, Russia prefers to secure deals at 
the bilateral level with the individual member states which offer more favourable deals to 
Russia. The situation is complicated further by the fact, that there is no coherent 
international agreement regulating EU-Russia energy relations. In 2009 Russia withdrew from 
the ECT treaty, and EU-Russia energy dialogue mainly focuses on the technical aspects of EU-
Russia energy relations.  
For a long time the EU struggled to develop a coherent and consistent energy policy 
towards external energy suppliers. First attempts to develop the Common European Energy 
Policy were taken in the 1980s, and ever since the EU member states have been slowly 
moving towards the liberalization of electricity and natural gas markets. However, the 
majority of these measures are directed towards strengthening internal market (greater 
integration internally; greater liberalization internally; greater external security of supply; 
greater access to clean energy). The most recent changes to the European legislation are 
known as the Third Energy Package, which is mainly aimed at the integration of the internal 
energy market, including the separation of energy producers from energy supplying 
companies, increasing energy efficiency. The Third Energy Package declares an intention of 
the EU to develop a single voice of the EU in external energy relations. However, the member 
states still have a lot of freedom in determining their energy policy. Russian energy policy is 
often perceived as a foreign policy tool. 
The analysis conducted for this thesis demonstrated that the factors behind Russian 
energy policy are often caused by domestic factors, rather than foreign policy aspirations 
(see Chapter 3 for more details). Ever since Putin came to power, the Russian government 
saw Russian energy potential as a way to reconstruct the Russian economy. To achieve these 
aims, Russia increased governmental control over the energy producing sector, the access of 
private investors (both Russian and foreign) is limited. Russia also quite assertively tries to 
keep control over the European market and the transportation networks. The consequences 
of this policy are controversial: in the short term, Russia has achieved high levels of economic 
growth, and managed to pay off a big share of its foreign debt. However, this growth has 
been achieved not through the wide-spread investment into production of goods and 
services in Russia, but through energy sales (mainly to the European market). The oil and gas 
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supplies constitute around 65 per cent of Russian exports. The dual pricing policy with 
different tariffs for domestic and external consumers for natural gas adds the pressure on the 
production of natural gas (see Chapter 2). Gazprom is in desperate need of investment for 
development of infrastructure and new gas fields. Overall, in the short term the 
securitisation of energy sector brought positive results from a Russian point of view, but in 
the long term such a policy creates a number of vulnerabilities for the Russian energy sector, 
and consequently Russian economy as a whole. Russian energy production is vulnerable to 
fluctuations of energy prices, to the ability to keep up with the current levels of supplies, 
because of the decline in production of the existing energy fields, and to the further 
diversification of the European energy imports, which would cost Russia a share on the 
European market. Russia is also vulnerable as a state because the state has structured itself 
to be as highly dependent and as closely interlinked to energy businesses as it is today. 
However, the securitisation process in Russia and the EU is not caused only by the surface 
factors, but also influenced by some non-tangible issues, such as identity, values and 
interests of securitising actors. These factors are described further in this chapter. 
Going deeper:  
The construction of securitisation is a complex process. The definition of securitisation 
applied in this thesis argues that the securitisation process consists of the two levels: the 
level of agent and the level of act. An issue could be presented as a threat by a securitisation 
actor by negotiating the issue to the audience. Not any actor could have an authority to 
present an issue as a threat to the audience. The audience needs to trust the securitising 
actor to accept his/her claims (Balzacq, 2010). For the securitisation process to be successful 
it should be embedded into a specific context shared by the securitising actors and the 
audience. Actors use the symbols rooted in this context to shape public opinion. That is why, 
to understand the roots of securitisation process it is important to study context of 
securitisation in both Russia and the EU. For instance, the national identity influenced the 
development of energy policies of Russia and the individual member states, which as a result 
affected the overall development of EU-Russia energy relations. 
For example, Russian national identity allowed Putin’s government to take quite 
assertive and even bold decisions in domestic and foreign policy, because these actions were 
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supported by the population. National identity in some ways informs the foreign-policy 
construction by shaping “the content of national preference and policy behaviour” (Hadfield, 
2006: 682). As Andrej Tsygankov (2010: 194-195) writes, even though the developments in 
Russian foreign policy in the middle of the 2000s (mainly the change of policy towards the 
former soviet states) have been perceived negatively in the Western Europe and in the 
neighbouring states, the Russian population did support it on the whole. Results of the 
opinion poll conducted in 2007 demonstrated that 61 percent of respondents “evaluated the 
Kremlin’s international actions as well balanced” (Tsygankov, 2010: 194-195). The broader 
historical, political and economic context affects the decision-making process of Russian 
authorities and is used as a tool by the authorities to convince the audience that the 
developments in energy policy are justified. As Chapter 3 demonstrates how the Russian 
government referred to the shared knowledge rooted in Russian national identity to convince 
the audience in the necessity of the consolidation of energy sector under the governmental 
control. The government used the negative attitude of Russian population towards the so-
called oligarchs, who got control of a number of Russian industries by abusing the 
imperfections of the privatization reform.  In the similar logic, the development of Russian 
legislation on strategic industries, which limits the possibility of foreign investors in the 
Russian energy industry, has been supported by the population because of traditional 
skepticism towards the participation of Western capital in the Russian economy (see Chapter 
3). 
National identity plays an important role in the development of the energy policy in 
the EU as well. The EU struggles to develop a Common European Energy Policy for a number 
of reasons, including the social differences: the EU does not have a single identity, but 
consists of the separate identities of the individual member states. For example, some of the 
Central European states see Russia as a danger to the EU's energy policy. There are a number 
of reasons for such a position, including the energy supply shortfalls in the 1990s and in the 
second half of the 2000s, but they are also affected by the national identity and collective 
memory of these countries. This thesis used the example of Poland: the negative image of 
Russia is rooted in Polish national identity and history. This image has been formed through 
the centuries of military conflicts between Russia and Poland. For a long time Russia had 
been a constant threat to Polish national security. Poland sees itself as a bulwark of Europe, 
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the state which for a long time protected Western Europe from the Russian threat. After 
joining the EU, Warsaw intended to use its knowledge of Russia to shape European policy 
towards Russia. Poland tries to promote a more united policy towards Russia. Poland as well 
as some other Central and Eastern European States argue that “Russia *intends+ to take over 
internal generation facilities and distribution networks in Europe, linking them to the larger 
supply networks, thus dominating a chain that would eventually put Russia in a politically 
advantageous position” (Closson, 2009: 100).  As it has been mentioned above, the EU 
consists of the individual identities of different member states. Polish suggestions are 
clashing with the interests of other European member states, which do not share Polish 
collective memory with regards to Russia, and therefore the Polish vision of the European 
energy policy towards Russia. On the contrary, some of the member states established strong 
bilateral relations with Russia (Germany, France, Italy). Russia responds to the differences 
within the EU by promoting its interests on the bilateral level, and, consequently, 
undermining European attempts for Common European Energy Policy.  
As has been demonstrated above, symbolic power is used by the governments in the 
securitisation process. Aradau writes that securitisation can be successful only if the 
audience can understand and relate to the reasoning for extraordinary actions (Aradau, 
2004: 400). That is why the securitising actors often appeal to shared knowledge for the 
speech act to be successful. This thesis used media analysis of Russian and European media 
as an example of the negotiation process between the securitising actor and the audience. 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed quantitative and qualitative media analysis of the printed 
media in Russia and the UK, and to support the argument the broader analysis of the 
European media frame is conducted to demonstrate how EU-Russia energy relations are 
presented in different EU member states. In the Russian case, the majority of the newspapers 
selected are known for taking a pro-governmental position. British newspapers, at the same 
time are more independent from the state, but they still do have unofficial political 
affiliation. European media sources selected present a variety of political perspectives and 
are aimed at a variety of audiences. The media analysis focused on how the January 2009 
energy crisis caused by the pricing disagreement has been presented to Russian and 
European audiences. Russian printed media created the media frame, which demonstrated 
an internal political struggle within Ukraine as the main reason for the crisis. Russian actions 
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were presented as justified and efficient. The media frame created by European sources 
explains the same events differently. Russian actions are criticized for a violation of contract 
obligations and for the use of a ‘political weapon’ to influence the internal politics of Ukraine. 
At the same time, the urgency and importance of the diversification of energy supplies for 
the EU has been emphasized.  
Both Russian and European media referred to shared knowledge of the audience to 
justify their position. Russian newspapers explained the Russian position by the refusal to 
subsidize the economy of other states at Russian expense. This message relates to the desire 
of the Russian public to see the return of Russia as a strong actor in international relations as 
compared to the weak Russia of the 1990s. European media also connected the European 
position with the everyday practices of the audience and emphasized the vulnerability of the 
energy consumers in Europe to the controversial policy decisions of the energy producers. 
Behnke explains how national identity could be used in security construction:  “states 
constantly produce and reproduce their national identities through discourses of in/security, 
in which the possibility of community and order on the inside is constituted through the 
construction of the outside as different, dangerous and disorderly” (Behnke, 2006: 64). The 
media frames constructed by Russian and European media are examples of the use of the 
‘Other’ in justification of the securitisation of energy trade.  
Consequences of the securitisation process 
The securitisation of energy trade threatens the future development of EU-Russia energy 
dialogue. Both Russia and the EU overlook interests of each other and focus on their own 
priorities in energy relations; at the same time there is no coherent international agreement 
between Russia and the EU, protecting the interests of both energy producers and energy 
consumers. The EU and Russia are highly dependent on each other: Russia for the revenues 
from the European market, and for the impetus for technological innovation which EU 
investment provides, and the EU depends on Russia for around 40 percent of its total energy 
requirements. It is unlikely that both sides would be able to reduce dependence on each 
other in the near future (Proedrou, 2012: 77). Nevertheless, the securitisation of energy 
trade resulted in a lack of trust between Russia and the EU, and both sides are concerned 
with the potential diversification strategies rather than on strengthening and harmonizing 
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existing relations. The EU tries to bring new energy suppliers to the European market (for 
example, Central Asian and Caspian states). However, the situation around the NABUCCO 
pipeline (described in Chapter 5) proves that it is difficult to diversify gas supply. At the same 
time, Russia wishes to diversify its exports and to enter the Chinese market. However, 
despite the long-lasting negotiations with China, Moscow and Beijing are failing to reach an 
agreement with regards to price. 
Possible solutions  
In a doctoral thesis, it is perhaps risky to anticipate the future, and the main claims to the 
originality lie in the analysis and the range of sources used. But the policy analysis here 
logically suggests (although they do not formally entail) the discussion about policy options 
and de-securitisation which the previous chapter includes. Although tentative, these are the 
valid parts of the conclusions. De-securitisation should be the first step towards 
normalisation of energy trade. Chapter 5 of this thesis suggested three levels of de-
securitisation: the Russian level, the European level, and mutual effort at the international 
level (p. 202-208). The liberalization of the Russian energy sector may ensure Russian energy 
security in the long-term, by providing additional financial support for the development of 
infrastructure and so needed investment in new oil and gas fields. At the same time the 
greater openness of the Russian energy industry to foreign investors may improve the 
Russian image in the EU. If the EU member states would see Russia more as a partner rather 
than a potential danger, it may reduce securitisation from the European side. From the other 
side, if the EU would consider “relaxing the market and competition principle *it+ may be a 
way ahead in order to deal with Russia more effectively” (Aalto, 2009: 177). On the 
international level, both Russia and the EU need to focus on the development of a coherent 
international agreement, which would consider both the interests of energy consumers and 
energy producers. Continuing negotiation of the ECT might be a way ahead. 
Limits of research and potential for future studies  
EU-Russia energy relations are developing, and the conclusions made in this thesis are based 
on the research conducted up to July 2012, and might need updating in the future as a result 
of new energy policy developments. This thesis claims that the securitisation of energy trade 
between Russia and the EU is a relatively recent phenomenon (started in the early 2000s). It 
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would be useful to look at how this process would develop over the longer period of time.  
There are some other limits of this research which could be addressed in future work. The 
subject of EU-Russia energy relations is very broad and this study could not cover all the 
aspects of it. For instance, the complexity of the EU structure and the different priorities of 
the individual member states in energy security have been considered in this research by 
looking at the interconnection of the energy policies of different member states and the 
energy strategy of the EU as a whole. However, the case studies of only two member states 
(Germany and Poland) have been studied in detail, due to the practical limitations, such as 
time, access to information and financial resources. Perhaps future work could analyze the 
energy policies of a bigger number of the individual member states. Furthermore, the 
discussion on de-securitisation creates a potential for further studies as well. One of the 
possible ways to enforce the de-securitisation of EU-Russia energy relations, which could be 
addressed in future studies, is to analyse the potential benefits of EU-Russia cooperation on 
energy efficiency as a way to decrease securitisation.  Some of the limitations in data 
collection should also be acknowledged. In particular, the interviews with top officials and 
businessmen directly involved in energy trade and energy policy development in both Russia 
and the EU provided valuable and original information. However, due to the sensitive nature 
of energy security, some of the potential interviewees preferred not to participate in this 
research.  
While reflecting on the research process, it is important to mention reflexivity and the 
positionality of the researcher, and the influence of personal values on the interpretation of 
research findings. It is impossible to be completely objective for the researcher who is 
engaged with academic inquiry. The post-positivist approach acknowledges the importance 
of researcher’s values for shaping research practice and design. Etherington defines 
reflexivity as “the capacity of the researcher to acknowledge how their own expenses and 
contexts (which might be fluid and changing) inform the process and outcomes of inquiry” 
(Etherington, 2004: 31).  Lynch writes about the importance of positionality the following 
terms: 
“whether acknowledged or not, the questions asked, the methods followed, and 
generally the way the questions and methods shape the research findings. This 
intentionality and ethical stance cannot be separated from the research procedures or 
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results” (Lynch, 2008: 711).  
 That is why it is important to reflect on the effects of my personal values on the 
research process. My own beliefs and values affected the research process. Recognising this 
is an essential part of the critique in ‘critical theory, not merely an appendage to it. It was 
important for me to present an in-depth analysis of domestic political and economic 
developments in Russia, which inform construction of Russian external energy policy, and 
contrast this with the explanations of EU-Russia energy relations based on the interests of 
the consumer (the position dominating in the European literature). This allowed me to 
present a distinctive overview of EU-Russia energy relations, and to explain the roots of the 
securitisation process. My personal history also affected the planning of my field work in 
Russia; it was possible to find interviews in the Altai Territory, because of my personal 
connections to the region. It is also important to mention, that initial personal assumptions 
on the EU-Russia energy relations evolved during the reseach project. Giddens writes that 
“reflexivity means world of self-monitoring” (Giddens, 1990:133). The analysis of Western 
literature on the subject as well as interviews conducted in Belgium and Germany allowed 
me to look at Russian policy more critically, and address its weaknesses in Chapters 2 and 5.  
Originality  
It is important to summarize the exact claims to originality made in this thesis: 
1. EU-Russia energy relations are discussed at length in the academic literature. This 
thesis is distinctive, because it provides a balanced overview of the subject by taking 
into consideration both Russian and EU perspectives, as compared to the existing 
literature, which usually presents either a pro-Russian or pro-EU perspective, 
depending on the background of the author (p. 19-26).  
2. The thesis is original in the choice of theory. The research is grounded in the 
distinctive interpretation of the securitisation theory, which is based on the critique 
of the Copenhagen School of Thought by such authors as Balzacq. This theoretical 
approach has never been applied to this problem before, and it allows us to open the 
subject from a new angle, by taking into consideration the combination of political, 
economic, and cultural contexts as well as different levels of the securitisation 
process. 
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3. The methods used for collection of data and its interpretation contribute to the 
originality of this thesis. For example, the interviews conducted in the Altai Territory 
provided a significant contribution to the discussion on the diversification of Russian 
energy demand (Chapter 5). The discourses (in Russia) on the potential consequences 
of the construction of a gas pipeline to China have not been discussed in this detail in 
the Western literature before. This discussion provides an invaluable contribution to 
the development of the argument in Chapter 5. Other interviews collected with 
policy-makers, energy companies, experts, and NGOs in Russia, Belgium, and 
Germany also provided significant contribution to the development of the argument. 
The data collected on the price disagreements with Ukraine, the ECT and FDI in the 
Russian energy sector underlined the clash of interests of different actors and 
different interpretation of the historical, political and economic contexts, which 
results in the securitisation of energy trade. The media analysis of Russian, British and 
the European media sources also present original results. Full list of original sources, 
including the interviews could be found in the list of bibliography.  
4. Finally, this dissertation presents an original argument: the problems faced by Russia 
and the EU in energy relations result from the complex and multi-layered 
securitisation process. A number of actors (the governments, international 
institutions, large energy companies) are interested in the securitisation for different 
reasons, which are not necessarily directly connected with the production and 
consumption of hydrocarbons. Moreover, Russia and the EU do not always accurately 
interpret the motives behind the new developments of each other’s’ energy policies, 
and this misperception also contributes to the securitisation process. Besides the 
obvious risks in EU-Russia relations (transit related problems, investment in the 
development of new gas fields). The securitisation process is embedded in and 
shaped by the broader socio-cultural contexts. For instance, Poland traditionally sees 
Russia as a threat to its national security, and since its admission to the EU, Poland 
has promoted a more united policy towards Russia. At the same time, despite the 
common European assumption, Russia does not rely on energy as a foreign policy 
tool. On the contrary, the foreign policy is (to some extent) a tool of Russian energy 
policy, which is seen as a way to reconstruct the Russian economy and to ensure 
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political stability. For the securitisation process to be successful, it should be 
negotiated to the audience. The securitisation process resulted in a lack of trust 
between Russia and EU, and supply/demand diversification. This thesis demonstrates 
that the EU-Russia energy relations would benefit from managed de-securitisation 
and moves towards the international governance of their energy relations (via 
institutions and international agreements).  
There is, as this thesis has noted a number of times, a considerable literature on EU-Russia 
energy relations. However much of that discussion is relatively untheorised, and much of the 
rest is rooted in more biased assumptions about the relationship learning to one side or 
another. The author cannot pretend that she has avoided all bias, but she does argue that a 
more nuanced and carefully sourced analysis grounded in a more sophisticated theoretical 
approach provides an analysis which more compellingly does justify to the complexity and 
dynamism of the EU-Russia energy relationship, and in turn provides more solid grounds for 
thinking about how it might be de-securitised in future.  
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